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Preface 15 
1 PREFACE 
In recent times, the topic of wealth inequality has attracted a lot of media 
attention. In 2011, the two psychologist Michael Norton and Daniel Ariely 
published an article about a survey they conducted (Norton and Ariely 
2011). In this survey, they asked a nationally representative online panel 
of US American citizens about their perception of the actual and about 
their desired level of wealth inequality in the USA. They found firstly, 
that respondents think that wealth is substantially more evenly distribut-
ed in the United States than it actually is. While the respondents ex-
pected the top quintile of the US American wealth distribution to hold 
60 per cent of total net worth, in fact the authors report them to hold 80 
per cent. Secondly, respondents at all income levels said that they would 
prefer wealth to be even more equally distributed than they expected it to 
be. These findings triggered a wide-ranging discussion about the societal 
consequences of high levels of wealth inequality. 
A second study that attracted large media attention, this time especially 
in Europe, was the “Household Finance and Consumption Survey” 
(HFCS). The first wave of the HFCS has been conducted in 2010 and 
2012. In early 2013, the national central banks published first results of 
this survey. These results triggered a wide-ranging discussion on the 
adequateness of rescue packages for the financially troubled Mediterra-
nean countries in the Eurozone area. The German Central Bank (GCB) 
results showed that “the households in bailed-out countries have more 
net assets than those in countries which paid out funds for the rescues” 
(Reuters 2013). Most notably, in Germany, “the bloc’s paymaster” 
(Reuters 2013) households possess less than a third of median net worth 
of those households in Italy or Spain. The GCB names the low home-
ownership rate, low house prices and a high number of single-person 
households in Germany as compared to Italy and Spain as the main 
reason for these differences in levels of private wealth (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2013). 
Only a couple of months ago, the French economist Thomas Piketty 
(2014) published an English version of his book “Capital in the Twenty-
First Century” (the original French version was published in 2013 under 
the title “Le Capital au XXIe siècle”). In this book, the author focuses on 
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wealth and income inequality in Europe and the USA since the 18th 
century. The argumentation of the book is based on the formula r>g, 
derived from economic growth theory, which states that over the long 
run, the rate of return on capital (r) is greater than the rate of economic 
growth (g) meaning that wealth grows faster than economic perfor-
mance, which means that inherited wealth will grow faster than earned 
wealth. Thus, capitalism leads to extreme inequalities in wealth that can 
cause discontent and undermine democratic values, unless these ine-
qualities are offset by political forces. This publication caused a lot of 
critical feedback, regarding Piketty’s theoretical argumentation (e.g. 
Bofinger 2014; Rogoff 2014; Sinn 2014), as well as the database he used 
for his empirical analyses (e.g. by Giles 2014). Due to the large impact of 
this book, I will give a more detailed overview of Piketty’s main argu-
ments and findings, but also on the main points of critique of his work 
here. In my conclusions section, I will then discuss my findings in the 
light of Piketty’s work.  
Piketty’s book is a collection of extremely rich and informative work on 
the role of personal wealth and inheritance for economic inequality. His 
detailed description of the distribution and concentration of wealth starts 
in the eighteenths century covering all continents, with comprehensive 
information for France, UK, USA, Germany, Canada and Sweden. With 
this book, Piketty is continuing the extensive work on the concentration 
of income, which he conducted in the past, documented in a number of 
journal publications (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2003; Atkinson, Piketty, and 
Saez 2009; Atkinson and Piketty 2007; Atkinson and Piketty 2010). In 
“Capital in the Twenty-First Century” Piketty expands his perspective to 
a much broader topic: an analysis of capitalism.  
The book consists of four parts, divided into 16 chapters. The first part 
(“Income and Capital”) lays the foundation for the following parts and 
consists mainly of basic ideas, among them definitions and important 
relationships, which are repeatedly used throughout the book. The sec-
ond part (“The Dynamics of the Capital/Income Ratio”) focuses on the 
long-run evolution of the capital-income ratio as well as the functional 
distribution of national income, differentiating between labor income 
and capital income. The third part (“The Structure of Inequality”) is an 
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analysis of inequality and distribution of wages, property income and 
wealth at the individual level. Moreover, Piketty describes the historical 
dynamics in inequalities in income and wealth. This part finishes with 
prospects for the global distribution of wealth. Finally, in the fourth part 
(“Regulating Capital in the Twenty-First Century”), Piketty derives nor-
mative lessons and policy implications from the findings of his book.  
The main objective of Piketty, though not stated by himself, “is nothing 
less than a unification of growth theory with the theories of functional 
and personal income distributions, and thus a comprehensive descrip-
tion of capitalist economy” (Milanovic 2014: 520). The similarity of Piket-
ty’s book to the work of Marx is not by chance. In the tradition of the 
classics of economics like Marx, Malthus or Ricardo, Piketty develops a 
model of the capitalist economy which he then uses to describe and 
explain the past and present and, most importantly, to predict the future. 
Piketty’s model comprises one definitional relationship, two fundamen-
tal economic laws of capitalism (termed so by Piketty himself), and one 
inequality relationship (cf. Milanovic 2014).  
The definitional relationship links the stock of capital (K) (or wealth) to 
the flow of income (Y): K/Y=β. The ratio between K and Y is termed β 
(Piketty 2014: 50f.). Based on historical data from France, the United 
States and the United Kingdom, Piketty states that β until today has 
followed a U-shaped pattern (Piketty 2014: chapter 3; Milanovic 2014). 
While it was on a very high level before the First World War, it decreased 
throughout the First and Second World War for about 50 years and is 
increasing again for the last 30 years, with a level coming close to the 
one before the First World War. Piketty goes on to claim that the U-
shaped pattern of β is a process all advanced capitalist economies go 
through. This finding becomes even more significant when β is linked 
to Piketty’s first economic law of capitalism and his inequality relation-
ship.  
The first fundamental law of capitalism states that the share of capital 
incomes in total national income (α) is equal to the real rate of return on 
capital (r) multiplied by β (Piketty 2014: 52f.): α=rXβ. This relates to 
Piketty’s inequality relationship (“the fundamental force for divergence”, 
Piketty 2014: 25), stating that the return on capital (r) remains perma-
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nently above the rate of growth of the economy (g): r>g. This relationship 
he derives from historical data. Although, he is aware of the fact that the 
force for “divergence is not perpetual and is only one of several possible 
future directions for the distribution of wealth” (Piketty 2014), this ine-
quality relationship is the lynchpin of Piketty’s model of capitalist econ-
omy. At the same time, it is the most controversial one. Applying this 
relationship, α increases by definition. In combination with the increas-
ing β, the share of capital income in national income is moving towards 
one (Milanovic 2014). This is a self-reinforcing process. If α increases, 
capital owners become richer and, assuming that they do not directly 
consume their capital gains, they have more capital for reinvestments, 
which in turn leads to a further increase in r over g and thus leads to a 
further increase in β (cf. Milanovic 2014: 522). If we accept it as a fact 
that β is rising in advanced capitalist economies, and if we accept Piket-
ty’s laws and definitional relationships, then in the future, the distribu-
tion of national income will change in favor of capital income and the 
personal income distribution will become even more unequal.  
The second fundamental law of capitalism refers to the long-run deter-
mination of the capital/income ratio β and is derived from basic growth 
theory. It claims that β in the steady state is equal to the savings rate (s) 
divided by the rate of growth of the economy (g): β=s/g (Piketty 2014: 
166). This means that if a country saves a lot but grows slowly (as can be 
observed in advanced capitalist economies), it will accumulate a huge 
stock of capital in disfavor of labor income in the long run, which in turn 
will result in ever increasing inequalities in both, income and wealth. 
Due to Piketty’s understanding, modern capitalist societies are thus 
inevitably moving towards increasing wealth inequality.  
In his last chapter, Piketty gives a number of suggestions to dam up the 
wealth inequality run based on the inequality relationship r>g. He 
claims, that the only way to reverse this relationship – under the as-
sumption that g is exogenously given – is to reduce r (cf. Milanovic 2014: 
532). Most controversially discussed, Piketty suggests a global wealth tax 
(combined with an increase in income tax progressivity and estate taxa-
tion), being aware of the fact that this is a utopian idea. If a subset of all 
countries introduces such a tax, the outflow of capital to other countries 
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is the logical consequence. Thus, it will only work through international 
collaboration, which is very unlikely, as long as there exists a meaningful 
number of countries profiting from the “opacity of financial transac-
tions” (Milanovic 2014: 532). In addition to this, emerging market econ-
omies will be very unlikely to implement such a wealth tax. Milanovic 
(2014) however claims that Piketty’s suggestion is not completely utopi-
an. He states, for example, that in most countries, the introduction of a 
wealth tax would be rather easy in technical terms, as housing wealth 
but also inheritances are already taxed in a reasonable number of coun-
tries for quite some time. An expansion to the other forms of capital 
should therefore not be too difficult, as the market value of most capital 
forms is easy to ascertain and the owner is easy to identify (Milanovic 
2014: 532).  
Piketty’s book caused many controversial discussions. Most of the cri-
tique he received for his inequality relationship r>g. Piketty’s whole 
model depends on the validity of this argument. Based on his historical 
data, Piketty claims that r has been mostly stable during the last two 
centuries, although the K/Y ratio was not (Milanovic 2014: 525). Two 
major points of critique have been raised here. The first claims that 
Piketty’s inequality relationship is actually not supported by the data. 
The second claims that the inequality relationship is running against the 
fundamental laws of economic theory. 
As to the first point of critique, Milanovic (2014: 527) optimistically un-
derstands the inequality relationship, which is dependent on the stability 
of r in times of capital deepening, “as an empirical proposition whose 
accurateness will be confirmed or not by future developments”. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) are much more critical claiming that the 
assumption that the level of inequality is actually linked to r and g is not 
clearly supported by the data. Using cross-country panel data, Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2014) cannot find evidence for a significant relationship 
between r and g on the one hand and the level of inequality on the other 
hand.  
Regarding the second point of critique, Milanovic (2014: 526) claims that 
Piketty’s inequality relationship, though the empirical evidence he pro-
vides as well as his argumentation are persuasive – might oppose one of 
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the fundamental laws of economics, namely the law of decreasing re-
turns to an abundant factor of production (i.e. the law of diminishing 
returns). The inequality relationship strongly depends on the relative 
stability of the rate of return on capital in the face of capital deepening. If 
for some reason r equals g, then Piketty’s whole model would fail. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2014) claim that there exist a number of cases, 
where the capital interest rate needs not exceed the growth rate. These 
are economies with an exogenous saving rate, with overlapping genera-
tions, or with incomplete markets. Only in economically efficient econ-
omies will r exceed g, which is however a question to be answered em-
pirically. Davies (2015: 158) joins the critique about the inequality rela-
tionship, blaming Piketty for not taking into account countervailing 
factors to the inequality relationship. He strongly advices taking into 
consideration the micro foundations of wealth inequality. As an exam-
ple, he mentions that generous public pensions, health insurance, as 
well as other state benefits might have reduced the need for private sav-
ing for a large share of the population, contributing to both the decline 
in wealth inequality in the 1970s and its rise thereafter. The recently 
growing importance of private provision shall increase private savings 
especially in parts of the population who have not saved before and 
might in turn “act as a brake on rising wealth inequality”. 
Related to this critique, Krusell and Smith (2014: 3) criticize Piketty’s 
second fundamental law of capitalism. They state that Piketty’s formula 
– β=s/g – is not consistent with the textbook model of growth theory 
where β=s/(g+δ), with δ being the rate at which capital depreciates. Ap-
plying the latter formula, if growth decreases, the capital output ratio 
would increase, but not substantially; and, when growth falls to zero, β 
would not become infinite (mathematically) or 100% (economically) 
(Krusell and Smith 2014: 3). In Piketty’s version of the formula, they 
demonstrate that if growth approaches zero, then the aggregate saving 
rate shall be 100% of GDP each year, which is highly implausible. The 
authors go on to compare Piketty’s model to a standard, alternative theo-
ry – the optimal saving theory. Applying aggregate data from the US, 
they find the data to disagree with Piketty’s assumption, much more 
supporting the optimal saving theory. Krusell and Smith (2014: 2) close 
with suggesting that future developments of other determinants of 
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wealth inequality, like educational institutions, skill-biased technical 
change, globalization, and changes in the structure of capital markets, 
might be much more fundamental for a change in wealth inequality. An 
argument similar to the one of Davies, mentioned above.  
Although Piketty’s book is very much related to the topic of my thesis, 
there are some important differences, which I like to highlight here. 
Firstly, our research aims are completely different. While Piketty is in-
terested in an analysis of capitalism, formulating general laws to diag-
nose and predict levels of wealth inequality, my interest is much more of 
a descriptive nature. My main research motivation is to find theoretical 
support and empirical evidence for the establishment of wealth as a 
distinct dimension of social stratification. This I will do through describ-
ing and analyzing the determinants, dimensions and consequences of 
wealth (inequality) and differentiating them from those of income. Sec-
ondly, while Piketty’s work is a historical study, my work is a pure con-
temporary study of the current distribution of wealth. The third differ-
ence refers to the data we use. While Piketty makes use of fiscal data, I 
use survey data. Related to this is the fourth difference, our understand-
ing of wealth inequality. Piketty argues that the best way to understand 
wealth inequality is to look at the concentration of wealth, focusing on 
(the top) wealth shares. He even goes as far as to explicitly condemn the 
use of the Gini coefficient, which due to Piketty gives an abstract and 
sterile view of inequality and has no intuitive meaning. Although fiscal 
data has some undeniable advantages, but also disadvantages, as com-
pared to survey data, I agree with Milanovic (2014), that abandoning the 
use of survey data and the use of the Gini coefficient is not a good solu-
tion and can lead to misleading results. A sole focus on the top wealth 
distribution does completely ignore the middle and the bottom of the 
distribution and is thus not well-suited for understanding the nature of 
inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2014). This is demonstrated by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2014). By comparing two countries, which 
show similar concentrations of wealth (referring to the top 1% of the 
wealth distribution), but differ a lot in their institutional frameworks and 
historical backgrounds, namely Sweden and South Africa, they show 
that the distributions of wealth in these countries differ a lot as well. In 
my study, I solely focus on survey data, which can be explained by my 
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specific research interest. In contrast to Piketty, I am interested in the 
whole distribution of wealth. Trying to understand the nature of wealth 
inequality, it is essential for me to understand what happens at the bot-
tom, the middle and the top of the wealth distribution. Fiscal data is by 
definition filed by a selective share of the population: those who pay 
taxes. Moreover, those who pay taxes might have a strong incentive to 
underreport their assets. Finally, taxes are not paid by individuals, but by 
fiscal units, who might change with changing laws of taxation (cf. 
Milanovic 2014). In the light of these problems, I opted to work with 
survey data as a more appropriate data source for my certain research 
interest. 
Finally, as a sociologist, I have a “natural” interest in the role of institu-
tions. Responding to the critique of Davies (2015) and Krusell and Smith 
(2014), as explained above, but also Acemoglu and Robinson (2014), 
blaming Piketty for his ignorance of institutions, in my thesis, I discuss 
and analyze the role of institutions for the evolvement of inequalities in 
wealth, most explicitly so in chapter 5. Considering the role of institu-
tions, I am also referring to Myles and Myers (2007) who claim that a 
major strength of the sociologist perspective for the analysis and under-
standing of social inequality, compared to the economic one is the con-
sideration of the role of organizations and institutions.  
Besides the public attention of the wealth topic these three studies at-
tracted, at the same time, they clearly indicate to the need for substantial 
wealth research. Many basic questions are still unresolved. For example, 
it is still not clear how wealth is distributed across countries and in how 
far this distribution resembles the distribution of income. Further, there 
is very little information on the composition of wealth, the meaning of 
wealth inequality in terms of social inequality, as well as the determi-
nants and the consequences of wealth. With the present thesis, I aim
to provide an answer to at least some of these questions.  
1.1 MOTIVATION 
Social stratification research until now has had an almost exclusive focus 
on inequalities solely deriving from the labor market, especially occupa-
tional status and income. These measures, however, represent only one 
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dimension of individuals’ socioeconomic position (Spilerman 2000). 
They are essential mainly for the working population, and may therefore 
paint a one-sided or even inaccurate picture of social stratification and 
social inequality. The central role of wealth (understood as the value of 
nonhuman assets net of debts) in the process of social stratification has 
been largely neglected by sociological research in the past decades, 
which is a serious pitfall. As compared to income, wealth shares im-
portant characteristics, making it a more comprehensive measure of 
economic well-being. Income – as a cash-flow – is restricted to a certain 
point in time or minor time interval. In addition, income is generally 
restricted to times of labor market activity. Wealth – as a stock figure – is 
accumulated throughout the whole life-course. While income thus re-
flects an entity's short-term consumption level, wealth is better able to 
capture its long-term consumption potential, which is “the capacity [...] 
to maintain a particular standard of living” (Spilerman 2000: 497). In 
contrast to earned income that demands investment of time, effort, and 
working ability from individuals, wealth offers access to capital and 
goods independently of individual investments and abilities (Elmelech 
2008). This has also implications for the understanding of poverty: while 
income poverty may often only last for shorter periods of time in a job 
career, poverty in wealth tends to be a long-term state in the life course 
(Elmelech 2008). In addition, wealth can be transferred across genera-
tions, which can result in a perpetuation of wealth inequalities. Studying 
the distribution of wealth, as well as its sources, determinants and con-
sequences is thus significant for an understanding of social stratifica-
tion. 
Despite the relevance of wealth for the process of social stratification, 
both, theoretical and empirical wealth research has almost exclusively 
been conducted in the field of economics for a very long time (e.g. 
Atkinson 1971; Davies and Shorrocks 2000; Gale and Scholz 1994; Lydall 
and Lansing 1959; Wolff 1996). The same, however, holds true for the 
broader issue of explaining economic inequality (i.e. the basic sociologi-
cal question of “Who gets what and why?”) (Myles and Myers 2007). 
Sociologist have remained almost silent on this issue in the last decades, 
being preoccupied with the question of “What determines individual 
attainment?” (Kenworthy 2007). This is very unfortunate, as sociology 
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can make important contributions to the study of wealth and economic 
inequality. Among the generic contributions sociology can make to  the 
explanation of cross-national differences in household or family wealth1 
are the role of family dynamics and family demographics; the role of 
power; and the role of organizations and institutions (cf. Myles and 
Myers 2007: 581).  
Very recently though, also sociology has become interested in studying 
wealth (e.g. Elmelech 2008; Keister and Moeller 2000; Kurz and 
Blossfeld 2004; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2011; Spilerman 2000; 
Torche and Costa-Ribeiro 2012). So far, sociologists agree that wealth 
has to be treated as an additional dimension of economic well-being and 
socio-economic status, as income and wealth show only weak correla-
tions (Keister and Moeller 2000; Spilerman 2000). Consequently, socio-
logical scholars argue that neglecting wealth in the study of inequality 
would tell only parts of the social stratification story (Keister and Moeller 
2000; Spilerman 2000; Elmelech 2008). The motivation of this thesis is 
to make a sociological contribution to the study of social stratification in 
terms of wealth. 
1.2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In general, my scientific work is based on the principle of methodologi-
cal individualism. Although some chapters convey a strong macro-
sociological perspective (e.g. chapter 5), I always understand social phe-
nomena (e.g. levels of wealth inequality) as resulting from the motiva-
tions and actions of individual agents. I understand the individual ac-
tions and motivations, which result in social phenomena as being 
shaped by social institutions, norms and, structures. This is especially 
reflected in chapters 5 and 6. In these chapters, I analyze the impact of 
different institutional contexts (specifically, differences in public old-age 
pension systems) on the distribution of wealth (chapter 5) as well as the 
relationship between wealth and subjective well-being (chapter 6). My 
                                                          
 
1  Myles and Myers (2007) actually refer to the study of economic inequality in terms of 
income. As an additional dimension of economic standing, alongside income, the 
same however applies to the study of wealth and wealth inequality. 
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theoretical approach is illustrated in Figure 1, which is based on the 
popular ‘Coleman boat’ (Coleman 1990), linking macro states and out-
comes on the societal level with the logic of individual-level action.  
1.3 DATA SOURCE 
In general, there exist two major sources of wealth data: survey data and 
tax data (wealth taxes and estate tax data). Each type shares some ad-
vantages as well as disadvantages. Problems of survey data are sampling- 
and non-sampling-errors. As the distribution of wealth is highly skewed, 
levels of inequality are likely to be underestimated. This issue can be 
solved, however, by oversampling the top wealth deciles, which is done 
by many surveys.   
Figure 1: Methodological individualism based on Coleman (1990) 
Note: Own illustration.   
Typical non-sampling-errors in wealth surveys are item- and unit-
nonresponse as well as mis- and underreporting, which are typical prob-
lems of questions addressing financial aspects. Problems of item-
nonresponse are normally tackled by applying a multiple imputation 
strategy for filling in missing values. Item-nonresponse is most likely to 
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appear for financial assets, and least likely to appear for housing values 
(cf. Davies 2011: 129). To correct for problems of unit-nonresponse, 
many surveys provide weights that correct for the low response rates, 
which are very often observed among the very poor and the very rich. In 
surveys, as compared to tax data, financial wealth has been found to be 
usually underreported, while values for real assets, particularly owner-
occupied housing are normally very well reported.  
In addition to the problems I already described above, the most severe 
problem of official tax statistics data is, that it neither captures foreign 
wealth nor can it fully account for the wealth of large family firms (be-
cause of their entrepreneurial activity, they pay only low taxes) which is 
also likely to result in an underestimation of first, the level of wealth and 
second, the level of wealth inequality. The data I use for my empirical 
analyses is mostly survey data, as will be described in the following. 
Most of the empirical analyses presented in chapters 2-6 are based on 
the “Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)”. The 
SHARE is an international, representative panel study of the population 
aged 50 years and older. It is one of the very few surveys that provide 
detailed and internationally comparable information on the financial 
and housing situation of private households. Respondents are private 
persons aged a minimum of 50 years (targets persons for the first wave 
were individuals born in 1954 or earlier) and their spouses (regardless of 
their age) living in the same household.  
Studying the distribution of wealth within the population segment of 
households that have either already entered retirement or are close to it 
allows me to investigate to what extent individuals have been successful 
in accumulating wealth over their life course. Nevertheless, it is a non-
random fraction of the overall population and does thus not allow me to 
draw conclusions on the countries’ overall population. For this reason, I 
make use of a second wealth data source in chapters 2 and 5. I derive 
aggregate-level data on the levels of private wealth and wealth inequality 
from the “Global Wealth Databooks” (GWD) published by the Credit 
Suisse Research Institute (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). With these data 
books, the Credit Suisse Research Institute aims to provide the best 
available estimates of private wealth holdings for the world’s 216 coun-
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tries for the period since the year 2000. The wealth data presented in the 
GWD is derived from a variety of different sources, among them house-
hold balance sheet (HBS) data2, survey data and “Rich Lists” (to derive 
an oversampling of the upper wealth tail). Unlike SHARE, the unit of 
analysis in the GWD is individuals, not households. The wealth 
measures of the GWD refer to individuals aged 20 or above. The usage 
of different data sources enhances the reliability of my results. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
The main research objective of the present thesis is to contribute to a 
broader understanding of social inequality by going beyond inequalities 
solely derived from the labor market and find theoretical support and 
empirical evidence for the establishment of wealth as a distinct dimen-
sion of social stratification and, more importantly, of social inequality. 
With social stratification, I am referring to the relative social position of 
individuals in a given social group, or other social unit. Social stratifica-
tion becomes social inequality if access to these positions is unequal and 
if these positions are systematically related to advantageous or disadvan-
tageous conditions of acting and living (Solga, Berger, and Powell 2009: 
15). In the course of my thesis, I will show that both these conditions 
apply to wealth: first, access is unequal and second, being of higher 
(lower) wealth is related to advantageous (disadvantageous) conditions of 
living. 
My thesis consists of five empirical studies that are knotted together by 
the common conception of wealth as a distinct dimension of social ine-
quality. In order to find empirical support for this argument, in each 
study, I will approach the topic of wealth, or wealth inequality, from 
different perspectives. All studies represent theory-driven empirical 
analysis and are designed as international comparative studies. Each 
chapter contains specific information about the state of research, a theo-
retical framework, detailed information about the applied datasets as 
                                                          
 
2  HBS data is usually a combination of survey and other data (Credit Suisse Research 
Institute 2010: 7). 
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well as information about its contribution to social stratification re-
search.  
By describing and comparing country patterns of income inequality to 
those of wealth inequality, chapter 2 sets the scene for the following 
chapters. In a first step, I formulate theoretical arguments, why wealth 
has to be treated as a distinct dimension of social stratification alongside 
income, and, as a distinct dimension of social inequality. In this context, 
I also present a detailed definition of wealth by differentiating it from 
income. In the empirical part of this chapter, I describe national distri-
butions of wealth and compare national patterns of wealth inequality to 
those of income inequality in 17 European countries and Israel.  
Important for the analysis of social inequality in terms of wealth, howev-
er, is not only the distribution of wealth, but also the composition of 
wealth, as different types of assets are not only related to different ad-
vantages and disadvantages in terms of consequences of wealth, but can 
also inform about different sources of wealth (cf. Elmelech 2008: 60). 
The composition of wealth – with a particular focus on the distribution 
of owner-occupied housing as the quantitatively most important compo-
nent of household wealth in most countries – I analyze in chapter 3. In 
this chapter, I also take a closer look at the income-wealth relationship, 
and I perform a decomposition analysis, in order to establish whether 
each particular wealth component has an equalizing or disequalizing 
effect on overall levels of wealth inequality. 
If wealth is a distinct dimension of social inequality alongside income, 
this means that wealth not only has different characteristics than in-
come, but also that wealth – and wealth inequality – and income – and 
income inequality – can differ in their sources (life-cycle wealth vs. 
transferred wealth) and determinants (e.g. education or ethnic origin), as 
well as in their consequences (e.g. differences in educational attainment, 
in health or in subjective well-being) (see also Figure 2). 
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 Figure 2: Structural levels of social inequality  
Note: Own illustration based on Solga et al. (2009:17). 
Chapters 4-6 are dedicated to the determinants and consequences of 
wealth. Restricted to the data available today, I can unfortunately not 
empirically analyze the sources of wealth. 
Chapter 4 focusses on owner-occupied housing, as the quantitatively 
most important component of household wealth in most countries. It 
sets the focus on micro-level determinants of wealth and wealth inequal-
ity. Moreover, it understands housing inequality as a two-dimensional 
phenomenon and explores the relationship between these two dimen-
sions of housing inequality, homeownership rates and housing values. 
Doing this, it, however, also considers a macro-level determinant of 
wealth. In my empirical analyses, I study homeownership rates and 
housing values across 13 European countries.  
Chapter 5 addresses the macro-level determinants of wealth. This chap-
ter studies international differences in public pension systems as a de-
terminant of international differences in, firstly, levels of wealth and, 
secondly, levels of wealth inequality. These relationships are studied 
across the 34 OECD and 6 non-OECD countries. 
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Finally, chapter 6 examines the consequences of wealth by analyzing how 
an individual’s position in the distribution of wealth influences his or 
her subjective well-being (SWB). This relationship is studied across 
three countries (Germany, Israel and Sweden); representing three dif-
ferent types of welfare state in order to additionally consider the possibil-
ity that macro-level factors might shape the influence of wealth on SWB. 
Just as chapter 4, it thus integrates the societal micro- and macro-levels. 
In the Conclusion, I summarize and discuss the main findings of this 
thesis. By formulating intriguing questions that arise from my analyses, 
it provides an outlook on the potential for future research on wealth as a 
distinctive dimension of social inequality.   
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2 SETTING THE SCENE: PATTERNS OF INCOME AND WEALTH  
INEQUALITY 
A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology (Skopek, Buchholz, and Blossfeld 2014). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Describing social inequalities, explaining how they come into being, and 
elaborating their impact on individual life chances, class identification, 
and political behavior has been at the core of sociology since its very 
inception. International comparative research on social inequality has 
shown that modern societies exhibit very different and distinct patterns 
of inequality, and that its level and persistence depend strongly on na-
tional institutional settings. The work of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) 
has had a particularly strong influence on today’s understanding of how 
specific national institutions – above all, the level of public commitment 
to equal opportunities through elaborated welfare arrangements and 
concepts of social solidarity – shape social inequality structures. In this 
respect, past research (Buchholz et al. 2008; Brady 2005) has shown that 
the so-called social democratic welfare regime of Scandinavia seems to 
be especially effective in reducing social inequalities by prioritizing pub-
licly supported (full) employment, high taxation of incomes, and a com-
paratively high level of decommodification3. Most studies within this 
field, however, consider social inequalities fundamentally in terms of 
inequalities deriving from the labor market (especially in terms of in-
come inequality), while neglecting the relevance of wealth in the stratifi-
cation process. The few empirical studies conducted until now which 
have analyzed the relationship between income and wealth were able to 
show that the correlation between the two measures is much weaker 
than one might expect; it has been found to range between 0.3 and 0.5 
(e.g. Keister and Moeller 2000; Wolff 2006). Thus, it can be assumed that 
                                                          
 
3  “De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right and when 
a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 
1990a: 21f.). 
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studies only addressing income are likely to paint a one-sided or even 
inaccurate picture of social inequalities. 
With this introductory chapter, I like to contribute to a broader under-
standing of social inequality by going beyond inequalities solely derived 
from the labor market. More precisely, I will describe and compare na-
tional patterns of income inequality to those of wealth inequality. The 
aim of this chapter is, firstly, to find out how private wealth holdings are 
distributed in different countries and, secondly, to find out if national 
patterns of wealth inequality resemble those of income inequality. This 
chapter shall be understood as a gentle introduction into the topic of 
cross-national wealth studies within the framework of social stratifica-
tion research. The later chapters of this thesis will built upon the de-
scriptive findings presented here.  
For the descriptive analysis presented in this chapter, I will make use of 
a number of different data sources: the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the OECD income data, and the wealth 
data as provided by the Global Wealth Databooks (GWD) (Credit Suisse 
Research Institute 2010; Credit Suisse Research Institute 2011; Credit 
Suisse Research Institute 2012; Credit Suisse Research Institute 2013). I 
will compare income and wealth holdings across 17 European countries 
and one country from the Middle East (Israel).  
2.2 THE LONGTIME DISREGARD OF WEALTH IN SOCIAL                    
STRATIFICATION RESEARCH 
At the end of the Second World War, the ownership and accumulation 
of wealth was reserved to elite groups in society. Consequently, wealth 
was mainly understood in terms of power, and wealth research was as-
signed to the field of elite sociology (e.g. LeBon 1939; Michels 1925; 
Mosca 1950: cf. Spilerman 2000). Only thereafter, in times of economic 
prosperity and peace in the industrialized countries, wealth has become 
a quantitatively significant economic resource for the population as a 
whole. In the course of economic development, along with increasing 
political stability, a broader group of the population was able to accumu-
late assets. Nevertheless, social stratification research until now has had 
an almost exclusive focus on inequalities deriving from the labor market 
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(occupational status and/or earnings), while neglecting the relevance of 
wealth in the stratification process. This oversight is related to substan-
tive as well as to empirical factors.  
Functionalist theories of social stratification understand societies as 
operating on meritocratic principles, and consider wealth only if it is 
self-generated (life-cycle wealth). Transferred wealth contradicts the 
principles of equal opportunity and merit, and is not taken into account.  
Theories of social class are oriented towards labor market processes, 
with a strong focus on the individual actor. Their main interest is the 
organization of work in modern industrial societies. Accordingly, they 
discuss wealth more or less peripherally. Marx’ concept of class (see for 
example Grusky 2008: 74-90) is derived directly from the individual’s 
position in the production system. Yet, in addition to the two main clas-
ses in capitalism - the proletariat and the bourgeoisie - Marx also men-
tioned the petty bourgeoisie and landowners, whose social position is 
based on their ownership of means of production. Weber’s class concept 
(Weber 1922) takes account of wealth to a great extent. Differentiating 
between class – the economic dimension of social stratification – status 
– the social dimension of social stratification – and party – the political 
dimension of social stratification – Weber has a clear multidimensional 
approach to social stratification. His three dimensions of social stratifica-
tion can be characterized by the interplay among wealth (class), prestige 
(status) and power (party). Further differentiating the economic sphere 
of social stratification, Weber understands the ownership of property 
(wealth) as representing the main difference between classes. He differ-
entiates between the property class – consisting of entrepreneurs (who 
use their wealth in commercial ventures) and rentiers (who profit by 
interest on their property) – and the property-less class; defined by the 
kinds of services they provide in the labor market. The EGP class sche-
ma (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979) as one of the standard 
approaches to classify social class in sociology, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the following excursion, is based on Weber’s class con-
cept, especially on his differentiation between class and status.  
Also in later approaches to social class, such as in the work of Bourdieu 
(1984, 1986), Dahrendorf (1959) and Durkheim ([1984] 2008), the con-
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cept of class is further extended, and wealth is considered more explicit-
ly. Similar to Weber, Durkheim, for example, is differentiating between 
three dimensions of social stratification, referring to them as three types 
of capital, which he understands as accumulated labor (Bourdieu 1986). 
The three types of capital are social capital – similar to Weber’s concept 
of status – economic capital – similar to Weber’s concept of class – and 
cultural capital4, which is not separately explicated in Weber’s class con-
cept. In later works, Bourdieu is referring to a fourth dimension of social 
stratification: symbolic capital. The distributional structure of his origi-
nal three types of capital at any given moment in time Bourdieu under-
stands to represent the “immanent structure of the social world” (cf. 
Bourdieu 1986). Economic capital Bourdieu defines as capital “which is 
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institution-
alized in the forms of property rights” (cf. Bourdieu 1986). Thus, similar 
to Weber, Bourdieu’s definition of the economic sphere of social stratifi-
cation considers both, income and wealth.  
Since the 1980s, theories of social environments (milieus) and lifestyles 
have claimed to offer a holistic approach to the explanation of social life, 
and continue to emphasize the multidimensionality of social inequality. 
These theories deny that one’s occupational position is the single most 
important feature in the definition of social class. Accordingly, they ini-
tiated a change of perspective from the individual actor to the family as 
the most important unit in the process of social stratification. Social 
stratification is no longer understood as a state, but as a process that 
develops over the life course, and is subject to changes. This perspective 
corresponds to the life course paradigm (Kohli 1986; Mayer and Müller 
1986; Elder 1975). As the accumulation of wealth is such a process, un-
folding over the whole life course, it can be best approached by adopting 
a life course perspective. The process of wealth accumulation is strongly 
related to and interdependent on important life course events (e.g. mar-
riage, divorce, childbirth, death of the spouse) and other life course pro-
                                                          
 
4  Goldthorpe (2007) is however strongly criticizing the concept of cultural capital of 
Bourdieu (but also of other scholars) as well as Bourdieu’s theoretical concept of social 
reproduction which, he claims, has a number of inherent weaknesses and, is moreover 
not supported by empirical evidence. 
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cesses (e.g. occupational or family trajectories). Unfortunately, even now 
there is a lack of suitable data to enable an empirical analysis of these 
interdependent processes, trajectories and events, which brings me to 
the empirical reasons for the longtime disregard of wealth in social strat-
ification research. 
The first wealth survey to have been conducted was in the USA in the 
1960s when the already established “Survey of Financial Characteristics 
of Consumers” added a wealth module. A number of similar studies in 
the USA were to follow, but not until 1980; in other industrialized coun-
tries wealth studies such as these were published as late as the 1990s 
and 2000s. Among the most popular wealth surveys nowadays are the 
“Survey of Consumer Finances” and the “Health and Retirement Study” 
(USA); the “Wealth and Asset Survey” and the “English Longitudinal 
Study of Ageing” (UK); the “Socioeconomic Panel Study” (Germany); 
the “Survey of Income and Housing” (Australia); the “Survey of House-
hold Income and Wealth” (Italy) and the “Survey of Household Financ-
es” (Spain). In addition, a number of cross-national wealth surveys have 
started recently, among them the “Luxembourg Wealth Study”, the 
“Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement” and the “Household Finance 
and Consumption Survey”. Nevertheless, many surveys cover only rela-
tively short periods, and only in some years, it will be possible to study 
the accumulation of wealth from a real life course perspective. 
The increasing relevance of wealth in social stratification research is also 
related to some more recent social and political developments. The first 
is population ageing, and the accompanying public pension retirement 
limit set by the modern welfare states, factors that have turned old age 
into a distinct phase of life. This life stage is much less structured by 
labor market activity, while leisure and consumption become increasing-
ly important (Kohli 1988). Thus, as individuals grow older, wealth in-
creasingly determines their economic status, while income becomes less 
meaningful. The second reason for the growing interest of social stratifi-
cation scholars in wealth studies is the increasing importance of private 
provision for old age. As a reaction to population ageing, welfare states 
nowadays reduce public pension benefits and try to set incentives for 
private provision for old age. Responsibility for old-age provision is in-
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creasingly being transferred from the welfare state to the individual 
actor, which makes the accumulation of private wealth an even more 
relevant topic for the individual actors. 
2.3 EXCURSION I: FOUR GENERATIONS OF COMPARATIVE              
STRATIFICATION RESEARCH 
Before I go on with my study of country-patterns of income and wealth 
inequality, I like to include two excursions here. The first one refers to 
my argument that social stratification researchers have mostly ignored 
wealth in recent years. To undermine this assertion, I will give a sum-
mary on developments and advancements of comparative stratification 
research since the 1950s. This excursion is largely based on two publica-
tions – Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) and Ganzeboom, Treiman, and 
Ultee (1991) – which I will enrich with some more recent information. 
In their two consecutive publications, the authors identify four genera-
tions of development in the field of comparative stratification research.  
In their first article from 1991, Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee (1991) 
give an overview of comparative stratification research since the end of 
the Second World War, which was the first time systematic studies be-
gan to appear. Yet, the authors highlight one post-war study – “Social 
and cultural mobility” by Sorokin ([1927] 1959) – to have marked the 
beginning of social stratification research. They identify three genera-
tions of stratification research until the 1990s, each identified through a 
set of core studies showing meaningful differences in five dimensions: 
methods of data collection, measurement procedures, methods of data 
analysis, definition of research problems, and specification of major 
hypotheses. Interestingly, in this article the authors actually claim in the 
very beginning that they cannot take into account the intergenerational 
transfer of material possessions, other than through occupational inher-
itance (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 279), as this topic so far 
has been hardly dealt with in the literature. This means that in the first 
three generations of comparative stratification research, the topic of 
economic inequality, especially referring to wealth inequality, has not 
received a lot of attention, what is however not that surprising, consider-
ing my explanations in the passage above (2.2).  
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Motivated by the study of Glass (1954) for England and Wales – which 
also stimulated the establishment of the Research Committee 28 on 
“Social Stratification and Mobility” of the “International Sociological 
Association” in 1950 – 12 researchers began to periodically collect data 
in a number of different countries (e.g.in Denmark, Japan and the Neth-
erlands). Their aim was to study social stratification and mobility within 
a common framework as well as to create an occupational prestige scale 
in each country to measure international relationships (Ganzeboom, 
Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 279). Among the core studies identifying the 
first generation of comparative social stratification research furthermore 
are the studies of Lipset and Zetterberg (1956), Lipset and Bendix (1959) 
and Miller (1960). The central research problem to be analyzed by first 
generation scholars was the question as to whether societies differ in 
their degree of openness, measured through the rate of intergeneration-
al occupational mobility (Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 123). The main 
conclusion was that mobility rates and patterns are rather similar in 
industrialized countries (Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 123). Methodo-
logically, the first generation scholars were strongly limited, largely due 
to technical restrictions. They mostly applied descriptive analyses of 
inflow and outflow percentages (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 
281). 
Three important innovations mark the beginning of the second genera-
tion of stratification research. This is first, the study of Blau and Duncan 
(1967), who coded occupations in the US into the categories of the US 
Census three-digit occupational classification and thereby set new stand-
ards for data collection (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991). The 
second one is the study by Duncan (1961), introducing a new scale for 
occupational status that can be used with techniques of continuous (de-
pendent variable) data analysis (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 
282). Blau and Duncan's status attainment model (1967) is the third 
innovation. This model, based on the work of Duncan (1966) and 
Duncan and Hodge (1963) introduced the concept of indirect effect 
(path) models into social stratification research (Ganzeboom, Treiman, 
and Ultee 1991: 282). Building on the achievements of these three inno-
vational studies, Treiman (1977) conducted a large-scale comparative 
study in which he developed highly comparable national prestige 
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measures resulting in the Standard International Occupational Prestige 
Scale (SIOPS) (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 283). The main 
research questions marking the second generation of social stratification 
research were: How does the (direct) influence of father's occupation on 
son's occupation compare with that of other background factors, like 
education? To what degree is this effect mediated by the status of the 
son's first job? (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 283). Methodo-
logical advancements of the second generation were the introduction of 
path analysis and structural equation modeling, going along with the 
assessment of and correction for measurement unreliability 
(Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 285). Despite these huge 
achievements of the second generation scholars, Treiman and 
Ganzeboom (2000: 123) note that in the end, “no definitive cross-
national comparison of status attainment was completed.” 
The third generation of comparative stratification research partly over-
lapped in time with the second generation. The studies of Featherman 
and Hauser (1978), Goldthorpe and Llewellyn (1977a, 1977b), 
Goldthorpe, Payne, and Llewellyn (1978), and Goldthorpe (1987) initiat-
ed this generation (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 286). The 
main methodological advancement of the third generation was the in-
troduction of log-linear modeling, replacing multivariate linear regres-
sion models. The research interest turned back to the analysis of occupa-
tional mobility. However, this time the outcome was different and more 
detailed: Although the structure of mobility chances is similar across 
countries in industrial societies, patterns of mobility vary across these 
countries because changes in the occupational structure across genera-
tions occur at different rates across countries (cf. Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1993; Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 124). The program of 
the third generation of comparative stratification research is very well 
reflected in the CASMIN project (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobili-
ty in Industrial Nations), headed by John Goldthorpe and Walter Müller. 
Within this project, a large number of researchers conducted studies on 
occupational mobility in 13 industrial nations in Western and Eastern 
European countries. A major achievement of these researchers was the 
recoding and standardizing of data derived from national mobility sur-
veys (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 287), resulting in the EGP 
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categories (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979), a common cate-
gorization, which allows allocating individuals and families into social 
classes. Until today, the EGP class scheme is accepted as a standard 
classification of occupations. Another achievement of the third genera-
tion of social stratification research is the establishment of multidimen-
sionality and discontinuities in intergenerational occupational mobility 
patterns (Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 287). As to the main 
results of the third generation research, CAMIN researchers found in-
heritance and sectoral effects to dominate hierarchical effects in explain-
ing relative mobility patterns. Moreover, they found relative intergenera-
tional mobility patterns to not vary across countries (cf. Ganzeboom, 
Treiman, and Ultee 1991: 287f.), and social mobility to not increase over 
time. Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee (1991: 289), however, critically 
note that in theoretical terms the third generation of social stratification 
research did not produce much progress. In addition, the field of re-
search questions became narrower. The authors close their 1991 article 
with a description of some recent developments, which might mark the 
transition to a fourth generation of comparative stratification research. 
These are new data collections, event history models, multiple indicator 
and sibling models, multivariate models with categorical variables, an 
increasing interest in women’s role in social stratification and an in-
creasing interest in the consequences of social mobility. 
The 2000 article from Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) is a direct con-
tinuation of their work published nine years earlier. Looking back to the 
1990s, the authors can now in fact identify a fourth generation of com-
parative stratification research. Within this generation, the area of re-
search questions became more diverse again, turning back to the ques-
tion of “how the stratification outcomes of individuals are affected by 
their social environment” (Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 124). Other 
achievements are improved data; improved statistical tools (e.g. mixed 
methods approaches) as well as improved research designs (e.g. multi-
level designs). The fourth generation moreover arrives at a new level of 
comparative research, considering both, considering both, panel and 
cross-sectional studies. In addition, scholars rediscover their interest in 
the effect of institutional arrangements (Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 
126). The authors differentiate between three types of research studies 
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identifying the fourth generation. These are first secondary data analysis 
projects, among them a project on trends in educational transition head-
ed by Yossi Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (see Shavit and Blossfeld 
1993); a project on school-to-work transition headed by Yossi Shavit and 
Walter Müller (see Shavit and Müller 1997); a project on labor market 
institutions and employment outcomes headed by a group larger of 
researchers (see DiPrete et al. 1997) and a project on status attainment 
in comparative perspective headed by Harry Ganzeboom and Donald 
Treimann (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993). Further, there are a number 
of new data collection projects. Here, Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) 
mention a comparative project on class structure and class conscious-
ness by Erik Olin Wright (Wright et al. 1989; Wright 1997); a project 
called “International Survey of Economic Attitudes”, headed by Jonathan 
Kelley (e.g. Evans 1992; Kelley and Evans 1993); and a study on social 
stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 headed by Ivan Szelény and 
Donald Treiman (Szelényi, Wnuk-Lipinski, and Treiman 1995; Szelényi 
and Treiman 1993). Among the developments in research design, 
Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) mention multilevel analytical designs 
(DiPrete and Forristal 1994), and, as they have already observed in 1991, 
event history analysis (e.g. Blossfeld 1989; Huinink et al. 1995; Mayer 
and Tuma 1990). Regarding important statistical developments, the 
mixed methods approach and the increasing consideration of selection 
bias are emphasized (Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 132ff.). The au-
thors furthermore observe an even more increased standardization of 
the measurement of key stratification variables, which, however, re-
mained the same: occupational status or position, and education 
(Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000: 137f.). As already mentioned above, 
Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000: 138) emphasize “major improvements 
in the availability of truly comparable cross-national and cross-temporal 
data”. They finish their article with a retrospection of the new develop-
ments they observed in 1991. While major progress could indeed be 
observed with regard to event history analysis (e.g. Blossfeld and Rohwer 
1995), multiple indicator and sibling models remained in an infant state. 
More attention has in fact been paid to consequences of social mobility 
(e.g. de Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995; Kohn et al. 1990), as well 
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as to the role of women in social stratification (e.g. Rosenfeld and 
Kalleberg 1991; Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund 1995).  
Since the second publication of Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) almost 
15 years have passed. It is, however, far beyond the scope of this thesis to 
provide an informed answer to the question of whether a fifth genera-
tion of comparative stratification has come into being. This might be the 
case or not. If a new generation is in fact evolving, recent research sug-
gests that a stronger focus on economic inequalities would definitely be 
a part of it. This, I claim, can be observed with regard to both, income 
and wealth inequality. An increase in sociological studies on income 
inequality can be observed for quite some time now (Beckfield 2006; Lee, 
Nielsen, and Alderson 2007; Bussmann, de Soysa, and Oneal 2005). This 
might be caused by the finding of increasing income inequality since the 
new millennium (Grusky and Ku 2008). Moreover, as I mentioned al-
ready several times, an increasing interest in the study of wealth inequal-
ity can be observed as well. Important publications I like to mention 
here (again), are Spilerman (2000); Keister and Moeller (2000); Frick and 
Grabka (2009b); Kurz and Blossfeld (2004a); Semyonov and Lewin-
Epstein (2013). From my personal view, time has come for a fifth gener-
ation of social stratification research, which should to go back to one of 
the basic questions of sociology: Who gets what and why? (Myles and 
Myers 2007). Answering this question calls for a stronger focus on in-
come and wealth inequality. We should not leave this field to economists 
alone.  
2.4 EXCURSION II: WEALTH AND THE EGP CLASS SCHEMA 
My second excursion is dedicated to the EGP class schema, named after 
the work of Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979). Although al-
ready developed in the third generation of comparative stratification 
research, the EGP schema is still widely accepted and widely used in 
contemporary social stratification research, whose main research focus 
is still the question of determinants of individual attainment (Kenworthy 
2007). In this section, I pursue two research objectives: Firstly, I will 
describe the EGP class schema. It will become clear that due to the per-
sistent focus of stratification scholars on the EGP class schema, the ig-
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norance of wealth is not surprising. Finally, I will spend some words on 
the consideration of wealth into the EGP class schema. 
In the early 1970s, Goldthorpe developed a sevenfold class schema for 
the “Oxford Social Mobility Study of England and Wales”, based on em-
pirical evidence from UK survey data. This schema forms the basis of 
the more differentiated EGP schema (Scott and Marshall 2009: 290). In 
general, this class schema (but also the EGP schema) differentiates be-
tween three groups of workers: employers or entrepreneurs who buy the 
work of others, employees, who sell their workforce and the group of the 
self-employed. The first two groups are then further differentiated by 
combinations of outcomes on two dimensions. The first dimension 
regards individuals’ sources and levels of income, their degree of eco-
nomic security and their chances of economic advancement. The second 
dimension regards an individual’s work situation, or, more precisely, the 
degree of autonomy in performing their work-tasks and roles. 
In the above-mentioned international CASMIN project, Goldthorpe and 
colleagues further differentiated the sevenfold class schema to make it 
fit to a larger number of countries, leading to the well-known eleven fold 
class schema as illustrated in Table 1. The central component of the 
schema is the “nature” of the employment relationship (Scott and 
Marshall 2009). The basic differentiation between social classes emerges 
between those who are involved in a service relationship with their em-
ployer (the so-called service class or salariat) and those whose employ-
ment relationships are essentially regulated by a labor contract (the so-
called working class) (cf. Scott and Marshall 2009). Compared to the 
working class, the salariat enjoys “incremental advancement, employ-
ment security, and the possibility of exchanging commitment to the job 
against a high level of trust on the part of employers” (Scott and 
Marshall 2009: 292). The working class to the contrary has typically 
closely regulated payment arrangements and their working life is subject 
to routine and greater supervision (Scott and Marshall 2009) (cf. Scott 
and Marshall 2009). 
The EGP class schema is based on Weber’s definition of class. In line 
with conflict theory, the EGP class schema is not a hierarchical schema, 
but a categorical one. The underlying notion is the understanding of 
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class as a result of the economic dimension of social stratification (class, 
operationalized through sources and levels of income, degree of eco-
nomic security and chances of economic advancement) and the social 
dimension of social stratification (status, operationalized through the 
degree of autonomy in performing work-tasks and roles). Hence, the 
EGP class schema is solely derived from occupational position. Income 
plays a secondary role, as it is at least strongly correlated with class; and 
wealth a tertiary role. Both are only considered if they are directly related 
to the individual’s occupational position. 
Table 1: The eleven-fold EGP class schema 
I Higher-grade professionals, administrators, and officials; managers in large 
industrial establishments; large proprietors 
II Lower-grade professionals, administrators, and officials, higher-grade techni-
cians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual 
employees 
IIIa Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce) 
IIIb Routine non-manual employees, lower grade (sales and services) 
IVa Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees 
IVb Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees 
IVc Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in primary production 
V Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers 
VI Skilled manual workers 
VIIa Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.) 
VIIb Agricultural and other workers in primary production 
Note: Own illustration based on Erikson and Goldthorpe (2008: 461).   
Although widely accepted as a kind of a gold standard, the EGP class 
schema also received much critique. Scott and Marshall (2009) name the 
two most-often raised points of critique. The first point of critique states 
that the EGP schema lacks validity, because in research practice, indi-
viduals are allocated to social classes based on their employment status 
and the title of their occupation. This might in fact not capture the char-
acteristics of the employment relationship (the degree of autonomy in 
performing work-tasks and roles) which are central to the EGP concept 
(see for example Evans and Mills 2000; Evans 1992). A second often-
raised point of critique refers to the ignorance of women in the EGP 
class schema. It states that because the categories were developed for an 
analysis of social mobility among men, they are by definition sex-specific 
and not (fully) applicable for the analysis of women’s position in the 
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system of social stratification (Bradley 1995; Skeggs 1997; Skeggs 2004). 
In a very recent article, Savage et al. (2013) formulate three additional 
points of critique. They claim that the EGP class schema is biased to-
wards the middle class in society. As it is based on national representa-
tion surveys (usually with moderate sample size), neither an elite, nor a 
potential “social bottom” can be distinguished. Related to this, Savage et 
al. (2013: 222) further claim that the EGP schema in general lacks “the 
ability to take highly important horizontal cleavages into account”. Ac-
cording to Oesch (2006) these horizontal cleavages have emerged during 
the last 30 years, due to service sector growth, welfare state expansion 
and rising female participation (as an example he mentions the horizon-
tal cleavage between managers and sociocultural professionals).  
The third point of critique is the most relevant one for this thesis. Savage 
et al. (2013) criticize that the EGP class schema is “abstracting class from 
measures of income and wealth in order to derive class from measures 
of employment”. Especially economists have objected that moves be-
tween income groups might be more relevant in terms of social inequal-
ity as compared to moves between occupational groups (Jenkins 2011; 
Blanden and Machin 2008). Thereupon, Erikson and Goldthorpe (2010) 
published a comprehensive defense of their class schema. This could 
however not fully satisfy Savage et al. (2013). Although they see the ad-
vantage of occupational classes to better capture the multidimensionality 
of social inequality as compared to income classes, they state that it is 
likely that income variation within occupations is growing, thus reduc-
ing the capability of the EGP class schema to capture patterns of social 
stratification. If measures of social class remain solely focused on occu-
pational status, they might miss important changes in social inequality. 
Savage et al. (2013) strongly recommend to go beyond measures of oc-
cupational class alone and to include measures of income and wealth. 
To conclude, the EGP schema is largely ignorant of the concepts of in-
come and wealth. In an article from 2012, Goldthorpe adds some further 
arguments to the defense of the EGP schema he published two years 
before (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2010). This article also contains some 
valuable explanations of the reasons, which lead to the putative disinter-
est of sociologist in the study of economic inequality. Moreover, he en-
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courages social stratification researchers to eventually join the economic 
inequality discourse, so far dominated by economists. Firstly, and most 
importantly, Goldthorpe (2012: 204) brings out an important difference 
between the sociological and economic concepts of inequality. Econo-
mists understand social inequality in an attributional sense, i.e. in terms 
of important attributes of individuals – most relevant income, wealth, 
and education – of which they can possess more or less. Sociologists, 
however, see inequalities much more in a relational manner, differenti-
ating between class and status as two different forms of social stratifica-
tion. This means that when sociologists speak of social inequality, they 
are referring to social relationships within which individuals are more or 
less advantaged or disadvantaged. Another important difference between 
social stratification scholars from sociology and economics – directly 
related to these different perceptions of social inequality – are differ-
ences in the periods they typically study. While sociologists have always 
shown an interest towards relatively long-term trends in overall social 
inequality, economists have more and more shifted their attention to 
short-term present day developments of one-dimensional measures of 
social inequality, like income and wealth. This is the reason, why econ-
omists are more actively engaged in the present-day discussions about 
increasing economic inequality, which they very often understand as a 
proxy of social inequality. Having a broader concept of inequality in 
mind, sociologists are more hesitant to announce significant changes in 
both, economic and social inequality. Goldthorpe (2012: 204) defends 
this broader concept by stating that it does “lead to a more comprehen-
sive view of economic inequality than does a focus on income, and espe-
cially on current income, alone”. He undermines this argumentation by 
citing two studies – Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006), Chan and 
Goldthorpe (2007) – that show that individuals in different class posi-
tions do not only differ with regard to their income position, but in at 
least three more income-related aspects: the degree of income security, 
short-term income stability, and longer-term income prospects. The 
multidimensional concept of social inequality differentiating between 
class and status, which goes along with the relational understanding of 
social inequality, he concludes, is distinctive to sociology. Goldthorpe 
(2012: 209) goes on to warn that studies with a one-dimensional under-
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standing of either economic or social inequality, like for example those 
of the OECD, contain a high risk of underestimating the propensities for 
economic immobility. In his own words, “relational inequality is more 
consequential than attributional inequality”. This however, he does not 
understand as an excuse for sociologists’ ignorance in the analysis of 
income and wealth inequality. To the contrary, he invites sociology 
scholars to actively engage in the economic inequality discourse, while 
maintaining the distinctive advantages of the sociological approach and 
using these to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
recent developments in social inequality. 
I agree with the position of Goldthorpe (2012) and with my thesis, I 
hope to provide some reference points for scholars in sociology to enable 
a deeper study of wealth as a multidimensional phenomenon that can be 
analyzed along various lines like levels, inequality, allocation to assets, 
intergenerational dynamics, sources or interactions with institutions 
within a (comparative) social stratification framework. The inclusion of 
wealth, rather than income, is especially promising as both measures 
have explicitly not been under investigation, but income has thus far 
been implicitly included due to its high correlation with occupational 
status. Therefore, there are at least two promising approaches that in-
clude wealth in the analysis of social stratification in the context of the 
EGP class schema. Firstly, wealth (with its multidimensionality) can be 
helpful in identifying social classes and employment statuses. I hypothe-
size the following links between the three groups of workers (employ-
ers/entrepreneurs, employees, self-employed) and wealth: First, the 
different groups of workers shall possess different amounts of wealth. 
Second, these groups shall further differ by the type of assets they hold 
(for a more profound discussion and a descriptive overview of the com-
position of wealth, see chapter 3). Third, welfare state institutions shall 
mediate these differences. Fourth, intergenerational dynamics between 
wealth differ by group of workers and social class.  
Employers or entrepreneurs by definition shall possess a significant 
amount of wealth, either in terms of real assets (e.g. ground, means of 
production), or financial assets (e.g. capital funds), or both. Moreover, 
the self-employed should possess considerable amounts of wealth, re-
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ceiving no or only very restrictive benefits from the social welfare system 
being one important reason. For this group it can be expected to find a 
tendency to hold financial capital, which is easy to liquidize in case of 
expected or unexpected events like unemployment or bad health. Em-
ployers finally shall possess the smallest amounts of wealth as they are 
in most cases well protected by the welfare system (for a more compre-
hensive discussion about the relationship between welfare state institu-
tions and the distribution of wealth, see chapter 5). Sources of wealth 
shall differ in general between groups and specifically differ by the 
amounts inherited. I hypothesize that large inheritances are more likely 
among the group of entrepreneurs, as firm capital is often received 
through inheritances.  
Secondly, wealth is very likely to not solely differ between groups, but 
also within existing definition of classes. These within group differences 
are a very scarcely researched topic, however, might be substantial and 
depending on future empirical and theoretical findings, might require 
either the inclusion of wealth as a distinct third dimension within the 
“old” schema or at least the adjustment of previous class definitions.  
In conclusion, a deeper analysis of wealth and its inclusion as a distinct 
dimension into the EGP class schema would allow sociologists to partic-
ipate to a larger extent in the current economic inequality debate without 
giving up of their comprehensive understanding of social inequality. A 
development of an alternative or enhanced model of social class is how-
ever beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I aim at showing that a 
consideration of wealth in the study of social stratification is necessary, 
as it constitutes a distinct dimension of social inequality. 
2.5 WEALTH AND INCOME – A SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIATION 
While both income and wealth are important features of individual eco-
nomic standing, each has different properties. Income, generally under-
stood to be earned income, is a flow measure that represents a an eco-
nomic entity’s financial situation at a certain point in time, or over a 
minor interval (usually a week, month or year). It can vary considerably 
from one period to the next and is restricted to persons or households 
who actively engage in the labor force (earned income), or who have 
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been engaged in the labor force at some time in the past (transferred 
income). In contrast, wealth is a stock measure, which – originating 
from a certain value – increases by inflows and decreases by outflows. 
Stock measures feature the following distinct characteristics: they repre-
sent the state of a system (and are thus the basis for decision-making); 
they bring inertia, history and memory to the system by accumulating 
events of the past and they allow delays and enable dynamic imbalances 
between inflows and outflows (Forrester 1961; Forrester 1968). In this 
regard, the economic unit of a person or household can be understood 
as a system. Accumulated assets represent the system’s material condi-
tion. Based on these assets, the economic unit will make decisions re-
garding for example, consumption and investment. Since wealth is ac-
cumulated over the whole life course, it brings inertia, history and 
memory to the individuals or households. However, larger short-term 
changes in the stock of wealth are possible, for example through inher-
itances or poor investments. These changes are, however, less likely to 
happen, and often correlate with decisive life events (like the death of 
one’s parents). As such, the stock of wealth accumulated represents 
resources of the individual’s past, present, and future (potential) finan-
cial well-being (Cowell, Karagiannaki, and McKnight 2012). Correspond-
ingly, Spilerman (2000) understands wealth as an individual’s or house-
hold’s consumption potential, or more precisely its capacity to maintain 
a particular standard of living.  
In addition, the process of wealth accumulation is a typical process of 
cumulative advantage (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). Once a certain amount 
of wealth has been accumulated, it will replicate itself through the 
mechanism of compound interest. At the same time, the state of having 
no or only low wealth is likely to be persistent over time. This is one 
important reason why the distribution of wealth is likely to be more 
unequal than the distribution of income. Finally, the functions of wealth 
are much broader than those of income, which can be either saved (or 
invested), or consumed. Frick and Grabka (2009) list seven important 
functions of wealth: income function, utility function, security function, 
power function, social status maintenance function, socialization func-
tion and inheritance function (p. 62). 
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According to Meade (1964, 1975) the wealth (W) of an economic entity 
at a certain time (t) is determined by age and the history (starting with 
birth: k=1) of earnings (E), saving rates (or consumption rates (C) as 
expressed in the formula below), and rates of return (r), plus inheritanc-
es and gifts (I): 
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Total wealth can thus be decomposed into two components: self-
accumulated wealth (life-cycle wealth: Ek-Ck) and transferred wealth (via 
inter vivos transfer or bequests: Ik) (Davies and Shorrocks 2000; Gale 
and Scholz 1994). For the analysis and understanding of wealth inequali-
ties, it is crucial to know whether most of the accumulated wealth hold-
ings stem from saved income or from transferred wealth. This question 
is, however, very difficult to answer, as one would need detailed longitu-
dinal information about personal income and wealth for at least two 
consecutive generations, which is not widely available, if at all. 
For the US however, plenty of studies have been conducted which either 
directly estimate the contribution of life-cycle to total wealth; simulate 
the bequeathing behavior of overlapping generations; or measure trans-
ferred wealth via surveys that directly ask respondents about the per-
centage of total wealth they received through transfers (Gale and Scholz 
1994). Results from the first and second type of studies are very hetero-
geneous with estimates of the contribution of transferred to total wealth 
ranging from less than 20% (Modigliani 1988a; Modigliani 1988b) to 
about 80% (Kotlikoff and Summers 1981; White 1978). Results from the 
latter type of studies are more consistent and estimate the contribution 
of transferred to total wealth to lie around 20% (Modigliani 1988a; Wolff 
and Gittleman 2011; Gale and Scholz 1994). A severe problem for all 
three types of studies is that bequest do not have to be intended but can 
rather be accidental (Gale and Scholz 1994). For this reason, Kessler and 
Masson (1989) even state that that it is "virtually impossible to distin-
guish life-cycle from bequest savings" (p. 145). Obviously, the contribu-
tion of transferred to total wealth is far from clear. 
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Considering the unique characteristics and the numerous functions of 
wealth – as compared to income – household but also country differ-
ences in levels of wealth and levels of wealth inequality are likely to be 
more consequential not only in terms of social stratification, but also for 
social mobility. Spilerman (2000) expressed this as follows; “a considera-
tion of wealth becomes relevant once the agenda of the field is enlarged, 
from a focus narrowly on labor market success and its rewards to a con-
cern with living standards and economic security” (p. 518). I therefore 
argue that, for a comprehensive understanding of economic and social 
stratification, it is crucial to go beyond inequalities derived from the 
labor market by additionally studying the distribution of private wealth.  
2.6 NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND 
THE LIFE-CYCLE HYPOTHESIS 
As already indicated, this study has a strong explorative and descriptive 
focus. My main motivation is to give the reader an initial idea of the 
distribution of private wealth across countries and to compare it to the 
distribution of income. In this chapter, I do not empirically analyze de-
terminants of wealth and wealth inequality. This is the focus of other 
chapters of this thesis, especially of chapters 4 and 5. However, in the 
following, I will suggest and discuss a number of possible factors that 
could explain national differences in the distribution of private wealth. 
Undoubtedly, individual and household characteristics strongly influ-
ence the process of wealth accumulation. Although the contribution of 
transferred to total wealth is far from clear, it is plausible to say that 
earnings differences within and across countries are translated into 
wealth differences at least to some degree. Empirical research revealed 
that income and wealth show only moderate levels of correlation, and in 
some countries, the level of income inequality significantly deviates 
from the level of wealth inequality. In line with these findings, Cowell, 
Karagiannaki, and McKnight (2013) claim that there are various reasons 
why levels of income and wealth inequality might differ from each other 
within countries, and why the distribution of wealth might differ across 
countries. First, they mention differences in the distribution of individu-
al demographic and economic characteristics across countries as an 
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important part of the explanation for national differences in levels of 
wealth and wealth inequality. These can be age differences, as already 
indicated by the above formula (see also the life-cycle hypothesis of 
Modigliani and Brumberg 1954, on the relationship between wealth and 
age), but also education, race and marital status, which have been found 
to be important micro-level determinants of national differences in lev-
els of private wealth (Conley 2009; Frick and Grabka 2009b; Henretta 
and Campbell 1978; Keister and Moeller 2000; Oliver and Shapiro 1990; 
Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2013). In addition to these demographic 
variables, a growing number of scholars agree on the importance of 
psychological variables to complement them (Feldstein 1995; Furnham 
1985; Thaler 1994; Thaler 1990). Among these variables are self-control, 
taste for saving, political preferences or other preference parameters like 
the degree of risk aversion.  
Secondly, a number of macro-level factors are also likely to affect the 
distribution of private wealth. Cowell et al. (2013) suggest that both insti-
tutional settings and economic environments will affect households’ 
saving motives and propensities. The standard life-cycle model devel-
oped by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) is a powerful and flexible theo-
retical framework for explaining individual saving behavior – which is 
likely to have an impact also on national levels of wealth – via differences 
in institutional settings. According to this model, saving behavior is the 
result of an optimization problem of inter-temporal consumption: Per-
fectly rational and forward-looking actors are faced with a deterministic 
income path with low earnings at the beginning of their career that in-
crease over their working life and drop to zero when they retire. Trying 
to keep their marginal utility of consumption constant over time to max-
imize their lifetime utility, they borrow at younger ages, save as their 
earnings increase, and dissave in retirement. In the basic model, there 
are neither capital market imperfections nor uncertainty (e.g. earnings 
insecurity or insecurity about the date of death). Saving is understood as 
earnings minus consumption. The only motivation for saving is provi-
sion for old age, and there are no bequests. Individuals work as long as 
they are able to. The introduction of a pay-as-you-go public pension sys-
tem would consequently lead to a perfect substitution between public 
pension wealth and private savings.  
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Based on the findings of Cagan (1965) and Katona (1964), Feldstein 
(1974), however, argued that this holds only true for workers who any-
way planned to retire around the official retirement age. For workers 
who planned to retire later than that, the introduction of an official re-
tirement age would generally make them to retire earlier than they actu-
ally planned to. As this will lengthen their total period in retirement, the 
introduction of a pay-as-you-go public pension system could motivate 
these workers to increase their savings. Thus, the implementation of a 
pay-as-you-go public pension system5 could also have a positive effect on 
the level of private savings, which could even offset the negative one. 
Either way, the standard life-cycle model can be helpful for the explana-
tion of the macro-level relationship between differences in public pen-
sion systems and differences in the distribution of wealth through dif-
ferences in individual (savings) behavior. In an early time-series analy-
sis, Feldstein (1974) in fact found a strong negative relationship between 
social security (pension wealth) and aggregate capital accumulation. 
However, other time-series analyses found this relationship to be much 
weaker, or even non-existent (Barro 1978; Leimer and Lesnoy 1982).  
Bringing transferred wealth back into the discussion, Cowell et al. (2013) 
further mention national differences in the importance of past inher-
itances, but also national differences in the population’s age composi-
tion and household structure, as representing possible explanatory fac-
tors for national differences in the distribution of wealth. In addition, 
national differences in the taxation of wealth (life-cycle wealth as well as 
transferred wealth), but also of earnings, are likely to have an impact on 
national differences in the distribution of wealth. Recently, it has been 
suggested that researchers should also account for differences in finan-
cial literacy as an important determinant of saving behavior across (but 
also within) countries (Bernheim 1998; Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 
2012). Differences in financial literacy might thus explain part of the 
finding that it is usually the highly educated/high-income households 
who show a saving profile close to the assumptions of the standard life-
                                                          
 
5  In all countries I analyze, the public pension system is a pay-as-you-go financed sys-
tem or has been so until very recently. 
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cycle model, while the less educated/low-income households hardly save 
at all. In an international comparative study, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) 
found financial literacy scores relatively high for individuals in Sweden 
and the Netherlands, but comparatively low for individuals in Italy and 
Russia. Similarly, Jappelli (2010) finds financial literacy to be high in 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark and low in Italy, Spain and Po-
land.  
Finally, Cowell et al. (2013) mention nationally-specific cultural and 
historical factors that shape preferences for holding specific types of 
assets (for example real estate, or stocks and shares) as an explanation 
for cross-country differences in the distribution of wealth. In line with 
this argument, Feldstein (1995: 411) suggests the shared experience of 
inflation or war of many generations of Europeans as an explanation for 
the higher saving rates of the European population as compared to US-
Americans,6 despite the greater generosity of social security retirement 
programs in Europe. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) likewise claim that 
international differences in financial literacy can be the result of specific 
historical factors. They found, for example, that individuals in countries 
with recent experience of inflation scored higher on questions about 
inflation, and individuals in countries that experienced pension privati-
zation scored higher on questions about risk diversification.  
In their empirical analyses, Cowell et al. (2013) find that the largest 
share of national differences in levels of wealth inequality cannot be 
traced back to differences in the distribution of individual characteris-
tics, but rather to country effects, which they could however not account 
for in their analyses due to their small sample size (consisting of 5 coun-
tries: United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, USA, Sweden). As suggested, and 
in line with other studies, they find relative levels of income and wealth 
inequality to be similar in some countries (e.g. the U.S.), while they 
strongly differ in others (e.g. Sweden). The following analyses contribute 
to the research on cross-country differences in the distribution of private 
wealth. Further, I will compare national patterns of wealth inequality to 
                                                          
 
6  The USA, however, are not considered in this chapter. Chapter 5, where analysis are 
based on other data sources, does consider the USA. 
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those of income inequality. Therefore, before I present my analyses, I 
will briefly trace national patterns of income inequality as detected by 
past research.  
2.7 NATIONAL PATTERNS OF INCOME INEQUALITY AND              
ESPING-ANDERSEN’S WELFARE STATE TYPOLOGY 
The OECD publication “Growing unequal” provides an overview of in-
come distributions in OECD countries over the period from the mid-
1980s until the mid-2000s (OECD 2008). Five groups of countries are 
distinguished. Denmark and Sweden belong to the “low inequality 
group” with Gini coefficients for income below 0.3. The “below average 
inequality group” exhibits Gini coefficients for income that are slightly 
below the OECD average, which is just above 0.3. Countries belonging to 
this group are Austria, Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
Slovak Republic and Switzerland. This group is followed by the “above 
average inequality group” that is composed of Korea, Canada, Spain, 
Japan, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The 
fourth group is the “high inequality group”, consisting of Italy, Poland, 
the United States and Portugal. Turkey and Mexico form the ‘very high 
inequality group’. As with regard to the European and North American 
countries, patterns of income inequality are very much in line with the 
welfare state classification Esping-Andersen (1990) developed in the 
1980s. 
Esping-Andersen differentiates between three types of welfare states: the 
liberal, the social-democratic and the conservative state. This regime 
classification is based on three main categories: (1) the degree of de-
commodification; (2) the degree of social stratification; and (3) the re-
spective importance of the market, the state, and the family for the pro-
duction of individuals’ welfare. In the liberal welfare regime, individuals 
take care of their welfare by themselves on the (labor) market. This is 
why the liberal welfare state is often also called the “workfare state”. The 
degree of decommodification is fairly low, and it is the (labor) market 
which produces individual welfare. In liberal countries, social inequality 
is usually high, particularly with respect to income differences. In con-
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trast, social democratic welfare states have a high level of public com-
mitment to offering equal opportunities and securing individuals’ well-
being. They manage to effectively reduce social inequality in terms of 
income. The typical conservative welfare regime has a modest degree of 
decommodification. However, compared to the social democratic model 
of welfare, the conservative welfare regime displays a high level of social 
stratification instead of a universal social policy ideology. Consequently, 
the level of social inequality can be located somewhere in-between liberal 
and social democratic countries.  
In recent years, Esping-Andersen’s typology has been extended by a 
Southern European welfare regime (Ferrera 1996) and a post-socialist 
welfare regime (Beyer 2009; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Fenger 2007). Esping-
Andersen himself, however, rejected the idea of the Southern and East-
ern European countries to form distinct and additional types of welfare 
regimes in 1996. Instead, he claimed that these countries are in a transi-
tional stage heading towards one of the three clusters he identified. Nev-
ertheless, there is consensus that the Southern and Eastern European 
countries – forming separate welfare state clusters or not – have distinct 
characteristics strongly differentiating them from the classical Esping-
Andersen typology (Ferrera 1996; Sengoku 2004; Sengoku 2009; Fenger 
2007; Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
The Southern European welfare regime as described by Ferrera (1996) is 
characterized by weak public institutions, a high importance of informal 
work, a comparatively weak system of social security, strong clientelism, 
and an outstanding importance to the family and the church in the pro-
duction of welfare (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Ferrera 1996). In the South-
ern European countries, families largely take the function of social secu-
rity, which in the continental and especially Northern European coun-
tries is conducted by welfare state institutions (Reher 1998). Especially 
important with regard to international differences in the distribution of 
wealth is the particular significance of homeownership in the Southern 
European countries. In general, homeownership is the most important 
form of family wealth (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004b). In Southern Europe-
an countries, homeownership is even more common than in most other 
European countries (Cabré Pla and Módenes Cabrerizo 2004). This is, 
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however, less the result of tradition than of social and economic change 
(Cabré Pla and Módenes Cabrerizo 2004).  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the mostly poor Spanish population 
was faced with eviction and homelessness. For the few economically 
better-situated, permanent tenancy was the most common phenome-
non. Homeownership emerged as a common phenomenon only after 
the Civil War (1936-39). It was a result of social and economic change, 
going along with legal changes (e.g. the “Ley de Vivienda de Renta Lim-
itada” in 1954 or the “Ley de Propiedad Horizontal” in 1960), strongly 
encouraging access to and investment in real estate property (Cabré Pla 
and Módenes Cabrerizo 2004), although these legal changes were not 
always meant to do so. Within only a couple of years, the Spanish society 
had turned into a society of homeowners, while the rental market was 
turned into a morbid niche market (cf. Cabré Pla and Módenes 
Cabrerizo 2004). In the second half of the twentieth century, due to edu-
cational expansion, young people spent more time in educational institu-
tions to acquire additional educational degrees. During this time of eco-
nomic vulnerability, staying at their parents was and is one very com-
mon strategy of individuals and families to keep up with the social and 
economic status of average Europeans (Cabré Pla and Módenes 
Cabrerizo 2004: 233). Children move out of the parental home only 
when they plan to set up an own family. Instead of moving into a rented 
apartment as some kind of interim solution, they save money during 
their stay at home, which very often includes their primary working 
years and then directly move into their own property, which they most 
often finance by their own savings together with the support of their 
families (Cabré Pla and Módenes Cabrerizo 2004).  
In addition, the high rate of homeownership in Southern European 
countries might be understood as a reaction of individuals and families 
to the poor performance of the welfare state in these countries. This 
relates especially to public pensions. Although public pensions are 
among the most generous in Southern European countries, the share of 
the population protected is low (Ferrera 1996). Normally, it is only those 
employed in the formal sector who are protected by social security, while 
young persons who are faced with unemployment at the beginning of 
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their career, single parents who did not contribute (yet) to the social 
system or uninsured persons do hardly receive any form of social protec-
tion (Ferrera 1996). This results in the dualistic character of the South 
European system of welfare state protection (Ferrera 1996). Moreover, 
according to Ferrera (1996: 25) the Southern European welfare state can 
be characterized by a low degree of state penetration combined with a 
low degree of state power (“double deficit of stateness”). These problems 
are largely coped with within the family, mediating the difficulties be-
tween the strong insider-outsider labor market (Buchholz et al. 2008) on 
the one hand and the stratified income maintenance system on the other 
hand (Ferrera 1996). As already mentioned, the acquisition of home-
ownership as well as the intergenerational transmission of tenure might 
be understood as family strategies to cope with these difficulties.  
Summing up, homeownership is a widespread phenomenon in Spain 
(78% of homeowners in 2013: EU-SILC 2015, see also chapter 4) as well 
as in other Southern European countries like Italy (73% of homeowners 
in 2013: EU-SILC 2015; see also chapter 4), Greece (76% of homeowners 
in 2013: EU-SILC 2015; see also chapter 4) or Portugal (74% of home-
owners in 2013: EU-SILC 2015; see also chapter 4). This phenomenon is 
very likely to have an important impact on the distribution of private 
wealth within these countries.  
Post-socialist countries strongly reduced social policy measures in favor 
of economic development in the first years after the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain. According to Sengoku (2004), in the new millennium, the post-
socialist countries display very diverse socio-political ad hoc activity to 
fight emerging problems such as increasing unemployment and pov-
erty, and can thus not be classified as one distinct type of welfare state. 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, reforming the political and economic 
sphere has been considered a primary goal, while the reformation of the 
social security system was considered as a secondary (Sengoku 2004). As 
a result, the governments of the Eastern European countries did not 
develop any systematic strategy for the implementation of a well-
functioning system of social security, but rather met newly emerging 
needs for social security (e.g. unemployment protection) with short-
sighted ad-hoc reactions (Sengoku 2004). During the late 1990s, most 
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post-socialist countries finally started to systematically reform their so-
cial-policy sector.  
In line with Sengoku's argumentation are the findings of Fenger (2007). 
He claims firstly, that the Eastern European countries did not transform 
into one of the three classic Esping-Andersen typologies 15 years after 
the fall of the Iron Curtain and secondly, that these countries do not 
form one common Eastern European type welfare state but three distinct 
welfare state clusters. Applying hierarchical cluster analysis on data of 27 
countries from 2005, Fenger (2007) can replicate the three Esping-
Andersen typologies of welfare states and finds three additional clusters 
all formed by Eastern European countries. Interestingly, the Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain) he finds to form a subtype of 
the conservative cluster, with differences, however, too small to form a 
distinct cluster. The three clusters formed by the Eastern European 
countries he names the former USSR type (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine), the Post-communist European type 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and 
the developing welfare states type (Georgia, Romania and Moldova). The 
former USSR type mostly resembles the conservative type but scores 
significantly lower in almost all governmental programs (mostly regard-
ing government expenditures on welfare state services) as compared to 
the countries of the conservative type. The Post-communist European 
type resembles the former USSR type but scores significantly higher on 
economic development (economic growth and inflation) and on social 
well-being (infant mortality and life expectancy), as well as on the degree 
of egalitarianism. The developing welfare states type includes countries 
that are still devolving towards a mature type of welfare states. They 
score lowest on economic development, governmental programs, social 
well-being and the degree of egalitarianism.  
As in the Southern European countries, the housing situation is very 
specific and different from Western European countries in the Eastern 
European countries. Before the Second World War, the share of home-
owners in Eastern European countries was relatively high (Turner 1992). 
After the introduction of socialism in the Eastern European countries (as 
well as the GDR), the government largely abolished private property. 
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Although the elimination of owner-occupied housing was considered 
unfeasible, the local authorities tried to restrict it as much as possible via 
strict regulations. In addition, no or restricted access was given to build-
ing material. Private landlords were either completely crowded out or at 
least largely restricted in their freedom regarding disposal and rent deci-
sions by the government (Turner 1992: 2). Private property rights were 
passed over to political committees. During the socialist times, three 
basic patterns of housing ownership were existent: state-owned, coopera-
tive and privately owned (Palacin and Shelburne 2005). Yet, there existed 
great differences with regard to recognition of property rights, the scope 
for self-construction and the operation of markets for housing services 
across countries (Palacin and Shelburne 2005).  
Due to the destruction of housing space during the Second World War, 
the socialist political committees organized a large-scale construction of 
public housing in high-rise real estates. However, the anonymity and 
sterility of these giant estates resulted in high values of dissatisfaction 
among the population. In addition, even more problematic, the socialist 
construction wave did not solve the problem of housing shortage. A 
reasonable number of individuals and families was faced with low spac-
ing standards and low quality indexes; many families had to share dwell-
ings with other members of the family and there was even a significant 
number of homeless persons. The population’s dissatisfaction grew with 
the diffusion of mass media and amongst other reasons (e.g. growing 
economic power from important groups of society) resulted in a change 
in policy towards more favorable conditions to private housing and to 
the establishment of a housing market in the 1970s and 1980s (Palacin 
and Shelburne 2005).  
During the phase of transition, however, there was an initial reluctance 
to the privatization of the housing stock, as many Eastern European 
countries were suddenly faced with new social phenomena like poverty 
and unemployment (Palacin and Shelburne 2005). Nevertheless, dispos-
sessed property was given back eventually to the former owners or was 
sold to the current residents at very low prices (Palacin and Shelburne 
2005). After the short phase of hesitation, the process of privatizing the 
housing stock went fast in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and 
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Slovenia, where homeownership was relatively widespread even during 
socialism, but went slower in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and 
Slovakia (Palacin and Shelburne 2005). Only few years after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain the Eastern European countries could be characterized 
by very high rates of owner-occupied housing (Palacin and Shelburne 
2005; Buckley and Hendershott 1995). These high rates of owner-
occupied housing have largely remained until today (e.g.: in 2013 80% of 
the population owned their home in Czech Republic, 90% in Hungary, 
86% in Bulgaria, 84% in Poland, 81% in Estonia, and 77% in Slovenia: 
EU-SILC 2015), due to a number of reasons, among them, the lack of a 
well-established rental market. Still, however, quality of housing has 
remained rather poor in Eastern European countries, which is especially 
true for the high-rise real estates. Apartments are small and the urban 
housing stock is old. In combination with insufficient maintenance and 
the low income of some owners this has resulted in a rapid process of 
depreciation (Palacin and Shelburne 2005). The low market value of 
these properties is likely to further decrease as modern properties are 
built (Palacin and Shelburne 2005). This description will help to better 
understand the wealth distribution in Eastern European countries as 
reported throughout this thesis. 
Coming back to the Esping-Andersen typology, it is fair to say that 
Esping-Andersen defines social inequality strongly in terms of the labor 
market in at least two ways: first, when analyzing an individual’s posi-
tion in the labor market (for the degree of social stratification); and sec-
ond, when measuring the degree of an individual’s dependence on the 
labor market to maintain his or her livelihood (for the degree of decom-
modification). This also becomes visible in the empirical data forming 
the basis of his classification. Esping-Andersen’s indicators relate almost 
exclusively to the labor market, especially when he measures the degree 
of social stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990: 58). Consequently, and in 
line with most contemporary social stratification research, he neglects 
the central role of wealth (including the importance of homeownership) 
and its distribution in the process of social stratification (Elmelech 2008: 
6). This is perfectly reasonable, as Esping-Andersen’s typology is in fact 
meant to explain societal patterns of income inequality and the effect of 
the welfare state on income inequality. In the light of the different char-
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acteristics of income and wealth, it can be expected that national patterns 
of wealth inequality do not perfectly resemble national patterns of in-
come inequality, and that Esping-Andersen’s typology cannot be applied 
to predict national levels of wealth inequality. 
2.8 DATA AND VARIABLES  
2.8.1 DATA 
In my empirical analyses, I make use of several different data sources. 
The first dataset I use is the “Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe” (SHARE)7, which provides rich and detailed information on 
household wealth and household income. So far, four waves have been 
conducted between the years 2004 and 2012. In order to balance for 
yearly variations in household income and household wealth, I apply as 
many waves as possible. Wealth and income information have been 
collected in the first, second and fourth wave. Yet, as the income meas-
ure in the first wave differs from those in the later waves, I do not make 
use of the first wave data. My final wealth and income measures are thus 
calculated as the means of median wealth and median income in the 
second (2006/07) and fourth (2010/11/12) SHARE wave. My final 
SHARE data sample consists of 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
                                                          
 
7  “This chapter uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013(DOI: 
10.6103/SHARE.w4.111) and SHARE wave 2 release 2.6.0, as of November 29 2013 
(DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.260 and 10.6103/SHARE.w2.260). The SHARE data collec-
tion has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th Frame-
work Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of 
Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-
062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) 
and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-
LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. Na-
tional Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 
AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the 
German Ministry of Education and Research as well as from various national sources 
is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institu-
tions).” 
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and Switzerland. As not all countries participated in all waves, for seven 
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia), income and wealth information stems only from one wave. 
The SHARE study is an international, representative panel study of the 
population aged 50 years and above. Studying the distribution of wealth 
within this population segment that has either already entered retire-
ment or is close to it, allows me to investigate how successful individuals 
have been in accumulating wealth over their life course. Still, it is a non-
random fraction of the overall population and does thus not allow me to 
draw conclusions on the countries’ overall population. For this reason 
and in order to enhance reliability of my results, I make use of a second 
wealth and a second income data source.  
I derived aggregate-level data on the levels of private wealth and wealth 
inequality from the “Global Wealth Databooks” (GWD) published by the 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). With these 
data books, the Credit Suisse Research Institute aims to provide the best 
available estimates of private wealth holdings for the world’s 216 coun-
tries. Data on levels of income and income inequality I derived from the 
OECD iLibrary (OECD 2013a). I merged the income and wealth infor-
mation for the overall (20+) population in the 18 above-mentioned coun-
tries from these two data sources and derived a second data sample. To 
likewise balance for yearly variations in household income and wealth, I 
made use of all four GWD publications (2010-2013) and I chose a similar 
period for my OECD income measure. More detailed explanations can 
be found in the following section. I will conduct all analyses separately 
with both data samples and compare the results.  
2.8.2 VARIABLES 
My two variables of main interest are household wealth and household 
income. Household wealth is measured in both surveys in terms of net 
worth, which means real assets, plus financial assets, net of debts on 
them, and refers to current net worth at the time the interview was con-
ducted. The second SHARE wave was conducted between 2006 and 2007 
with the exception of Israel, where the second wave was conducted be-
tween 2009 and 2010. The fourth SHARE wave was conducted between 
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2010 and 2012. The GWD wealth variables refer to the years 2010, 2011, 
2012 and 2013.  
In the SHARE data, net worth is defined as household net worth includ-
ing (1) gross real assets, i.e. the ownership and value of the primary 
residence, of other real estate, of the share owned of own businesses and 
of owned cars; plus (2) gross financial assets, i.e. the ownership and 
value of bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual 
funds, individual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing 
and life insurance policies; minus (3) mortgages and financial liabilities 
(Christelis, Japelli, and Padula, 2005: 358). The target population of indi-
viduals in the first SHARE wave is “all individuals born in 1954 or earli-
er, speaking the official language of the country and not living abroad or 
in an institution such as a prison during the duration of the field work” 
(Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing 2013). In addition, spouses 
or partners living in the same household are interviewed independent of 
their age. The SHARE team applies a multiple imputation strategy for 
filling in missing values for both household wealth and household in-
come. Five values are estimated for every missing value. All my follow-
ing analyses are ran across these five imputations. A more detailed de-
scription of the imputation method used in the SHARE can be found in 
Christelis (2011). All financial values are expressed in Euros and are 
adjusted for differences in the purchasing power of money across coun-
tries and over time using the ppp8-values as provided by the SHARE 
team (see Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing 2013). The refer-
ence category is Germany in the year 2005. Further, net worth values are 
divided by the root of the number of persons living in a household 
(equivalized household net worth) to account for household size. My 
final net worth measure is the mean value of annual median household 
net worth in the second and fourth SHARE wave. Due to the strong 
skewness of the wealth distribution, I opted for median instead of mean 
wealth. In order to prevent problems of comparability of values of net 
worth across countries and between the two datasets to the greatest ex-
tent, and in consistency with previous research, I derived an additional 
                                                          
 
8  The abbreviation “ppp” stands for purchasing power parity. 
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wealth measure by dividing median net worth at time t by median dis-
posable income at time t, and express net worth in times of disposable 
income. I label this measure “wealth rate” in the following.  
The net worth measure in the GWDs is defined as the marketable value 
of financial assets plus non-financial assets (principally housing and 
land) less debts for individuals aged 20 or above. In contrast to SHARE, 
the GWD measures net worth in terms of individual net worth. All net 
worth values are expressed in Euros to make them most comparable to 
the SHARE data.9 For reasons already explained above, I decided on 
median net worth as the final wealth variable and, as also explained 
above, I further calculated an additional measure of wealth: the wealth 
rate. Importantly, the current value of public and occupational pension 
plans is not included, neither in the SHARE nor in the GWD net worth 
measure. 
Household income in the SHARE waves two and four refers to yearly 
household net income in the year before the interview took place. 
Household total net income is equal to the sum of the individual-level 
values of all household members’ annual net income from employment 
and self-employment; annual public old-age pensions, and other forms 
of public pensions; annual public long-term insurance payments; annual 
sum of private long-term care insurance payments; and annual life in-
surance payments received. To this, the sum of the following household-
level variables is added: annual other household members’ net income; 
interest income from bank accounts; interest income from bonds; divi-
dends from stocks/shares; and interest and dividend income from mu-
tual funds (Munich Center for the Economics of Ageing 2013: 31). My 
final SHARE income measure is the mean of median annual net house-
hold income from waves two and four. All values are ppp-adjusted, ex-
pressed in Euros, and divided by the root of the number of persons liv-
ing in a household (equivalized household income) to account for 
household size.  
                                                          
 
9  I used exchange rates as provided by the OECD (OECD 2014) to convert USD, the 
currency provided by the GWD, into Euros.  
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The OECD defines disposable income as “Household net adjusted dispos-
able income”, i.e. the average amount of money that a household earns 
per year, after taxes. Again, I express all income values in Euros. To 
likewise balance yearly variation in income, my income measure is cal-
culated as mean of median disposable household income of the years 
2007 to 2010, in order to come closest to the period the GWD wealth 
measure is based upon.  
In my descriptive analyses, for the SHARE data, I apply weights in ac-
cordance with the recommendations of the SHARE team. I use cross-
sectional calibrated weights that compensate for unit-nonresponse and 
sample attrition in the CAPI interview (Munich Center for the 
Economics of Ageing 2013: 40). The level of inequality in income and 
wealth I measure via the Gini coefficient, which is provided for the 
GWD and OECD data and which I calculated for the SHARE data ac-
cording to the following formula:  
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with inequality G in wealth w (or likewise in income y) measured by the 
arithmetic average of the absolute difference between all wealth (or in-
come) pairs standardized by dividing it by the population’s average 
wealth (or income). As a result the Gini index ranges from 0 (total equal-
ity) to 1 (total inequality). Apart from being the best known measure of 
inequality in social sciences, Gini has another considerable advantage 
for my purpose: it is well defined for negative and zero values (Jenkins 
and Jäntti 2005: 20)10, which are likely to appear in the distribution of 
private net worth. 
                                                          
 
10  This however applies only under the assumption that mean wealth is positive, which is 
the case here. If mean wealth is negative, the Gini coefficient will also take on negative 
values (Jenkins and Jäntti 2005). 
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2.9 ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
2.9.1 THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE WEALTH 
Table 2 shows the distributions of net worth and disposable income as 
well as the wealth rate (median net worth divided by median income) 
across the 18 countries in my SHARE and GWD/OECD data sets. Look-
ing at median values of net worth, we can first see that – with only very 
few exceptions – net worth values are higher among the 50+ SHARE 
than among the 20+ GWD population, which corresponds to the as-
sumptions of the life-cycle hypothesis. In the SHARE data, the highest 
values for median net worth can be found in Belgium (€180,820), Israel 
(€172,540) and France (€165,290), followed by Switzerland (€159,460). 
The lowest values can be found in Estonia (€24,140) and Hungary 
(€25,380). 
In the GWD data, the highest values for median net worth can be found 
in Italy (€99,970), Belgium (€92,670) and France (€71,310). The lowest 
values emerge in Poland (€7,190), Hungary (€10,200) and the Czech 
Republic (€11,430). Trends in median net worth show a similar tendency 
in the two data sets, which can be understood as an indicator of high 
data quality. 
With regard to disposable income, readers have to be aware of the fact 
that, in the SHARE data, a meaningful fraction of each country’s popula-
tion is already retired and receives only transfer incomes (mainly pen-
sion income). The highest values for median net income in the SHARE 
data emerge in Switzerland (€30,908), Sweden (€21,294) and the Nether-
lands (€21,804) and in the OECD data again in Switzerland (€34,000) 
and Denmark (€28,740). The lowest values in the SHARE data emerge in 
Estonia (€4,960), Portugal (€5,240), Poland (€5,600) and Hungary 
(€5,820) and in the OECD data in Hungary (€4,740), Poland (€5,450) and 
Estonia (€6,420). 
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Table 2: Median net worth (NW), median net income (INC) and wealth rates 
Country Country 
code 
NW median (€) INC median (€) Wealth rate 
SHARE GWD SHARE OECD SHARE GWD/ 
OECD 
Austria AUT 83,700 58,960 17,400 22,440 4.8 2.6 
Belgium BEL 180,820 92,670 19,130 21,240 9.6 4.4 
Czech Rep. CZE 58,820 11,430 10,710 7,600 5.8 1.5 
Denmark DNK 122,430 34,490 19,450 28,740 6.3 1.2 
Estonia EST 24,140 9,880 4,960 6,420 4.9 1.5 
France FRA  165,290 71,310 19,590 20,840 8.4 3.4 
Germany DEU 92,570 38,960 17,130 20,020 5.4 1.9 
Greece GRC 102,64 32,980 11,090 12,590 9.3 2.6 
Hungary HUN 25,380 10,200 5,820 4,740 4.4 2.2 
Israel ISR 172,540 31,740 15,500 12,260 11.1 2.6
Italy ITA 111,410 99,970 11,910 17,580 9.3 5.7
Netherl. NLD 125,260 52,600 21,800 21,710 5.8 2.4 
Poland POL 26,080 7,190 5,600 5,450 4.7 1.3 
Portugal PRT 67,550 25,500 5,240 9,350 12.8 2.7 
Slovenia SVN 88,840 25,300 12,610 13,270 7.1 1.9 
Spain ESP 131,730 47,960 10,250 14,550 12.8 3.3
Sweden SWE 113,110 31,270 21,300 22,640 5.3 1.4 
Switzer-
land 
CHE 159,460 61,000 30,900 34,000 5.4 1.8 
Note: SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1), GWD (Credit Suisse Research 
Institute 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013a). Own calculations. 
The next two columns show the wealth rate (median net worth divided 
by median income), relating a country’s level of net worth directly to its 
level of net income. In the SHARE data, the highest wealth rates (wr) 
appear in Portugal and Spain, where older households hold values of 
median net worth about 13 times greater than their (last year’s) disposa-
ble income. Portugal and Spain are followed by Israel (wr=11.1), Bel-
gium (wr=9.6), Greece and Italy (wr=9.3). Also, in the GWD data, the 
two Southern European countries Italy (wr=5.7) and Spain (wr=3.3) 
show comparatively high wealth rates. High wealth rates in the GWD 
emerge also in Belgium (wr=4.4) and France (wr=3.4). In general, wealth 
rates are much higher in the SHARE as compared to the GWD data, 
which should principally be a result of the different population groups. 
The lowest wealth rates in the SHARE data emerge in Hungary (wr=6.5), 
Estonia (wr=6.6) and Austria (wr=6.8), and in the GWD data in Denmark 
(wr=1.2), Poland (wr=1.3) and Sweden (wr=1.4).  
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Summing up, with regard to the distribution of wealth and income 
across Europe and Israel, I found the following: the Southern European 
countries Spain and Italy, but also France, Belgium, and Israel show 
high values for median net worth as well as high wealth rates. At the 
same time, median income is comparatively low in the Southern Euro-
pean countries. Low wealth (in terms of median net worth and wealth 
rates) emerges in the Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary and Poland. These countries also show low values of 
median income.  
2.9.2 NATIONAL PATTERNS OF WEALTH AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Table 3 shows my findings for the levels of income and wealth inequality 
in the SHARE and the GWD/OECD datasets. In the SHARE data, the 
highest values for inequality in net worth emerge in Estonia (Gini=67), 
Switzerland (Gini=61) and Israel (Gini=60), in the GWD data in Den-
mark (Gini=93), Sweden (Gini=82) and Switzerland (Gini=82). The low-
est values for wealth inequality due to the SHARE data emerge in Bel-
gium and Greece (Gini=45), Spain (Gini=48) and the Czech Republic 
(Gini=49), and due to the GWD data, in Italy, Slovenia and Spain 
(Gini=63), followed by Hungary (Gini=64) and Belgium (Gini=65). The 
trends in the levels of wealth inequality reported by the SHARE data 
resemble those found in the GWD data for most countries. An exception 
is Estonia, which shows a below-median level of wealth inequality in the 
GWD data, but a level of wealth inequality considerably above the medi-
an in the SHARE data. Similar differences between the two datasets, 
although less pronounced, can be found for Austria and the Czech Re-
public. 
The highest income inequalities according to the SHARE data can be 
found in Portugal (Gini=72) and Slovenia (Gini=57), and according to 
the OECD data, in Portugal (Gini=35) and Israel (Gini=37). The lowest 
values for income inequality emerge in Denmark (Gini=30), Sweden 
(Gini=31) and Austria (Gini=33) according to the SHARE data and in 
Denmark and Slovenia (Gini=24), followed by Belgium and the Czech 
Republic (Gini=26), Austria, Hungary and Sweden (Gini=27) according 
to the OECD data. As to the national patterns of income inequality, the 
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results of the SHARE resemble those of the OECD data and those of 
past research (as reported under 2.6.). In general, income inequalities 
are higher among the 50+ population than among the 20+ population. I 
could find meaningful differences between the two datasets for Slovenia, 
Belgium and Israel. While the SHARE data reports above-median levels 
of income inequality in those countries, in the OECD data they are be-
low-median level. 
Table 3: Gini net worth (NW), Gini net income (INC) and difference between Gini NW and 
Gini INC  
Country Country 
code 
Gini NW Gini INC Diff. Gini
NW/INC 
SHARE GWD SHARE OECD SHARE GWD 
Austria AUT 56 70 33 27 23 44
Belgium BEL 45 65 47 26 -2 39
Czech Rep. CZE 49 71 36 26 13 46
Denmark DNK 54 93 30 24 24 69
Estonia EST 67 68 52 32 15 36
France FRA  51 74 39 30 12 44
Germany DEU 57 75 39 29 18 46
Greece GRC 45 69 43 33 2 35
Hungary HUN 51 64 38 27 13 37
Israel ISL 60 78 47 37 13 41
Italy ITA 51 63 41 32 10 32
Netherlands NLD 58 75 39 29 19 46
Poland POL 56 73 35 31 21 42
Portugal PRT 51 71 72 35 -21 36
Slovenia SVN 51 63 57 24 -6 38
Spain ESP 48 63 45 32 3 31
Sweden SWE 55 82 31 27 24 55
Switzerland CHE 61 82 39 30 22 53
Note: SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1), GWD (Credit Suisse Research 
Institute 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013a). Own calculations. 
The last two columns show the differences between the Ginis of income 
and wealth for each country. This informs us, whether a country’s level 
of income and wealth inequality are either similar to or different from 
each other. We can see first that, in all countries except Belgium, Portu-
gal and Slovenia (but only in the SHARE data), levels of wealth inequali-
ty are higher than levels of income inequality, which is in line with theo-
ry as well as with past empirical findings (e.g. Davies, Sandström, 
Shorrocks, and Wolff 2008). Similar levels of income and wealth ine-
quality in the SHARE data can be found in Belgium, Greece, Slovenia 
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and Spain. Large discrepancies emerge in Denmark, Sweden, Austria 
and Switzerland.  
According to the GWD/OECD data, income and wealth inequalities are 
similar in Spain, Italy and Greece and more dissimilar in Denmark, 
Sweden and Switzerland. As before, trends emerging from the SHARE 
data on the one hand and from the GWD/OECD data on the other hand 
are similar to each other, indicating high data quality, but can also point 
to the relative stability of patterns of wealth inequality over the life 
course. 
Figures 3 (SHARE data) and 4 (GWD/OECD data) illustrate the findings 
of Table 3 in simple scatterplots. The x-axis indicates the level of income 
inequality, the y-axis indicates the level of wealth inequality. The thick 
lines represent median levels of income and wealth inequality over all 
countries in each dataset. At first glance, the two figures look quite dif-
ferent from one another. Firstly, there is a larger variance in levels of 
income inequality in the SHARE (older population) than in the OECD 
(overall population) dataset, while variance in levels of wealth inequality 
is larger in the GWD (overall population) than in the SHARE (older 
population) data. The median level of income inequality is higher in the 
SHARE (Gini=39) than in the OECD (Gini=31) data, and the median 
level of wealth inequality is higher in the GWD (Gini=69) than in the 
SHARE (Gini=53) data. 
Upon closer inspection of Figures 3 and 4, results regarding the national 
patterns of income and wealth inequalities become more similar to each 
other. In both datasets, I could compose four country clusters, each con-
taining countries with similar levels of wealth and income inequality. In 
both datasets, there emerges one cluster of countries with below-median 
levels of income but above-median levels of wealth inequality, which is 
made up of the two Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark (and 
also Austria according to the SHARE data).  
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Figure 3: Gini of income and wealth: SHARE data 
Note: SHARE waves 2 (release 2.6.0) and 4 (release 1.1.1).Own calculations. 
Figure 4: Gini of income and wealth: GWD/OECD data  
Note: GWD (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) and OECD (2013a). 
Own calculations. 
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A second cluster, which exhibits above-median levels of income but 
below-median levels of wealth inequality, is made up of the Southern 
European countries Italy, Greece and Spain in both datasets. In the 
SHARE data, Belgium, Slovenia and Portugal can also be assigned to 
this cluster. The latter two countries are, however, outlying due to their 
very high levels of wealth inequality. In the GWD/OECD data, Estonia 
also lies within this cluster and Portugal is fairly close to it, with its level 
of wealth inequality being, however, slightly above the overall median.  
In the SHARE data, the rest of the countries scatter close to the median 
levels of income and wealth inequality. I generated a third cluster, made 
up of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland, which is 
characterized by median levels of income but above-median levels of 
wealth inequality. A fourth cluster, characterized by median levels of 
income and below-median levels of wealth inequality, consists of Hun-
gary, France and the Czech Republic. Finally, Israel and Estonia are 
outliers with above-median levels of income and strongly above-median 
levels of wealth inequality. In the GWD/OECD scatterplot I generated a 
third cluster with levels of income and wealth inequality pretty close to 
the median. To this cluster, I assigned Germany, the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland, and Poland (as in the SHARE data). Finally, there remains a 
fourth cluster with levels of income and wealth inequality below the 
median. This cluster consists of Slovenia, Belgium and Hungary. The 
Czech Republic and Austria are pretty close to this cluster. Israel re-
mains as an outlier with high levels in both inequality in income and 
wealth.  
Several conclusions can be drawn at this point. Firstly, both datasets 
show similar trends regarding patterns of income and wealth inequali-
ties. In both datasets, I could construct four country clusters in total. 
Three of them almost completely overlap, while there is only a small 
number of countries located at significant different positions in the co-
ordinate plane made up by the median levels of income and wealth ine-
quality (Slovenia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Israel) in my two 
datasets. Secondly, I found countries to be distributed over all four quad-
rants of the coordinate plane in both datasets, meaning that there are 
countries with similar levels of income and wealth inequalities, as well 
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as countries that differ in the levels of income and wealth inequality they 
exhibit. At the same time, this means that the Esping-Andersen classifi-
cation of welfare states, which is mainly derived from indicators related 
to the labor market, does not fully apply when it comes to national pat-
terns of wealth inequality. I found two clear-cut groups that are charac-
terized by strong differences in the levels of income and wealth inequali-
ty they exhibit in both datasets. A first group with high wealth and low 
income inequalities is made up of the Northern European countries, and 
a second group with low wealth and high income inequalities is made 
up of the Southern European countries.  
Most surprising is certainly the first finding: the high levels of wealth 
inequality in the Northern European countries, known for their high 
level of social equality. Yet a number of studies have already reported 
this phenomenon, at least for Sweden (Roine and Waldenström 2009; 
Domeij and Klein 2002; Sierminska, Brandolini, and Smeeding 2006). 
Domeij and Klein (2002: 505) suggest that the generous public pension 
system (with a common benefit payable to each senior, as well as an 
upper limit to earnings-related pension benefits) explains the differences 
in the levels of income and wealth inequality to a large degree, as it re-
duces incentives for the low income-earners to save proportionately 
more than for the high-income earners. Roine and Waldenström (2009: 
170) add that the wealth concentration in Sweden increased dramatically 
after 1980, due to “dramatic increases in stock returns at the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange between 1980 and 2000”. In the same period, the value 
of large privately held family firms, making up an important share of 
Swedish private net worth, has strongly grown (Roine and Waldenström 
2009: 169). For Denmark, however, no such studies are currently availa-
ble. 
2.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I focused on answering two research questions. First, I 
wanted to find out how private wealth is distributed over countries, and 
second, I was interested to see if national patterns of wealth inequality 
resemble national patterns of income inequality. Previous research has 
largely neglected the importance of wealth in the process of social strati-
74  Setting the scene: Patterns of income and wealth  inequality 
fication, being preoccupied with the determination of individual attain-
ment (Kenworthy 2007). Only recently, there is a growing awareness 
among researchers that social inequality is a multidimensional phenom-
enon. In the light of demographic and social changes, measures solely 
related to the individual’s position in the labor market are increasingly 
less suited to capture a society’s level of social inequality. With this chap-
ter, I contribute to this growing awareness by drawing attention to 
wealth. Past research provided a number of arguments suggesting that a 
sole reliance on levels of income inequality would result in a one-sided 
or even inaccurate picture of economic and, in a broader sense, social 
inequality. 
Theoretically, there are reasons to assume both similarity and dissimilar-
ity in a country’s levels of income and wealth inequality. It is important 
to mention that wealth can stem from two sources, transfers and self-
accumulation (income minus consumption). Wealth can be self-
accumulated by saving parts of one’s earned income. Saving earned 
income depends firstly on the ability to save and secondly on preferences 
to save. Finally, saving earned income also depends on the necessity to 
save.  
If most of the wealth in a country is life-cycle wealth, then it is fair to 
assume that earnings differences strongly translate into wealth differ-
ences, controlling for individual preferences for saving. If a country 
offers a generous social welfare system, the necessity to save is low, 
which should result in a low median level of wealth in these countries 
when compared to countries with less generous welfare  states. As these 
services are normally financed through taxes, a generous welfare state 
can, however, also result in a lower ability to save. Yet, this does not 
allow us to draw any inferences regarding the level of wealth inequality. 
Past research has been able to show that there exist meaningful differ-
ences in preferences for saving (the better-educated show higher prefer-
ences for saving) and in preferences for certain types of asset accumula-
tion (Nordic countries show higher preferences for financial as opposed 
to real assets, while Southern countries show a strong preference for real 
assets), within as well as across countries. Finally, not only institutional, 
cultural and historic factors are likely to shape a country’s distribution of 
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wealth, but also individual demographic and economic factors, such as 
the age composition of a population or shares of unemployment. How-
ever, if most wealth is transferred wealth, the distribution of wealth 
might be much more dependent on the taxation of wealth or inheritanc-
es. The question of how much wealth is transferred and how much is 
self-accumulated is, however, still unanswered, and the current data 
situation will not allow us to answer it in the near future.  
In my empirical analyses, I studied and compared data from two differ-
ent data sources referring to two different population segments 
(SHARE: 50+ population, GWD/OECD: 20+ population) in 17 European 
countries and Israel. My results showed the following: first, I found 
meaningful differences in levels of wealth between countries. The high-
est levels of median wealth (in times of median income) I found in the 
Southern European countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain), while the lowest 
values for median wealth emerged in the Eastern European countries 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia). Second, levels of wealth 
inequality also differ strongly across countries. The lowest levels of 
wealth inequality are found in the Southern European countries (which 
showed the highest wealth rates), while, surprisingly, I found the high-
est levels of wealth inequality in the Northern European countries (Swe-
den, Denmark). Central European countries mostly show moderate 
levels of wealth inequality, while Eastern European countries are distrib-
uted over the full range of levels of wealth inequality. This grouping only 
partly complies with the national grouping based on levels of income 
inequality. I found as many countries with similar levels of income and 
wealth inequality as countries with strong differences in their levels of 
income and wealth inequality. Finally, I grouped countries according to 
their levels of income and wealth inequality. In both datasets, I was able 
to construct four groups. Three of them are almost identical. A first 
group with low levels of income and high levels of wealth inequality is 
composed of the Northern European countries. The Southern European 
countries form the second group, with high levels of income and low 
levels of wealth inequality. The Central European countries form the 
third group with medium levels of income and wealth inequality. The 
fourth group, with low levels of income and wealth inequality, is made 
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up of different countries in the two datasets, and results are thus less 
reliable.  
So what do these findings imply? First and foremost, my results strongly 
suggest that income and wealth should be treated as two distinct dimen-
sions of social stratification. Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare 
states (Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990; Gosta Esping-Andersen 1999), 
which still works reasonably well to describe national patterns of income 
inequality, cannot be applied when it comes to wealth. In light of the 
growing importance of wealth as an income substitute in older age and 
during retirement, stratification research should focus on wealth ine-
qualities in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the level of 
social inequality in modern societies. Further, my results lay the founda-
tions for research on the sources and consequences of wealth and wealth 
inequality. Especially interesting are the national groups with different 
levels of income and wealth inequality: broadly, the Northern and 
Southern European countries. As such, this chapter sets the scene for 
the following chapters of this thesis, which will built upon this descrip-
tive introduction. 
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3 THE COMPOSITION OF WEALTH: INCOME-RICH – ASSET-POOR? 
A slightly different German version of this chapter has been published in Berliner Journal 
für Soziologie (Skopek, Kolb, Buchholz, and Blossfeld 2012). 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Socio-economic status as a key variable in social stratification research 
has, until now, been mapped primarily via occupational position and 
income. Considering the significant increase in employment uncertainty 
and employment risks since the 1980s (Blossfeld et al. 2007; Giesecke 
2006; Kurz et al. 2008), it appears more and more inadequate to attempt 
to capture social inequalities via indicators that are solely related to the 
individual labor market position, particularly with regard to income. 
Income is a flow measure which can, for example, only partly account 
for individuals who do not participate in the labor force (e.g. homemak-
ers) or for life stages in which a person does typically not participate in 
the labor market (especially retirement). In contrast to income, wealth – 
typically defined as financial plus real assets net of debts on them (i.e. 
net worth) – is a stock figure. Wealth can, for example, serve as a protec-
tion against foreseeable and unforeseeable financial difficulties resulting 
from job loss, divorce, or retirement. Thus, the consideration of accumu-
lated wealth – alongside earned income – allows researchers to account 
for all persons in all life stages. In addition, wealth, or indeed its ab-
sence, can have more far-reaching and long-term implications for the 
individual’s economic well-being than income alone. Despite the obvi-
ous relevance of wealth as an indicator of socio-economic status, for a 
very long time, social stratification research paid little attention to it. 
Only very recently, there can be observed a growing interest among so-
cial stratification scholars in addressing wealth as a determinant – but 
also as a dimension – of economic and in a broader sense social inequal-
ity.  
Just like the one preceding it, this chapter has a strong empirical focus. 
My aim is to present empirical validation for the theoretical understand-
ing of wealth as a separate dimension of social stratification and social 
inequality. In a first step, I will empirically determine the income-wealth 
relationship. If the income-rich (income-poor) and the asset-rich (asset-
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poor) were the same group of persons, this would indicate a very strong 
accumulation of financial advantages for this particular group. In a sec-
ond step, I will analyze the composition of wealth to establish whether 
households in different income groups hold different types of assets. 
Determining the composition of wealth is relevant for social stratifica-
tion research, as different types of assets entail different advantages and 
disadvantages. A particular focus is set here on the distribution of own-
er-occupied housing as the quantitatively most important component of 
wealth in most countries (e.g. Kolb, Skopek, and Blossfeld 2013; Lewin-
Epstein, Elmelech, and Semyonov 1997; Krivo and Kaufman 2004). Fi-
nally, I am also interested in the marginal impact of the various wealth 
components on national levels of wealth inequality, which have been 
described in chapter 2. Carrying out a decomposition analysis, I intend 
to find out whether a certain wealth component has an equalizing or 
disequalizing effect on overall levels of wealth inequality. 
For my empirical analyses, I make use of the data from the second wave 
of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 
which provides comprehensive information on the financial situation of 
older households in 13 European countries. Studying the distribution of 
wealth within a population segment who have either already entered 
retirement, or are close to it, offers at least two undeniable advantages: 
first, it provides information on how successful individuals have been in 
accumulating wealth over their life course, and thus enables me to ana-
lyze the outcomes of the process of wealth accumulation. Second, be-
cause a substantial fraction of individuals over 50 are already out of the 
labor force, they will rely more on wealth than on income, which makes 
wealth a very important source of financial well-being for this population 
segment. This applies even more in the light of population aging, which 
is accompanied by cuts in public pension generosity, and consequently 
in an increasing importance of private provision for old age.  
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3.2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
3.2.1 THE INCOME-WEALTH RELATIONSHIP 
The study of social stratification has, until recently, been characterized 
by an almost exclusive focus on inequalities deriving directly from the 
labor market, above all (earned) income. However, income is only one 
dimension of economic well-being. Recent studies increasingly empha-
size the importance of wealth for a comprehensive understanding of 
social stratification (Spilerman 2000; Elmelech 2008; Semyonov and 
Lewin-Epstein 2011). While both income and wealth represent im-
portant components of an individual’s economic standing, each has 
different properties. Income, generally understood as earned income, is 
a flow measure that represents an economic entity’s financial situation 
at a certain point in time, or over a minor interval (usually a week, 
month or year). Income can considerably vary from one period to the 
next, and is usually bound to persons that are or have been actively en-
gaged in the labor market. Wealth, on the other hand, is a stock figure 
that is accumulated over a longer period. Compared to income, which 
can be either consumed or saved (invested), wealth has many functions. 
These include an income function, an utility function, a security func-
tion, a power function, a social status maintenance function, a socializa-
tion function, and an inheritance function (Frick and Grabka 2009: 62). 
Whereas earned income stems from labor market activity, wealth can be 
derived through two channels: it can either be self-accumulated 
(saved/invested income), or it can stem from transfers (inter vivo trans-
fers or bequests). Unlike income, the stock of wealth accumulated repre-
sents resources of the individual’s past, present, and future (potential) 
financial well-being (Cowell, Karagiannaki, and McKnight 2012). Anoth-
er important characteristic of wealth, further distinguishing it from in-
come, is that once a certain amount of wealth has been accumulated it 
will replicate itself through the mechanism of compound interest. The 
growth in wealth will be exponential, as future accumulation depends on 
current accumulation. At the same time, the state of having no or only 
low wealth is likely to be persistent over time. From this it follows that 
the process of wealth accumulation is a typical process of cumulative 
advantage (DiPrete and Eirich 2006: 272f.). Inequality of advantage 
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grows over time. This is one important reason why the distribution of 
wealth is likely to be more unequal than the distribution of income. If, 
moreover, income and wealth prove to be strongly positively correlated 
this would indicate an even stronger process of cumulative advantage: 
fundamentally, those with high (low) income are those with high (low) 
wealth, and this status is characterized by an increase of advantage (dis-
advantage) over time. High (low) income individuals thus profit from a 
“double advantage (disadvantage)” with regard to financial well-being. 
Previous studies indicate that a sole focus on earned income may lead to 
a one-sided or even inaccurate picture of economic inequality. For ex-
ample, it has been found that levels of wealth inequality differ signifi-
cantly from those of income inequality in a number of countries, among 
them Sweden, for example. This country is known for its equal distribu-
tion of income, but exhibits a very high level of wealth inequality 
(Cowell, Karagiannaki, and McKnight 2012; Sierminska, Brandolini, and 
Smeeding 2006). Other countries, however, exhibit similar levels of ine-
quality in income and private wealth, among them the USA and Germa-
ny (Sierminska, Brandolini, and Smeeding 2006; Davies et al. 2008). 
Obviously, determinants of wealth inequality differ from those of in-
come inequality, at least in some countries. As already explained above, 
wealth inequalities are typically more pronounced than income inequali-
ties. Empirical studies support this argument (Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini, 
and Ríos-Rull 1997; Davies and Shorrocks 2000; Keister and Moeller 
2000). In addition, the correlation between income and wealth is weaker 
than often assumed, with correlation coefficients around 0.5 for earned 
income in the USA and Canada (Budria Rodriguez et al. 2002; Díaz-
Giménez, Glover, and Ríos-Rull 2011; Brzozowski et al. 2010) and 0.6 for 
disposable income in the USA (Budria Rodriguez et al. 2002; Díaz-
Giménez, Glover, and Ríos-Rull 2011). Wolff (1996) states that this ra-
ther weak relationship can be partly traced back to the fact that the top 
wealth deciles earn very little compared to the wealth they hold, as they 
can generate income from their assets. This points to a previously men-
tioned characteristic of wealth (or of the wealthy themselves): the charac-
teristic of self-reproduction. The relationship between earned income 
and wealth is further weakened by the fact that consumption in retire-
ment is financed through transfers (public pensions) and accumulated 
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wealth. Consequently, Henretta and Campbell (1978) understand wealth 
as “an important aspect of economic and social status, particularly for 
the elderly”. 
Based upon these arguments, and on the findings presented in chapter 
2, I assume that, a sole concentration on the distribution of income can 
only partly capture individual economic welfare –especially with regard 
to the older population – and that, secondly, the level of income inequali-
ty alone is an inadequate predictor of social inequality. 
3.2.2 THE COMPOSITION OF WEALTH 
Various studies have been able to show that the composition of wealth 
differs between countries (Christelis, Japelli, and Padula 2005), but also 
within countries along the income and wealth distributions, as well as 
according to socio-demographic variables such as age, gender or race 
(Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Choudhury 2003; Thompson 2013; Keister 
2004). These differences in the wealth portfolio are of relevance for so-
cial stratification, as different types of assets entail different advantages 
and disadvantages. Financial assets, especially money in bank accounts, 
can be accessed quickly and easily, and can thus be used to facilitate 
consumption, while real assets, like housing, cannot. On the other hand, 
compared to real assets, financial assets are much more subject to inter-
est rate changes and inflation, as compared to real assets. Furthermore, 
different types of assets are associated with different rates of return 
(Davies and Shorrocks 2000: 644). Assuming that the composition of 
wealth held by individuals is stable over time, information about interest 
rate changes of various types of assets can help to explain temporal varia-
tions in the distribution of wealth (Davies and Shorrocks 2000).  
In quantitative terms, residential property occupies a central position in 
the wealth portfolio of households (Kolb, Skopek, and Blossfeld 2013; 
Lewin-Epstein, Elmelech, and Semyonov 1997; Krivo and Kaufman 
2004). Nonetheless, when looking at wealth distributions internationally, 
differences in the quantitative importance of residential property in the 
population as a whole as well as over the different income quartiles may 
emerge. For Spain, Azpitarte (2010) showed that the wealth portfolio of 
households in the upper wealth deciles is fairly balanced, containing 
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residential property and other housing, as well as stocks and shares. For 
the middle wealth deciles, residential property is by far the most im-
portant wealth component. The wealth portfolio of the lower wealth 
deciles is mainly made up of consumer goods such as cars or televisions. 
Similar findings have also been reported for other countries, among 
them the USA (Kessler and Wolff 1991; Wolff 1994), Italy (Brandolini et 
al. 2006), and France (Denis Kessler and Wolff 1991).  
As I am especially interested in the income-wealth relationship, in this 
chapter I will analyze and compare the wealth portfolio of different in-
come groups in the 13 European countries that participated in the sec-
ond SHARE wave. According to the findings of Azpitarte (2010), I expect 
homeownership to be the dominant asset in the wealth portfolio of the 
lower and middle-income groups, especially in countries with high 
homeownership rates, such as Spain. The wealth portfolio of the higher 
income groups I expect to be more diversified, with a higher importance 
of financial assets compared to the lower income groups. Financial as-
sets I expect to be more prevalent in countries with lower homeowner-
ship rates.  
3.2.3 THE DECOMPOSITION OF WEALTH INEQUALITY 
In a third step, I will decompose national levels of household wealth 
inequality, which have already been presented in the previous chapter, to 
find out about the contribution of certain wealth components to the level 
of overall wealth inequality. A decomposition of total wealth inequality 
for the different components of wealth has rarely been conducted so far. 
Exceptions are the works of Azpitarte (2010) for Spain and Brandolini, 
Cannari, Alessio, and Faiella (2004) for Italy. Azpitarte (2010) was able to 
show that housing wealth in Spain, where homeownership is very wide-
spread, can be considered as an equalizing component in total wealth 
inequality, at least from a pure relative inequality approach. He identi-
fied financial assets as disequalizing factors, whose value and portfolio 
share increase with the level of household wealth. Brandolini et al. 
(2004) found an increase in wealth inequality in Italy during the 1990s, 
which they trace back to an increase in the concentration of financial 
wealth.  
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I am especially interested in the question as to whether housing wealth 
has a disequalizing effect on overall levels of wealth inequality not only 
in countries with high homeownership rates, like Spain, but also in 
countries with low homeownership rates.  
3.3 DATA AND METHODS 
3.3.1 DATA 
In my analysis, I make use of the second wave of the SHARE data.11 
This survey is an international, representative panel study of the popula-
tion of Europe aged 50 years and older. It provides detailed, internation-
ally comparable information on the financial and housing situation of 
older households. Compared to the overall population, the SHARE pop-
ulation is likely to possess higher wealth holdings: firstly, they have 
simply had more time to accumulate wealth (although of course also to 
“de-accumulate” some of it); secondly, they are more likely to have re-
ceived an inheritance; and thirdly, a large part of the debt of this popula-
tion is likely to have already been repaid.  
In the second SHARE wave, conducted in 2006/2007, 33,281 people in 
22,721 households from 13 EU member states participated. Table 4 illus-
trates the sample sizes per country. I decided to work with the second 
wave only as, at the time of writing this chapter, it covered the broadest 
range of countries and contained the most detailed information on pri-
vate wealth holdings. A typical problem of questions addressing finan-
cial aspects is a high rate of item-nonresponse (Riphahn and Serfling 
                                                          
 
11  “This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011. The SHARE 
data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 
5th framework programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme 
Quality of Life), through the 6th framework programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-
2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-
028812) and through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and 
SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U .S. National Institute on Aging 
(U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 
and OGH A 04-064, IAG B SR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national 
sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of 
funding institutions).” 
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2005). The SHARE team is tackling this problem by applying a multiple 
imputation strategy for filling in missing values.12 All financial values 
are adjusted for differences in the purchasing power of money across 
countries and over time (the reference is Germany in 2005; see 
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging 2011 for fur-
ther information) and refer to the household level.  
Table 4: Sample size 
 Country Observations Percent 
 AT - Austria 897 4.28% 
 BE - Belgium 2,022 9.65% 
Central CH - Switzerland 967 4.62% 
Europe DE - Germany 1,550 7.40% 
 FR - France 1,844 8.80% 
 NL - Netherlands 1,710 8.16% 
    
Northern DK - Denmark 1,663 7.94% 
Europe SE - Sweden 1,725 8.24% 
    
Southern ES - Spain 1,279 6.11% 
Europe GR - Greece 2,083 9.95% 
 IT - Italy 1,786 8.53% 
    
Eastern CZ - Czech Republic 1,722 8.22% 
Europe PL - Poland 1,697 8.10% 
    
 Total 20,945 100.00% 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0). Own calculations. 
The key variables in my analysis are net income and net worth which I 
disaggregate into the following components: net financial assets (gross 
financial assets net of debts on them), net real assets (gross real assets, 
excluding housing wealth, net of debts on them) and net housing wealth 
(i.e. owner-occupied housing). In order to prevent problems of compara-
bility of values of net worth across countries to the greatest extent, and in 
consistency with previous research, I further divide median net worth at 
time t by median net income at time t, and express net worth in terms of 
yearly income. I label this measure as “wealth rate”. 
                                                          
 
12  Five values were estimated for every missing value. All the analyses reported below I 
ran across the five imputations. A more detailed description of the imputation method 
used in the SHARE can be found in Christelis (2011). For further information on mul-
tiple imputation see Rubin (1987).  
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3.3.2 METHODS 
I apply descriptive methods and correlation analyses to empirically de-
termine the income-wealth relationship and the composition of wealth, 
measured as net worth. To examine the marginal impact of various 
wealth sources on overall wealth inequality in the 13 European countries 
in question, I apply the Gini decomposition, as proposed by Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1985). The Gini coefficient is a widely-used measure for eco-
nomic inequality in the social sciences. For the analysis presented in this 
book, it is also the most appropriate measure, since the Gini coefficient 
allows for zero and negative values, which are likely to emerge for net 
worth.13 For income and wealth (net worth) as discrete variables, the 
Gini coefficient is defined as the ratio to the mean of half the average 
over all pairs (i, j) of absolute deviations of income (y) or wealth (w) 
between (in this case) households, as has been illustrated in Formula 2. 
The Gini coefficient ranges between zero (total equality) and one (total 
inequality).14 In a next step, I will decompose overall wealth inequality 
G(w) by the different wealth components. According to the decomposi-
tion method of Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), which is based on the work 
of Shorrocks (1982), overall wealth inequality G can be decomposed as 
follows:  
∑
K
k
kkk RGSG
1=
=       (3) 
Sk is the share of the wealth component k in total wealth, Gk is the Gini 
of wealth component k, and Rk (the so-called Gini correlation) is the 
correlation of wealth component k with the distribution of total wealth. 
                                                          
 
13  However this applies only as long as mean net worth is not lower than zero (Jenkins 
and Jäntti 2005), which is the case here. 
14  The Gini coefficient might, however, take on values above one, if the mean of a certain 
wealth component is lower than zero. This results in a loss of explanatory power re-
garding quantitative differences between the inequality of two distributions of in-
come/wealth (e.g. inequality in country A is twice as large as in country B), but not in 
terms of qualitative differences (e.g. inequality in country A is larger than in country 
B). 
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Rk indiates whether a certain wealth component k has an equalizing or 
disequalizing effect on overall wealth inequality. It is similar to Pear-
son’s product-moment correlation (Pearson 1896) as well as to 
Spearman's rank-order correlation (Spearman 1904) and is defined as 
ranging between minus one and one. A positive (negative) value of Rk 
means that k has a disequalizing (equalizing) effect on overall wealth 
inequality G (Lerman and Yitzhaki 1985: 152). Finally, the percentage 
contribution P of a certain asset component k to overall wealth inequality 
G can be rewritten as: 
G
RGSP kkkk        (4) 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 THE INCOME-WEALTH RELATIONSHIP 
In a first step, I intend to establish the empirical determination of the 
income-wealth relationship. Figure 5 shows the percentage share of total 
wealth by the four income quartiles for all 13 European countries in my 
sample. If the two measures were perfectly correlated, wealth would be 
equally distributed over the income quartiles, which is obviously not the 
case. Substantiating both theoretical considerations and past research, 
income and wealth show a positive correlation (see Figure 7). Higher 
income quartiles possess higher wealth holdings. Yet in Greece, Poland, 
and Spain, the percentage share of total wealth of the first income quar-
tile is higher than that of the second one. The share of total wealth of the 
two lower income quartiles is relatively small (less than 30%) in Switzer-
land, Germany, France, and the two Scandinavian countries Sweden and 
Denmark. In contrast to this, the two lower income quartiles can be 
labeled as “asset rich” in the Southern European countries (Spain, 
Greece, Italy) as well as in the two post- socialist countries (Czech Re-
public, Poland), where they hold around 40% of total net worth. 
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Figure 5: Percentage share of total net worth by income quartile 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0). Own calculations. 
Figure 6 shows median wealth holdings for the overall population in the 
13 countries and by income quartiles. My wealth measure is median net 
worth in terms of median income – the wealth rate. This relative wealth 
measure expresses each quartile’s wealth holdings relative to their (last) 
annual income. The highest overall wealth rates can be found in Spain, 
followed by Italy, the lowest in Sweden and Poland. In most countries, 
the wealth rate actually decreases over the income quartiles. A very im-
pressive example is Spain, where the first income quartile holds, on 
average, wealth to the value of 45 times that of their annual income. In 
Greece, too, the wealth rate of the first quartile is extraordinarily high. In 
the two Scandinavian countries Denmark and Sweden, but also in Ger-
many, the wealth rate increases over the income quartiles. Also very 
interesting is the fact that in all countries, even the lowest income quar-
tiles hold wealth equal to at least five times their annual income. Alt-
hough this might partly be explained by the age structure of the SHARE 
population, this is still a quite remarkable number. It seems as if the 
SHARE population has been fairly successful in the accumulation of 
wealth over their life course. 
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3.4.2 THE COMPOSITION OF WEALTH 
My next step is to analyze the composition of wealth. Again, I will pre-
sent a breakdown by income quartile, to see whether the composition of 
wealth of low-income households differs from that of high-income 
households, or if the latter just possess more of everything. In a first 
step, however, I will examine the homeownership rates across the 13 
countries, as illustrated in Figure 8. In line with past findings, home 
ownership is not very common in Central and Northern European coun-
tries such as Austria, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland. On the other 
hand, homeownership is a widespread phenomenon in the three South-
ern European countries represented in SHARE. The high homeowner-
ship rates in these countries might explain the high share of wealth of 
the lower income quartiles within these countries, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5, as well as their high wealth rates, as illustrated in Figure 6. The 
high homeownership rates in these countries might explain the high 
share of wealth of the lower income quartiles within these countries, as 
illustrated in Figure 5, as well as their high wealth rates, as illustrated in 
Figure 6. Castles and Ferrera (1996) state that the Southern European 
countries are an interesting exception among the advanced industrial-
ized countries, as they combine high rates of homeownership with very 
generous public pensions. At the same time, however, these countries 
are characterized by a strong insider-outsider labor market: although 
welfare services are comparatively generous, they are only provided to 
those in core sector employment, while the increasing number of “out-
siders” (i.e. those persons who are either unemployed or working in the 
informal sector, especially if they don’t have family) receive very little 
(Allen and Maloutas 2004: 191). In this regard, the high homeownership 
rates in Southern Europe can be understood as a compensation for the 
poor safety net, an argument originally presented by Kemeny (1981). In 
most countries, homeownership rates increase over the income quar-
tiles. In Spain and Greece, however, homeownership rates stay almost 
constant over all income quartiles.  
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Figure 9: Composition of household wealth, overall  
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0). Own calculations. 
Figure 9 shows the composition of wealth across the 13 countries in my 
sample. Corresponding to past research, housing wealth is the quantita-
tively most important component of the households’ wealth portfolio in 
all countries. In the Southern European countries Spain and Italy, the 
two post-socialist countries, and in Austria, the contribution of housing 
to total wealth is around 70%. 
Overall, the relative importance of financial wealth, as compared to 
housing wealth, is fairly low. While financial wealth has only a minor 
importance for the household wealth portfolio in the Southern European 
countries (8% or less), in the Northern European countries, but also in 
Belgium and Switzerland, financial wealth accounts for at least 24% of 
total household wealth. Christelis, Japelli, and Padula (2005: 317) sug-
gest a lower risk-adversity among the people in Nordic countries as a 
possible explanation for this finding. Alternative explanations might be 
country-specific cultural and historical factors that shape preferences for 
holding specific types of assets (Cowell, Karagiannaki, and McKnight 
2013), country-specific historical experiences (inflation or war experi-
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ence) (Feldstein 1995), or national differences in financial literacy 
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
Figure 10 again shows the composition of wealth, but now by income 
quartile. In fact, there are huge differences in the household wealth 
portfolio across income quartiles. In contrast to the homeownership rate 
(Figure 8), the share of housing wealth decreases over income quartiles 
in most countries. This is, however, less the case in the Southern Euro-
pean countries. In Poland, the share of housing wealth on total wealth 
actually increases over income quartiles. Housing wealth is quantitative-
ly the most important component of total household wealth in all coun-
tries, especially within the first and second income quartile. The wealth 
portfolio of the higher income quartiles is much more diversified com-
pared to the lower ones, which implies greater stability in the case of 
financial or housing market crises, as well as better protection against 
inflation. The overall trends in our results corroborate the results of past 
research. 
3.4.3 THE DECOMPOSITION OF WEALTH INEQUALITY 
In this final section, I shall consider inequality patterns with regard to 
the various wealth components. Using the Gini decomposition method 
as proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), I will also determine the 
relative contribution of each wealth component to each country’s overall 
level of wealth inequality. The columns of Table 5 refer to the compo-
nents of the Gini decomposition by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), dis-
cussed at greater length in the paragraph on my methods. The first col-
umn shows the Gini coefficient for overall wealth (G). Overall wealth 
inequality is high in Poland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, 
while it is relatively low in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic and the 
Southern European countries. This is in line with the results presented 
in chapter 2. A closer look at the Gini of the various wealth components 
(Gk) reveals an extraordinarily high level of inequality in real assets, 
especially in Poland and the Netherlands. Housing wealth is, however, 
relatively equally distributed. The level of inequality in financial assets 
lies between those of housing wealth and of real assets. Yet, in France, 
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Greece, Poland, Sweden and Spain, financial assets are less equally dis-
tributed than real assets. 
Figure 10: Composition of household wealth by income quartile 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0). Own calculations. 
Pk shows the percentage contribution of each wealth component to the 
overall level of wealth inequality. In Germany, for example, 19% of total 
wealth inequality is attributable to financial assets, 27% is attributable to 
real assets, and 54% is explained by housing wealth. The effect of each 
wealth component on overall wealth (Sk) is somewhat different, as al-
ready seen in Figure 5. Housing wealth, for example, accounts for as 
much as 57% of total wealth in Germany, while it accounts for only 54% 
of total wealth inequality there. This indicates an equalizing effect of 
housing wealth on total wealth inequality. In general, the contribution of 
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housing wealth to the explanation of total wealth inequality is relatively 
high (60% and more) in Austria, Italy, and Spain, as well as in the East-
ern European countries. These countries also show high rates of home-
ownership. In Belgium, France, and Greece, however, where home-
ownership rates are also very high, housing wealth contributes compara-
tively little to overall wealth inequality. The same applies for Denmark 
and Sweden. Conversely, these two countries also exhibit low homeown-
ership rates. Real assets contribute considerably to overall wealth ine-
quality (between 34% and 54%) in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden. In Belgium (31%), Denmark (33%) and Switzerland (25%), on 
the other hand, financial assets make a strong contribution to the expla-
nation of overall wealth inequality.  Finally, Rk shows the Gini correla-
tion of the various wealth components. Negative (positive) values indi-
cate an equalizing (disequalizing) effect of a certain wealth component k 
for overall wealth inequality G. In most countries, an increase in finan-
cial assets as well as in housing wealth would, ceteris paribus (c.p.), lead 
to a decrease in overall wealth inequality (negative correlation). Excep-
tions to this are Belgium, Denmark, Greece, and Poland. In these coun-
tries, an increase in financial assets would, c.p., lead to an increase in 
overall wealth inequality (positive correlation). An increase in real assets 
would, c.p., result in an increase in overall wealth inequality in all coun-
tries of our sample (positive correlation).  
3.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The aim of this chapter, as well as of the whole thesis, is to find empiri-
cal validation for the theoretical understanding of wealth as a separate 
determinant of economic standing – alongside income – and as a dis-
tinct dimension of social inequality. In a first step, I determined the 
income-wealth relationship. Commensurate with theoretical considera-
tions and past research, I found income and wealth to be positively cor-
related. Older European households, even those in the lowest income 
quartile, possess considerable amounts of wealth, equal to at least five 
times of their annual income.  
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In a second step, I analyzed the composition of wealth. In accordance 
with past research, I found significant differences in wealth portfolios 
across the income distribution. While owner-occupied housing is the 
most important wealth component in the countries’ overall wealth port-
folio, it is most meaningful for the middle income quartiles. Housing 
wealth is the dominant asset in the wealth portfolio of Spain and Italy, 
which exhibit very high rates of homeownership, but this is not the case 
in Belgium, where homeownership is also very common. The wealth 
portfolio of the top income quartiles is much more diversified than the 
lower ones’, and thus less sensitive to financial shocks. In the Southern 
and Eastern European countries, households’ wealth portfolios are 
strongly dominated by owner-occupied housing, while in the Northern 
European countries, financial wealth is relatively important for the 
households’ wealth portfolios. Households in Northern Europe can thus 
relatively easily access – and consume or reinvest – their wealth, while 
the wealth of the households in Southern European countries is less 
easy accessible and much less mobile. Compared to the Southern Euro-
pean countries, households in the Northern European countries are, 
however, more sensitive to financial shocks.  
In a third step, I analyzed the contribution of the specific wealth compo-
nents (financial assets, owner-occupied housing, and real assets) to the 
countries’ overall level of wealth inequality. Real assets are the most 
unequally distributed wealth component in all countries. The portfolio 
share of real assets increases with the level of household income. In all 
countries, an increase in real assets would result in an increase in the 
level of wealth inequality. Housing wealth and financial assets, on the 
other hand, were found to have an equalizing effect on wealth inequality 
in most countries. Overall, my results provide empirical evidence that 
the income rich are also the asset rich. The higher diversification of their 
wealth portfolios indicates the self-reinforcing nature of wealth, as well 
as that of wealth inequalities. 
Coming back to the second chapter of this thesis, the results presented 
here indicate a positive relationship between high levels of owner-
occupied housing – combined with the high importance of housing 
wealth in households’ wealth portfolios – and low levels of overall wealth 
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inequality. This relationship is also indicated by the disequalizing effect 
of housing wealth on overall levels of wealth inequality.  
My results can be understood as empirical support for the theoretical 
understanding of wealth as a separate dimension of social stratification. 
Knowledge regarding the levels and composition of household wealth 
can shed new light on the ongoing debate on old-age poverty. Even now, 
both poverty and richness are largely defined by disposable income, 
which is an incomplete definition of economic standing, as my results 
have shown. Depending on the wealth status of households in the vari-
ous countries discussed here, it may be the case that the problem of old-
age poverty has, until now, been both underestimated and overestimat-
ed. 
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4 MICRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF WEALTH:                              
THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF HOUSING INEQUALITY 
A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in Comparative Population 
Studies (Kolb, Skopek, and Blossfeld 2013). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Studying homeownership15 is of major sociological importance, as social 
inequalities are not only defined by educational, occupational or income 
inequalities, but also in terms of real property (Kurz and Blossfeld 
2004a; Lewin-Epstein, Elmelech, and Semyonov 1997). Homeownership 
is an important purpose in life for many people. Individuals claim dif-
ferent reasons for their desire to purchase residential property, among 
them: independence from the landlord; capital investment; a long-
lasting value which can also be transferred to the children; a secure old-
age provision16; long-term protection against inflation; and a higher 
quality of life (Faller et al. 2001; LBS (Bundesgeschäftsstelle 
Landesbausparkassen) 2004). Moreover, homeownership can serve as a 
symbol of status and success (Constant, Roberts, and Zimmermann 
2009). 
Various studies have revealed that residential property is an essential 
factor for wealth accumulation (Brandolini et al. 2006; Sierminska, 
Brandolini, and Smeeding 2007; Frick and Grabka 2009b), a finding that 
I could replicate in the previous chapter. Yet there are major differences 
in homeownership rates in Europe, which vary between 35 percent in 
Switzerland and 83 percent in Spain (Euroconstruct/ifo 2009). The dis-
tribution of homeownership in general, but also the analyses of socio-
economic determinants that affect the probability of becoming a home-
                                                          
 
15  With homeownership, I am referring to owner-occupied homeownership. The expres-
sions “residential property”, “homeownership” and “own homes” are used synony-
mously. The same applies to the expressions “housing value”, “real estate value” and 
“value of residential property”. 
16  Some authors (Castles 1998; Kemeny 1981) also argue that there might be a trade-off 
between the expansion of homeownership and the generosity of old-age pensions 
within countries. 
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owner, have received the attention of a number of researchers (among 
them Kurz and Blossfeld 2004; Wagner and Mulder 2000). I, however, 
argue that the differentiation between owners and non-owners is only 
one dimension of social inequality in housing. Being a homeowner does 
not necessarily imply that a household is wealthy, as the value of a house 
heavily depends on the location, the social environment (neighborhood) 
as well as the quality of the residential property (Besley and Mueller 
2009; Li and Brown 1980). The housing value reflects all these factors. 
Thus, in order to capture social inequality patterns in homeownership in 
their entity, it is important to also take into account the real estate value 
(see Figure 11), which has been a somewhat neglected aspect in research 
on housing in the social sciences so far (exceptions: Krivo and Kaufman 
2004; Lewin-Epstein et al. 1997).  
In this chapter, I will account for both of the above-mentioned dimen-
sions of social stratification in housing by analyzing whether various 
socio-economic household characteristics differently affect 1) the proba-
bility of being a homeowner and 2) the value of housing within different 
European countries. In addition to that, I am 3) interested in the rela-
tionship between these two dimensions of social stratification in hous-
ing. The contribution of this chapter is thus twofold: Firstly, I provide a 
broad international comparison of homeownership rates and housing 
values, and secondly, I explore the relationship between those two di-
mensions of housing (inequality).  
As in the previous chapter, the population on which I focus is elderly 
Europeans because it is at this stage of life that residential property is 
particularly common in all European societies (Sierminska, Brandolini, 
and Smeeding 2007). As the elderly are generally confronted with a con-
siderable fall in their income when they retire, their socio-economic 
position can only be adequately determined when additionally consider-
ing wealth (e.g. Spilerman 2000). The financial position of homeowners 
(especially if their housing is free from debts) is strengthened by the fact 
that they do not need to invest money to rent a house or flat, so that they 
can spend these resources on consumption or savings (Wolff 2005: 
1076). Considering the ageing of industrialized societies and the grow-
ing importance of private pension provision, I assume that wealth and 
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owner-occupied housing, as an important part of it, will even become 
more important in future. However, purchasing an apartment or a 
house can also have negative aspects, especially among the very old (75 
years and above). High financial burdens, mobility restrictions and high 
(transaction) costs when selling residential property are often associated 
with homeownership (Bourdieu 1998; Häußermann and Petrowsky 
1990; Häußermann and Siebel 2000; Sierminska, Brandolini, and 
Smeeding 2007). Moreover, in many cases housing is the only notewor-
thy wealth component of elderly households. As housing wealth is illiq-
uid wealth, it cannot directly be used for consumption. Therefore, elder-
ly homeowners are sometimes described as housing rich, but cash poor 
(Angelini, Brugiavini, and Weber 2009; Venti and Wise 2000).  
In the following section, I will give an overview of the current research 
on socio-economic characteristics affecting the probability of homeown-
ership and housing values. For my statistical analyses, I again use the 
second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE). I apply logistic regressions to analyze household characteris-
tics affecting the chance of being a homeowner, and linear regressions 
to analyze household characteristics that influence the value of housing 
among homeowners. I make use of a multilevel model to investigate the 
relationship between home-ownership rates and housing values. Con-
sidering housing inequality as a twofold process and analyzing it over a 
broad range of countries will enable social stratification scholars to ob-
tain a multidimensional understanding of social inequalities in housing.  
4.2 CURRENT RESEARCH AND EXPECTATIONS 
4.2.1 THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS ON     
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES AND HOUSING VALUES 
Housing is likely to be affected by various individual and household 
characteristics, such as age, household size, children, family status, edu-
cation, occupation, income, inheritances, migration status and urbaniza-
tion (Krivo and Kaufman 2004; Kurz and Blossfeld 2004a; Lewin-
Epstein, Elmelech, and Semyonov 1997). The impact of these socio-
economic characteristics does not necessarily need to be the same for 
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the two dimensions of housing inequality – homeownership rates and 
housing values.  
Figure 11: The two dimensions of social stratification in housing 
Note: Own illustration. 
In addition, the national institutional settings, characterized by a coun-
try’s welfare regime, should exert a major influence on its housing situa-
tion (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004a). Welfare regimes can affect the individ-
ual chances and incentives to acquire property (e.g. through taxation or 
housing allowances). Differences in social security systems, especially 
retirement systems, may affect the need to own a home as a part of pri-
vate old-age provision (Dewilde and Raeymaeckers 2008). For example, 
homeownership plays a crucial role for old-age provisions in Southern 
European countries. These countries are characterized by a strong insid-
er-outsider labor market. Thus, although welfare services are compara-
tively generous, they are only provided to those in core sector employ-
ment, while the increasing number of “outsiders” (i.e. those persons 
who are either unemployed or working in the informal sector, especially 
if they don’t have family) receive very little (Allen and Maloutas 2004: 
191). This stands in contrast to the universalistic Northern European 
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welfare system, where the overall population is entitled to welfare state 
provision (Allen and Maloutas 2004: 191). Moreover, there is a strong 
promotion of housing in Southern European countries, which is provid-
ed by the (extended) family that supports access to housing through the 
development of strategies that can secure housing for family members 
(Allen and Maloutas 2004: 190). In this regard, the high homeownership 
rates in Southern Europe can be understood as a compensation for the 
poor safety net, an argument originally presented by Kemeny (1981). As 
a result, in Southern European countries, residential property is the 
main if not the only wealth component in the household wealth portfo-
lio, while in Northern Europe, it is of less importance (Sierminska, 
Brandolini, and Smeeding 2007). In order to capture country-specific 
differences in homeownership rates and housing values in my analyses, 
I will distinguish between Northern and Central Europe, following the 
welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), as well as and South-
ern and Post-socialist countries. Finally, welfare regimes can also influ-
ence the patterns and intensities of social inequalities in housing arising 
from the above-named socioeconomic characteristics. 
The life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954) states that 
wealth grows with advancing age, as people accumulate increasing 
amounts of wealth throughout their working lives by saving parts of 
their income in order to keep their consumption level stable over their 
life course. When entering retirement, they then start “dissaving” (con-
suming their wealth). I assume that homeownership rates follow a simi-
lar pattern (Artle and Varaiya 1978). However, different studies have 
shown that the probability of being a homeowner only starts to decrease 
significantly from the age of 70 onwards (Tatsiramos 2006; Venti and 
Wise 2000). The reasons for this decrease are that the elderly put their 
homes in their children’s names (e.g. for fiscal reasons), or sell them in 
case of the loss of the partner through death (Chiuri and Jappelli 2010), 
or to finance the move into an old people’s home or into a smaller (rent-
ed) flat (Häußermann and Siebel 2000; Mulder and Wagner 1998). Yet, 
it has been found that many elderly retain their homes, which means 
that they have a high stock of illiquid capital that cannot be used directly 
for consumption (Angelini, Brugiavini, and Weber 2009; Attanasio, 
Leicester, and Wakefield 2011). A possible explanation for this finding 
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might be the individuals’ motivation to bequeath their home to their 
children. Regarding my sample of elderly households, the homeowner-
ship rate should already be at its peak (Scanlon and Whitehead 2004), 
and should only slightly start to decrease with age. Given the current 
(market) value of residential property, I do not see any reason to expect 
differences over age in my sample. However, processes like “ageing in 
place” (which might result in age-homogenous residential areas) may 
result in decreasing housing values as people age. As this most often 
takes place in suburban areas (Frey 2011; Swiaczny, Graze, and 
Schlömer 2008), I argue that I can control for this effect by differentiat-
ing between urban and sub-urban areas in my analyses.17  
The literature unanimously reports that household composition is cru-
cial for the homeownership situation. Couples and families with chil-
dren in particular live in their own homes more often compared to sin-
gles (Davidov and Weick 2011; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 2000; 
Mulder 2006; Wagner and Mulder 2000). In general, the probability of 
living in one’s own home increases with a growing number of people 
living in the household, as residential property is often associated with a 
family-friendly residential area and comfortable living accommodation 
(Häußermann and Siebel 2000; Mulder and Wagner 1998). The value of 
residential property is also found to be positively influenced by the 
number of household members (Lewin-Epstein, Elmelech, and 
Semyonov 1997). When it comes to the property value, I assume that 
having a partner also has a positive effect, while I have no clear assump-
tions for parenthood and household size.18 Finally, I expect family-
related characteristics to be especially important in Southern European 
welfare states where families have a central influence on the standard of 
                                                          
 
17  Another phenomenon that might lead to decreasing housing values over age is the 
process of “asset meltdown”. Yet, so far there is no empirical evidence that this process 
is actually taking place (see for example Börsch-Supan, Heiss, Ludwig, and Winter 
2003). 
18  This is because more living space is needed with an increasing number of people 
living in a household, and at least in multigenerational households more people can 
help finance the property. However, more people and having children cause higher 
costs that reduce the financial resources available to purchase residential property, 
which could have a diminishing effect on the residential property value as well. 
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living and therefore also on the homeownership situation (Gosta Esping-
Andersen 1990). 
Previous studies have emphasized the significant influence of an indi-
vidual’s educational (and occupational19) status on the transition to 
homeownership (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004a; Wagner and Mulder 2000). 
Additionally, the chance of receiving bequests or inheritances increases 
with higher educational and occupational status, as these individuals 
often originate from higher-status families (Blau and Duncan 1967; 
Sandra Buchholz 2008; Szydlik and Schupp 2004). I expect educational 
attainment levels and income to increase the probability of homeowner-
ship as well as the value of residential property. The educational level 
should be particularly important in countries with a highly standardized, 
stratified education system and a strong vocational specificity (like Ger-
many and Switzerland), as the impact of formal qualifications on the 
employment career, and therefore on the potential of wealth accumula-
tion, shall be especially strong in these countries (Müller and Shavit 
1998). In addition to that, I expect that households who received finan-
cial gifts or inheritances have a higher probability of being homeowners. 
Furthermore, if they own a dwelling it might be of higher value as inter-
generational transfers enhance the household’s wealth position. 
In the U.S., households with migration background, especially those of 
African-American and Latin-American origin, are less likely to own resi-
dential property, and if they realize homeownership, their houses are 
often of low value (Krivo and Kaufman 2004; Lewin-Epstein, Elmelech, 
and Semyonov 1997; Parcel 1982). Although a higher educational back-
ground and growing income weaken the negative impact of a migration 
background on the likelihood of homeownership, different studies show 
clear evidence that even when controlling for these variables, discrimina-
tion on the housing market can still be observed (Chiteji and Stafford 
1999; Horton and Thomas 1998; Krivo and Kaufman 2004). Possible 
explanations of these findings are migrants’ disadvantaged labor market 
position, the fact that migrants less often receive bequests and inher-
                                                          
 
19  Occupational status is not included in my analyses as many people in my sample are 
already retired and their (former) occupational status is then unknown. 
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itances, migrants’ information deficit on the local housing market, as 
well as discrimination against migrants in the credit approval process 
(Charles and Hurst 2002; Krivo and Kaufman 2004; Szydlik and Schupp 
2004). So far, the question of whether this holds true for European coun-
tries as well is unresolved.  
Due to the high real estate prices, greater financial resources are needed 
in cities in order to gain access to homeownership, thus reducing the 
probability of owning residential property (Kurz and Blossfeld 2004a). 
However, if owner-occupied housing has been realized successfully, it 
should consequently be of higher value in urban communities. 
4.2.2 LINKING HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES TO HOUSING VALUES 
In addition to the socio-economic factors that have an impact on home-
ownership rates and housing values, I am interested if there is a system-
atic relationship between these two dimensions. More precisely, I want 
to find out if high homeownership rates correlate with high housing 
values (positive relationship) or if they can only be realized at the cost of 
low housing values (negative relationship). To my knowledge, social 
stratification research has not yet adequately addressed this question. 
Theoretically, a positive as well as a negative relationship are imaginable. 
Firstly, in countries with low ownership rates it might be the case that 
only a very selective group of better-off households achieves homeown-
ership what would then result in high mean housing values (Poggio 
2006). If this were the case, the homogeneous socio-economic composi-
tion of this group would be the explanation for the high mean housing 
values in these countries. Likewise, in countries with high homeowner-
ship rates homeowners might be a rather heterogeneous group (every-
body has access to housing), which should lead to low mean housing 
values on the aggregate level, given that a large share of those home-
owners cannot afford high-value housing.  
Secondly, if a country’s rental market is unattractive as compared to the 
homeownership market (e.g. low quality of rented housing or small 
rental sector), being a homeowner might be an interesting, desirable 
alternative to renting a home. If demand for homeownership is high, 
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housing prices are likely to increase. This however might still not deter 
individuals from buying residential property, pushing up housing prices 
even further. Thus, an unattractive renting market might lead to a posi-
tive relationship between homeownership rates and housing values. By 
running a set of multilevel regressions, I am statistically testing whether 
country-level variables can explain the variation in (individual) housing 
values. 
4.3 DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
4.3.1 DATA 
In my analyses, just as in the previous chapter, I make use of the second 
wave of the SHARE data20. This survey is an international, representa-
tive panel study of the population aged 50 years and older. The main 
advantage of the SHARE data is that it provides detailed, internationally 
comparable information on the financial and housing situation of 
households. As waves one and two were conducted in a rather narrow 
period of time (2004 to 2007) and for reasons of comparability with the 
previous chapter, I decided to work with the second wave only. The ob-
servation that becoming a homeowner in the life course is a slow pro-
cess with few events encourages my decision (Venti and Wise 1989).  
In the second wave, conducted in 2006/2007, 33,281 people in 22,721 
households from 13 EU member states participated in the survey. After 
eliminating households with missing or implausible values as well as 
households where none of the individuals interviewed were aged 50+ 
                                                          
 
20  “This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011. The SHARE 
data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 
5th framework programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme 
Quality of Life), through the 6th framework programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-
2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-
028812) and through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and 
SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U .S. National Institute on Aging 
(U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 
and OGH A 04-064, IAG B SR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national 
sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of 
funding institutions).” 
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(148 households), my final dataset contains 20,94521 households. Table 6 
illustrates the sample size per country. 
A typical problem of questions addressing financial aspects is a high rate 
of item-nonresponse (Riphahn and Serfling 2005). The SHARE team is 
tackling this problem by applying a multiple imputation strategy for 
filling in missing values.22 All financial values are adjusted for differ-
ences in the purchasing power of money across countries and over time 
(see Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging 2010 for 
further information). 
Table 6: Sample size 
Country Observations Percent 
AT - Austria 897 4.28% 
DE - Germany 1,550 7.40% 
SE - Sweden 1,725 8.24% 
NL - Netherlands 1,710 8.16% 
ES - Spain 1,279 6.11% 
IT - Italy 1,786 8.53% 
FR - France 1,844 8.80% 
DK - Denmark 1,663 7.94% 
GR - Greece 2,083 9.95% 
CH - Switzerland 967 4.62% 
BE - Belgium 2,022 9.65% 
CZ - Czech Republic 1,722 8.22% 
PL - Poland 1,697 8.10% 
Total 20,945 100.00% 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0). Own calculations.  
4.3.2 VARIABLES  
 Homeowner is the dependent variable in my first set of anal-
yses. It differentiates between households owning residential 
                                                          
 
21  For my analyses, I eliminated households with missing or implausible values in the 
following variables: owner (n=334), family status (n=3), migration status (n=88), edu-
cational level (n=60), retirement status (n=266), financial transfers/inheritances 
(n=260) and residential area (n=1,462). 
22  Five values were estimated for every missing value. All the analyses reported below, I 
ran across the five imputations. A more detailed description of the imputation method 
used in the SHARE can be found in Christelis (2011). For further information on mul-
tiple imputation see Rubin (1987). 
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property (=owners) and households not owning residential 
property (=non-owners). 
 Financial value of residential property is the dependent variable 
in my second set of analyses.23 Financial value stands for the 
subjective market value estimated by the financial respondent.24 
It ranges between €025 and €27,950,000. As the distribution of 
this variable is very much skewed to the right, I use the varia-
ble’s log value in my analyses. 
 Age corresponds to the mean age of all household members 
surveyed. Age ranges between 34 (for households with people 
aged above and below 50 years) and 104 years. I also calculated 
age square to test the assumption that the rate of homeowner-
ship first increases with age and then starts to decrease. 
 Household size controls for the number of individuals living in 
a household. It ranges between 1 and 14 persons. 
 Family status informs whether the main respondent is living 
together with a spouse (family status=1) or as a single person 
(family status=0). 
 Children controls for parenthood of the main respondent and 
his/her spouse, irrespective of whether the child still lives in the 
parental household. 
 Migration status informs whether the main respondent and/or 
his/her spouse were born abroad (migrations status=1). 
                                                          
 
23  As I am interested in the actual value of residential property and not in households’ 
level of indebtedness, I do not take into account the net but the gross value (market 
value). The fact that it is likely that the households are in different stages of their re-
payment and that the method of financing homeownership varies widely between 
countries makes it even more plausible for me to make use of the gross housing value. 
24  The exact question in the SHARE questionnaire was: “In your opinion, how much 
would you receive if you sold your property today?” 
25  Twenty households were assigned a housing value of zero. I kept them in the sample 
but for the analysis of the housing value, I added €1 to those households in order to 
calculate the logarithm of those housing values. 
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 Educational level (7 categories, ISCED-coded) equals the highest 
educational attainment level of the main respondent and 
his/her spouse. It ranges between 0 (pre-primary education) 
and 6 (second stage of tertiary education). 
 I operationalize household income as total net annual income26 
and make use of an equivalence scale (total income divided by 
the root of the number of persons living in a household) to ac-
count for household size. It ranges from €0 to €727,000. 
 Retirement status differentiates between households where the 
main respondent and/or his/her spouse are already retired vs. 
households where none of them is retired yet. As a large pro-
portion of household members in the dataset are already re-
tired, I use this variable for control reasons. 
 Gifts and inheritances controls for whether a household has ev-
er received a financial gift, inherited money, goods or property 
(of at least €5,000). 
 Urban area informs whether a household is located in a big city 
or in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city (urban area=1) or in a 
small town or a rural area or village (urban area=0). 
                                                          
 
26  “The SHARE income measure reflects money income [after] taxes on a yearly base and 
includes only regular payments. Lump-sum payments and financial support provided 
by parents, relatives or other people are not included. The available data at the individ-
ual level include: income from employment; income from self-employment or work 
for a family business; income from (public or private) pensions or invalidity or unem-
ployment benefits; income from alimony or other private regular payments; income 
from long-term care insurance (only for Austria and Germany). The available data at 
the household level include: income from household members not interviewed; in-
come from other payments, such as housing allowances, child benefits, poverty relief, 
etc.; income actually received from secondary homes, holiday homes or real estate, 
land or forestry; capital income [. . .]. For homeowners, the data at the household level 
also include imputed rent, based on the self-assessed home value minus the net resid-
ual value of the debt (payments for mortgages or loans). The interest rate used for im-
puted rents is fixed at 4% for all countries. The SHARE definition of income does not 
include home business and other types of debts” (Paccagnella and Weber 2005: 357ff.). 
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4.3.3 METHODS 
In order to account for socio-economic factors that have an effect on the 
probability of being a homeowner, I apply binary logistic regression 
models. Subsequently, trying to find socio-economic factors that affect 
the financial value of residential property, I use log-linear regression 
models. To find out about the relationship between homeownership 
rates and housing values, I finally run log-linear regression models once 
more, but this time in a multilevel framework. My unit of analysis is the 
household. The binary logistic model I am applying aims at estimating 
the probability (P) of belonging to the group of homeowners (owner=1): 
)++( 10+1
1
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ownerP εββ     (5) 
I estimate a separate model for each country. For more details on the 
binary logistic model see Long (1997). To analyze the effect of different 
socio-economic attributes on the financial value of residential property 
(housing value), I apply a log-linear regression model, firstly in a single-
level framework 
     (6) 
and secondly in a two-level framework 
    (7) 
with the logarithmized housing value for households i clustered in coun-
tries j. Xij are predictors on the household level and εij is the household-
level error term. β0+uj is the random intercept that varies across coun-
tries. For more details on multilevel regressions, consider for example 
Hox (2010) or Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008). Note that there are 
only 13 cases on the country level (level two). Although there is no con-
sensus in the literature regarding the minimum number of cases for 
upper levels in multilevel analyses, 13 cases is without doubt very small. 
Simulation studies on two-level linear models claim that standard errors 
and variance components tend to be underestimated when the number 
of cases on the second level is smaller than 30 (Bell, Ferron, and 
Kromrey 2008; Hox 2010; Maas and Hox 2005). Hence, the statistical 
iii Xhoval   10)ln(
jijijij uXhoval   10)ln(
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power of my country-level effects might be rather small. To account for 
that, I additionally ran an alternative single-level regression with robust 
and cluster-adjusted standard errors. Results were largely the same. For 
substantive reasons, I finally opted for the multilevel estimation ap-
proach, which allows an explicit modeling of variance across countries. 
Housing values by definition can only be observed for the group of 
homeowners. For the analysis of housing values, the most obvious strat-
egy would therefore be to drop non-owners out of the sample. This strat-
egy was applied until the late 1990s (Horton and Thomas 1998; Myers 
and Chung 1996; Parcel 1982). The 1997 article by Lewin-Epstein et al. 
was one of the first to state that restricting the analysis to homeowners 
can lead to biased estimations, as being a homeowner might be the re-
sult of a self-selection process. To avoid selection bias, the authors ap-
plied tobit regression models (also called censored regression models, 
see Tobin 1958) instead of linear regressions. Krivo and Kaufman (2004) 
applied the same strategy. However, neither of the two articles compre-
hensibly explains that a sample selection problem with regard to their 
specific research question indeed exists. I argue instead that, if one is 
interested in determinants of housing values among the group of home-
owners, one cannot diagnose a bias in the analysis due to restricting the 
sample on homeowners. In fact, in this case, the selection process (the 
decision to become a homeowner) creates a necessary precondition for 
the outcome (the housing value) (cf. Rohwer 2012). When applying the 
tobit regression, Lewin-Epstein et al. (1997) as well as Krivo and 
Kaufman (2004) are thus modelling a very specific and very hypothetical 
choice situation27: the choice for a certain housing value by an individual 
who has not yet purchased a house. However, in this chapter I am ex-
plicitly not interested in this hypothetical decision at all. Rather, I am 
interested in the realized distribution of housing values of households 
who actually own a home. Thus, when analyzing the housing value, I 
will restrict my sample to homeowners. More precisely, I will carry out a 
two-part model. Firstly, I regress on the chance of being a homeowner 
                                                          
 
27  The same holds true for the Heckman selection model often used as an alternative to 
the tobit regression (Heckman 1979). 
Micro-level determinants of wealth 113 
among all households, and secondly I regress on the value of housing 
among those households who own a home. 
4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW 
For my descriptive analyses I use cross-sectional calibrated weights28 
(see Börsch-Supan et al. 2005: 21). Table 7 shows the distribution of 
socio-economic household characteristics among homeowners in com-
parison to the overall population in my sample. About 70 percent of the 
households live in their own real property. Country differences in 
homeownership rates are also illustrated in Figure 12. Especially in 
Southern European countries like Spain, Greece and Italy, home owner-
ship is a widespread phenomenon, which is in line with current re-
search. Also in some Western European countries such as Belgium and 
France, many elderly households live in owner-occupied property. In 
contrast, home-ownership is, as expected, less common in Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland. I compared my 
findings with data collected by Euroconstruct/ifo (2009) covering the 
whole adult population. As expected, the rate of homeowners is higher 
in my sample of older households.29 The ranking of countries is very 
similar in both cases. The average value of residential property among 
homeowners in the SHARE data is €260,530; the median value is 
€194,960 (right-skewed distribution). 
The highest median housing value can be found in Switzerland 
(€306,210) and the lowest in Poland (€48,430).30 These findings are illus-
trated in Figure 13. In Continental Europe, median housing values are 
                                                          
 
28  These weights compensate for problems of unit-nonresponse and sample attrition 
(Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging 2011).  
29  The Czech Republic and Sweden are the only cases where homeownership among the 
adult population is higher than among older households. 
30  The term “housing value” is used in this chapter as a synonym for the gross housing 
value (market value). In general, the share of households with a mortgage on their real 
property is low due to the age structure of the sample (with the exceptions of Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). 
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generally rather high (above €194,000),31 while they are comparatively 
small in the post-socialist countries. Table 7 further shows that house-
holds owning a home are slightly younger on average than the overall 
population. In line with my expectations, compared to the overall popu-
lation, owners more often live in a steady partnership (72.4% vs. 65.8%), 
but in only slightly larger households (2.30 vs. 2.21 persons).  
With respect to parenthood, there are only minor differences between 
the two groups. Among homeowners, 7.9 percent of the households 
have a migration background, in contrast to 10.6 percent of the total 
population. The overall share of migrants is comparably low in Southern 
Europe and Poland, while it is remarkably high in France, Germany and 
Switzerland. As expected, owners have a higher level of education than 
the overall population. The mean educational level is particularly low in 
Southern Europe. The median income of homeowners (€15,590) is also 
higher than that of the overall population (€14,680). 
With regard to the overall population, median income is comparatively 
low in Eastern and Southern Europe, while it is rather high in France, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. Retirement status does not differ be-
tween owners and the overall population. Homeowners appear to benefit 
more often from financial gifts or inheritances compared to the total 
population (29.5 percent vs.25.4 percent). Finally, homeowners live less 
often in urban areas compared to the total population (39.2 percent vs. 
44.5 percent).  
  
                                                          
 
31  With the exception of Austria: €153,440. 
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Figure 12: Percentage of homeowners in European comparison 
Note: Euroconstruct/ifo (2009) and SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0), SHARE data weighted. 
Own calculations. 
4.4.2 WHICH SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES CAN PREDICT               
HOMEOWNERSHIP? 
Table 8 contains the results of the logistic regression models (more de-
tailed results can be found in Appendix A). In the following, I will focus 
on the direction and significance of effects. The likelihood of owning a 
home rises significantly with age in the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Switzerland. The quadratic age term – testing the assumption 
that the rate of homeownership first increases with age and then starts 
to decrease – has no effect on the probability of homeownership in our 
sample. This means that in the countries analyzed, homeownership 
rates do not decline with age, thus contradicting the basic life-cycle hy-
pothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).  
120  Micro-level determinants of wealth  
Figure 13: Mean and median values of houses 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0), data weighted. Own calculations. 
Parenthood significantly affects the likelihood of belonging to the group 
of homeowners only in Switzerland. This might be because childless-
ness is a rather rare phenomenon in the population studied (see also 
Table 3). In Germany and Sweden, household size has a positive impact 
on the probability of being a homeowner. However, there is not much 
variation in household sizes across countries. Controlling for household 
size, households with a steady partnership have a significantly higher 
chance of belonging to the group of homeowners compared to other 
households (except for Austria and the Czech Republic).  
I find a negative impact of migration background on the probability of 
being a homeowner in all countries analyzed, though the effect is not 
statistically significant in the Northern countries, Greece and Poland. 
Thus, the U.S. findings also apply to Europe. As expected, education has 
a positive impact on the probability of being a homeowner in all coun-
tries, though not statistically significant. Moreover, my findings high-
light the positive impact of education in Central Europe, which is in line 
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with previous research. Income has an impact on the probability of be-
ing a homeowner, particularly in Continental Europe. The control varia-
ble “retirement status” does not have a statistically significant effect on 
the likelihood of homeownership in most countries. This could be be-
cause the decision to acquire a home is mostly made before entering 
retirement. It is only in Italy where being retired positively affects the 
likelihood of homeownership. Financial gifts and inheritances have a 
positive effect that is statistically significant in all countries. As expected, 
homeownership is less probable in urban areas. Summing up, the re-
sults of the logistic models for the probability of being a homeowner are 
consistent with my expectations based on previous research. 
4.4.3 WHICH SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS CAN PREDICT                    
HOUSING VALUES? 
Table 9 contains the results of the linear regression analyses on the im-
pact of socio-economic household characteristics on the logarithmized 
value of housing (more detailed models can be found in Appendix B). 
The impact of age is positive in almost all countries studied. Again, the 
quadratic term has no influence on my dependent variable. My analyses 
demonstrate – as expected – that household size and partnership status 
have a positive impact on the housing value. Household size has a posi-
tive effect that is statistically significant in the Southern and Eastern 
European countries as well as in Germany. The influence of parenthood 
is only statistically significant (positive) in Italy and the Czech Republic.  
A very interesting finding is that migration status has no statistically 
significant effect on the value of housing in all countries except for Aus-
tria. This contradicts the findings from previous studies, mostly con-
ducted in traditional immigration countries like the USA and Israel. 
Education is not only important for the probability of homeownership, 
but also for the value of residential property. Higher education (except 
for Germany) as well as higher income significantly (in statistical terms) 
increase the housing value in all countries studied. Retirement status 
has no statistically significant impact on the property value in most 
countries. Transfers and bequests contribute to an increase in the value 
of residential property. Especially in Belgium, Germany, Poland, the Ne-
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therlands and Sweden, inheritances and financial gifts are important for 
the probability of being a homeowner as well as for the value of housing. 
Consistent with my expectations, living in an urban area has a positive 
effect on the housing value, particularly in Southern and Northern Eu-
rope. A result that needs to be explored in more detail is that living in an 
urban area has a negative impact on the housing value that is statistically 
significant in Belgium and the Netherlands.  
4.4.4 IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES AND 
HOUSING VALUES? 
To explore the relationship between homeownership rates and housing 
values on the country level, in a first step, I plotted all countries in a two-
dimensional coordinate system (Figure 14). No clear relationship how-
ever becomes evident in the emerging picture. Two lines divide the co-
ordinate system in Figure 14: The mean housing rate over all countries 
(70.3 percent) divides the y-axis, and the mean housing value (€260,530) 
divides the x-axis. Countries are evenly distributed across all four quad-
rants. There are as many countries showing a negative relationship be-
tween homeownership rates and housing values (GR, BE, IT, DK, NL, 
CH), as countries showing a positive relation (PL, CZ, AT, SE, DE, FR, 
ES). 
Thus, in a next step I will carry out a multilevel regression to statistically 
test whether, controlling for individual characteristics of homeowners, 
the country context has a discrete impact on the housing value. Results 
are presented in Table 10. M0 shows that we have an intra-class correla-
tion of 0.23, meaning that the households within countries are not inde-
pendent from one another. The multilevel framework thus seems to be 
appropriate. The variance between countries is 0.23; the variance be-
tween households is 0.77. If I introduce the homeownership rate into 
the model (M1), I see a zero and not statistically significant impact on 
individual housing values. The variance between countries does not 
change at all from M0 to M1.  
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Figure 14: Homeownership rates and housing values 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0), data weighted. Own calculations.  
In Model 2, I further include the country clusters. This explains a large 
share of the variance between countries. The Northern and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries show significantly lower mean housing values com-
pared to Continental countries. Finally, I include my household-level 
factors (the demographic and socio-economic household characteristics) 
into Model 3. This model is able to explain part of the variance between 
households. 
Overall, homeownership rates and housing values show no systematic 
relationship. Whereas the homeownership rate itself cannot help to 
explain the differences in housing values, homeowners’ socio-economic 
composition contributes to explaining them, as does the welfare state 
context to a considerable degree. 
In the theoretical part, I argued that the socio-economic composition of 
homeowners could be an explanation for a negative relationship between 
homeownership rates and housing values. In countries with high home  
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Table 10: Multilevel regression (with robust standard errors) on the logarithmized housing 
value with households (Level 1) clustered in countries (Level 2) 
M0 M1 M2 M3
Constant 5.07 *** 5.18 *** 5.53 *** 3.49 *** 
Level-1-Variables 
Age 0.04 *** 
Age² -0.00 *** 
Hhd. size 0.07 *** 
Partnership=yes 0.10 *** 
Children=yes 0.05 * 
Migrant=yes 0.02  
Education (ISCED) 0.11 *** 
Hhd. net inc. 0.00 *** 
Retirement=yes -0.03  
Transfer/Bequest=yes 0.10 *** 
Urban community=yes 0.11 *** 
Level-2-Variables 
Homeownership rate 0.00 0.00  0.00  
Continental Ref.  Ref.  
North -0.40 * -0.43 * 
South -0.31  -0.20  
East -1.23 *** -1.11 *** 
N (level-1) 14,82
7 
14,82
7 
14,82
7 
14,82
7 
N (level-2) 13  13 13  13  
ICC 0.23  0.23 0.07  0.07  
Variance Components 
Variance between 
households 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.70 
Variance between 
countries 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.05 
Note: SHARE wave 2 (release 2.5.0), data unweighted. Own calculations. *p≤0.05, *p≤0.01, 
***p≤0.001. 
ownership rates and low housing values (like in Belgium, Greece and 
Spain), homeowners would be a rather heterogeneous group with regard 
to socio-economic characteristics, while they would be a homogenous 
group in countries with low homeownership rates and high housing 
values (like in Switzerland, Germany and Sweden). To test for the validi-
ty of this argument, I carried out a Heckman selection test (Heckman 
1979). I found the group of homeowners to differ significantly in their 
demographic and socio-economic composition from the overall popula-
tion (including homeowners, non-homeowners and owners of houses 
that are rented out) in seven countries; four of them with comparatively 
low homeownership rates – Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Poland – 
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but three of them with rather high rates – Belgium, Greece and Spain. 
Thus, the socio-economic composition of the group of homeowners does 
seem to work as an explanation for the negative (though not statistically 
significant) relationship between homeownership rates and housing 
values at least in some countries. 
To conclude, my statistical analyses do not show evidence for a systemat-
ic and meaningful relationship between homeownership rates and hous-
ing values among the 13 countries of my sample. 
4.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In times of demographic ageing and less generous public pensions, 
wealth will probably gain in importance for the financial well-being of 
the elderly. To determine the socio-economic position of households, it 
is therefore important to consider not only income, but also the stock of 
wealth and especially homeownership as a central component of it. The 
underlying question driving my research was: Who is successful in ac-
cumulating housing wealth? Housing wealth respectively inequality in 
housing wealth, I understand as a two-dimensional phenomenon, with 
homeownership being the first dimension of and the value of housing 
being the second dimension. Previous studies mainly focused on the 
distribution of homeownership, while neglecting its value. The value of 
housing, however, significantly determines the wealth position of 
households and therefore patterns of social inequality.  
In this chapter, I have adopted a comparative perspective in order to find 
out which socio-economic household characteristics affect these two 
dimensions of housing. My special interest was to find out whether 
there are characteristics that differently affect these two dimension of 
housing. Finally, I was also interested if I could find a systematic rela-
tionship between the two dimensions of housing as such.   
Making use of the SHARE data, which is an international, representative 
panel study of the population aged 50 years and older, I empirically ana-
lyzed my research questions across 13 European countries. To find out 
about socio-economic household characteristics that can predict the 
likelihood of being a homeowner, I conducted a series of logit regres-
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sions. My results were mostly consistent with previous research. In or-
der to find out about socio-economic household characteristics that can 
predict the housing value, I carried out a series of log-linear regressions 
on the sample of homeowners. To avoid selection bias, recent scholars 
applied censored regression models instead of linear regressions. I in-
stead argue that the selection process of becoming a homeowner is a 
necessary precondition for the housing value to be observed and thus, 
no selection bias will emerge with regard to my research question. 
My analyses showed that the impact of socio-economic household char-
acteristics on the probability of being a homeowner, on the one hand, 
and the value of housing, on the other, is not identical. For example, the 
effect of education and income is statistically significant for both dimen-
sions in most countries, whereas the influence of family-related charac-
teristics varies: Having a partner seems to be especially important for 
being a homeowner, while household size mainly affects the value of 
housing. Most interesting, my results showed that the main obstacle for 
migrants is the access to homeownership. Once they obtained residen-
tial property, their housing values do not differ from those of homeown-
ers without migration background. Thus, in contrast to previous results 
for the USA and Israel, migration status only affects the first dimension 
of housing inequality among elderly Europeans.  
The most interesting country differences I found also with regard to 
migration background. The negative impact of migration background on 
the likelihood of being a homeowner is statistically significant in all 
continental European countries, while it is not so in the Northern Euro-
pean countries and in some of the Southern and Eastern European 
countries. 
Finally, a set of multilevel regression results could not reveal any sys-
tematic relationship between homeownership rates and individual hous-
ing values. My results did thus not show statistical support for a system-
atic relationship between the two dimensions of housing inequality.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a broad interna-
tional comparison on socio-economic household characteristics that can 
predict (1) homeownership and (2) the value of housing. It further con-
tributes to current research by showing that (3) socio-economic house-
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hold characteristics can differently affect the two dimensions of housing. 
Although I did not find statistical support for a cross-country relation-
ship between homeownership rates and housing values in the SHARE 
data, I provided theoretical arguments for such a relationship to exist. 
Future research can take on these arguments and try to find statistical 
support for the existence of such a relationship in a larger set of coun-
tries. 
My work shows different research paths and opens up further research 
question, which future research may follow. First, it would be fruitful to 
replicate my study with a larger set of countries. Second, it would be 
beneficial to apply longitudinal data in order to be able to trace back 
developments and analyze socio-economic characteristics of households 
at the time when they acquire residential property. Finally, it would be 
advantageous to address further macro-level indicators of homeowner-
ship rates and housing values. Among them, the overall demographic 
and economic situation, the design and extension of social security pro-
grams as well as cultural attitudes towards homeownership. As there is a 
large number of projects collecting data on especially private wealth 
holdings in an increasing number of countries and over longer periods, 
in some years it will be possible to follow up the research paths suggest-
ed in this chapter. 
In conclusion, this chapter offers an innovative approach of an interna-
tionally comparative, two-dimensional analysis of housing inequalities. 
A valuable home provides individuals with economic resources, which 
can also be used to enhance overall well-being. In the light of the grow-
ing importance of private provision for old age, knowing about factors 
that can either boost or hinder the transition to homeownership will be 
essential for public policy decision makers. 
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5 MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF WEALTH: PUBLIC PENSION 
GENEROSITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE WEALTH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The rationale of social security is to protect individuals from poverty 
(Bismarck system) or, more generally, from a decline in standard of 
living (Beveridge system). These benefits provided by the welfare state – 
which are usually dependent on income or labor market experience or 
both, as well as the taxes to finance them – are likely to have an impact 
on individuals’ saving behavior (Feldstein and Liebman 2002: 2247), 
which should in term affect aggregate private savings. However, 
Feldstein (1974) claims that social security can have any effect on private 
savings. The introduction of social security can reduce aggregate private 
savings because of a reduced need for private provision. On the other 
hand, social security can increase aggregate private savings, because it 
motivates individuals to retire earlier than they would have done other-
wise. The competing effects might even cancel each other out.  
There is a large empirical literature on the relationship between social 
security and individual but also aggregate capital accumulation. Accord-
ing to Feldstein and Liebman (2002: 2279) these studies can be best sub-
divided by the type of variation they apply in order to identify the impact 
of social security: time-series studies, cross-sectional studies, and cross-
country studies. One of the earliest and most popular empirical studies 
was conducted by Martin Feldstein (1974) and belongs to the first sub-
division. Feldstein found a strong negative relationship between social 
security (pension wealth) and aggregate capital accumulation. Other 
studies however found this relationship to be much weaker or even not 
existent (Barro 1978; Leimer and Lesnoy 1982; Lesnoy and Leimer 1985), 
what could be a result of the high sensitivity of time-series regressions to 
the exact time period chosen (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1983; Feldstein 
and Liebman 2002). Empirical evidence from cross-sectional studies on 
the other hand, is relatively consistent. Cross-sectional studies found a 
negative relationship on the micro-level, with a substitution effect being 
considerably smaller than one (DE: Kim and Klump 2010; DK: Kapteyn, 
Alessie, and Lusardi 2005; IT: Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003; UK: 
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Attanasio and Rohwedder 2003; USA: Diamond and Hausman 1984; 
Engelhardt and Kumar 2011). Cross-country studies firstly, are compara-
tively rare and secondly, findings differ strongly in sign and magnitude 
of the effect of social security on aggregate capital accumulation. While 
Alessie, Angelini, and van Santen (2013) as well as Hurd, Michaud, and 
Rohwedder (2012) could find a displacement effect of pension wealth on 
private net worth across countries, Barro and MacDonald (1979) could 
not. With this chapter, I like to contribute to this third strand of re-
search. As to the direction of causality, there are a few studies that try to 
approach this issue either by using pension reforms as natural experi-
ments (e.g. Attanasio and Rohwedder 2003), simulations (Hubbard, 
Skinner, and Zeldes 1993) or certain techniques of times-series analysis 
(Kim 1992) to test for causality. These studies claim that the causal effect 
operates from the public pension system to individuals’ saving behavior, 
which is assumed in this chapter as well. 
A second contribution I want to make with this chapter is to relate social 
security not only to levels of private wealth but also to levels of private 
wealth inequality. Levels of private wealth inequality, as an additional 
dimension of economic and social inequality alongside income, have 
been found to differ significantly from those of income inequality in a 
number of countries, as shown in chapter 2. Among these countries is 
for example Sweden, which is known for its equal distribution of income 
but exhibits a very high level of private wealth inequality (Cowell, 
Karagiannaki, and McKnight 2012; Domeij and Klein 2002; Roine and 
Waldenström 2009; Sierminska, Brandolini, and Smeeding 2006). Other 
countries however exhibit similar levels of inequality in income and 
private wealth, among them the USA or Germany (Davies et al. 2008; 
Sierminska, Brandolini, and Smeeding 2006). In line with that, chapter 
4 has shown that determinants of wealth inequality differ from those of 
income inequality, at least in some countries. Yet, little is known about 
macro-determinants of levels of wealth inequality. The few international 
comparative studies on the distribution of wealth are either designed as 
in-depth country studies without comparing results across countries 
(e.g. Wolff, 2006), or they do not explicitly address the issue of wealth 
inequality (Börsch-Supan 2003; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2013). I 
argue that national differences in public pension generosity are not only 
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an important determinant of national differences in levels of private 
wealth but also of national differences in levels of private wealth inequal-
ity. 
Summing up, in this chapter, I concentrate on the cross-country rela-
tionship between mandatory public pension wealth – the quantitatively 
most important part of social security – and the distribution of private 
wealth. More precisely, I aim to study two cross-country relationships: 
firstly, the relationship between the generosity of mandatory public pen-
sion systems and the level of wealth and secondly, the relationship be-
tween the generosity of mandatory public pension systems and the level 
of wealth inequality.  
I address shortcomings of previous research in the following ways. 
Compared to previous studies, I focus on a wider range of countries with 
meaningful variation in the generosity of public pensions, as well as in 
levels of private wealth and private wealth inequality. The OECD pro-
vides comprehensive data on various characteristics of social security 
systems. Data about wealth levels and levels of wealth inequality I drew 
from the ‘Global Wealth Databooks’, as published by the Credit Suisse 
Research Institute. Further indicators I derived from Eurostat and the 
World Bank database. Combining these data sources allows me to study 
the relationship between public pension generosity and the distribution 
of private wealth across 40 countries. In addition, I relate social security 
not only to levels of wealth but also to levels of wealth inequality and 
suggest national differences in public pension generosity to be a mean-
ingful determinant of national differences in levels of wealth inequality. 
A better understanding of the sources of national differences in the lev-
els of private wealth is crucial for social stratification research, which 
increasingly understands wealth as a separate determinant of economic 
standing alongside income. Understanding the interactions between 
public pensions and accumulated private savings as a form of private 
insurance  (Schunk 2007) is also important for policy makers in the light 
of the ongoing reforms of the public pension systems in most of the 
industrial countries. These reforms are primarily based on a strengthen-
ing of private forms of old age provision that go hand-in-hand with a cut 
down in public pension services. 
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5.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
5.2.1 THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT BETWEEN PUBLIC PENSIONS AND    
PRIVATE SAVING 
In his seminal study, Feldstein (1974) investigated the relationship be-
tween social security wealth (measured as pension wealth) and aggregate 
saving rates using aggregate time-series data for the US and found a 
large negative effect of social security wealth on individual saving rates. 
Anyhow, Feldstein and Liebman (2002) but also Attanasio and 
Rohwedder (2003) suggest that estimates from aggregate time-series 
may be inconsistent due to aggregation problems. Cross-sectional stud-
ies could however replicate this finding on the micro-level for the US 
(Diamond and Hausman 1984; Engelhardt and Kumar 2011; Gale 1998; 
Hubbard 1986; King and Dicks-Mireaux 1982), but also for other coun-
tries, among them Denmark (Kapteyn, Alessie, and Lusardi 2005), Ger-
many (Kim and Klump 2010), Israel (Lavi and Spivak 1999), Italy 
(Attanasio and Brugiavini 2003; Jappelli 1995), and the UK (Attanasio 
and Rohwedder 2003).  
Very recently, also a few cross-country studies have been conducted, 
further strengthening these findings (Alessie, Angelini, and van Santen 
2013; Börsch-Supan 2003; Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder 2012). 
Alessie et al. (2013) use retrospective survey data to estimate the dis-
placement effect of pension wealth on household savings (private net 
worth, micro-level data) among the population 50+ across 13 European 
countries. They find a mean displacement effect of 47 resp. 61 Cents 
decline on private net worth with each Euro of pension wealth, depend-
ing on the regression method applied (robust regression vs. median 
regression). Börsch-Supan (2003) guided six in-depth country studies in 
a comparative framework, analyzing individual saving behavior based on 
micro data. He interprets apparent differences in individuals’ saving 
profiles of the participating countries as resulting from differences in 
the countries’ institutional framework. More precisely, he infers a sub-
stitution of private savings through the public pension system. In a sim-
ple correlation table, he can show that the replacement rate of the public 
pension system is negatively related to the aggregated households’ sav-
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ing rate. This however holds only true when controlling for financial 
market imperfections, measured through down-payment ratios for own-
er-occupied housing. Yet, a sample of six countries is too small for a 
proper multivariate or multidimensional analysis. Hurd et al. (2012) use 
a combination of micro-data sources from aging surveys in 12 countries 
(10 continental European countries, the UK and the US) covering the 
age 50+ population to analyze the substitution effect between mandatory 
public pensions and private savings for retired males aged 65 to 75. 
Their country-level regression, on the ratio of financial wealth to lifetime 
earnings, which is similar to the one conducted by Feldstein (1980), 
shows a significant negative effect of public pension generosity. In a 
second step, they disaggregate their data and estimate a pooled regres-
sion where they include education and marital status fixed effects but no 
country fixed effects. The effect of public pensions stays almost the 
same. Finally, they also control for country fixed effects what results in 
an increase in the size of the effect of public pension generosity. They 
find a 22 Cents decrease of financial wealth for each Dollar increase in 
mandatory public pension wealth. Finally, I found one sociological study 
that analyzes the determination of private wealth among older house-
holds across 16 countries (14 European countries, the UK and the US). 
Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (2013), however, do not find any systemat-
ic association between household net worth and country-level character-
istics (e.g. GDP per capita, income tax, social expenditures).  
Summing up, almost all past studies provide evidence for a negative 
relationship between public pension wealth and private wealth, at least 
on the micro-level. However, on the aggregated level empirical results on 
the relationship between public and private wealth are mixed. With my 
study, I try to shed some light on the ecological correlation between 
social security and private net worth. Doing this, I hope to contribute to 
a better understanding of national differences in private wealth.  
5.2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC PENSIONS AND PRIVATE 
WEALTH INEQUALITY 
Although indirectly addressed by a number of studies, the relationship 
between national differences in public pension wealth and levels of pri-
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vate wealth inequality has not yet been systematically studied. However, 
literature provides various hints that public pension generosity might 
affect levels of private wealth inequality.  
In fact, economic theory states that the average propensity to save in-
creases with increasing income (Keynes 1936). Although there exists a 
number of studies that challenge the view of a positive relationship be-
tween saving rates and (lifetime) income (Furnham 1985; Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1999; Venti and Wise 1999), results of more recent studies 
find saving to be strongly concentrated among households with higher 
income (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes 2004; Huggett and Ventura 2000). 
Based on the argumentation of Keynes, Feldstein (1974) argues that the 
impact of pension wealth on individual saving rates is likely to vary 
across the income distribution, and suggests a complete offset between 
public pensions and private wealth for households especially in the low-
er and middle income distribution (p. 920). These differences in indi-
vidual saving behavior across the income distribution and the resulting 
differences in the impact of public pension wealth on private savings are 
likely to affect the level of wealth inequality. 
Often mentioned reasons for the lower propensity to save for house-
holds in the lower compared to those in the upper part of the income 
distribution are differences in the “taste for saving” (Alessie, Angelini, 
and van Santen 2013; Feldstein 1995; Furnham 1985) as well as saving 
and/or credit constraints (e.g. Attanasio and Rohwedder 2003; Jia and 
Zhu 2013). Several studies could further show that for households with 
low expected lifetime income, non-saving could be a utility-maximizing 
decision in the light of asset-based means tests to qualify for social secu-
rity transfers in retirement, which are existent in most countries 
(Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995). Such programs place an implicit 
tax rate of 100 percent on private wealth that is above the limit that is set 
to qualify for these transfers (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1993; 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1994; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 
1995). This strongly discourages saving for a considerable part of the 
population and makes being of low wealth likely to be an “absorbing 
state” (Hubbard et al., 1994: 175). Domeij and Klein (2002) in fact find a 
negative relationship between public pensions and the level of wealth 
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inequality in Sweden. According to economic theory, they argue that “a 
common benefit payable to each senior citizen (independent of lifetime 
earnings) will reduce the savings of low income earners proportionately 
more than for high-income earners and thus increases the inequality of 
wealth (provided that claims on future pensions are not included in 
measured wealth)” (p. 505). 
Recently, it has been suggested to account for differences in financial 
literacy as an important determinant of saving behavior within and 
across countries (Bernheim 1998; Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2012). 
Differences in financial literacy might explain part of the finding that 
usually the highly educated/high-income households are those who 
show a saving profile close to the assumptions of the standard life-cycle 
model, while the less educated/low-income individuals hardly save at all. 
In addition, first studies show that there are large national differences in 
financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). Finally, an increasing part 
of scholars agrees on the importance of psychological variables to com-
plement economic theory on individual saving behavior (Feldstein 1995; 
Furnham 1985; Thaler 1994; Thaler 1990). Among these variables are 
self-control, taste for saving or other preference parameters like the de-
gree of risk aversion. I will make use of a basic psychological concept to 
explain how national differences in the generosity of public pensions can 
explain national differences in levels of wealth inequality, which will be 
explained in the following  
5.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
5.3.1 PUBLIC PENSION GENEROSITY AND LEVELS OF PRIVATE WEALTH  
The standard life-cycle model developed by Modigliani and Brumberg 
(1954) is a powerful and flexible theoretical framework to explain indi-
vidual saving behavior. The model assumes that saving behavior is the 
result of an optimization problem of inter-temporal consumption: Per-
fectly rationale and forward-looking actors are faced with a deterministic 
income path with low earnings at the beginning of their career that in-
crease over their working life and drop to zero when they retire. Trying 
to keep their marginal utility of consumption constant over time, they 
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borrow in younger ages (consumption>earnings), save as their earnings 
increase (consumption<earnings) and dissave in retirement (consump-
tion>earnings). In the basic model, there are neither capital market im-
perfections nor uncertainty (e.g. earnings insecurity or insecurity about 
the date of death). Saving is understood as earnings minus consump-
tion. The only motivation for saving is provision for old age and there 
are no bequests (as people save only for retirement and have perfect 
knowledge about their date of death). Moreover, individuals work as long 
as they are able to. In this scenario, if a standard pay-as-you-go public 
pension system32 is introduced – going along with an official retirement 
age – each unit of public pension wealth shall result in a one-unit de-
crease in private saving, suggesting a perfect substitution between public 
pensions and private saving. This shall translate into a negative effect of 
pension wealth on aggregate levels of private wealth. This translation 
shall however not be perfect, due to, for example interests on accumulat-
ed savings. Importantly to say, the introduction of a public pension sys-
tem does not only decrease the necessity and thus the willingness of 
individuals to save, but, as public pensions are generally financed 
through taxes, it can also decrease the ability to save. 
Based on the findings of Cagan (1965) and Katona (1964), Feldstein 
(1974) however, argued that the substitution effect between public pen-
sion wealth and private wealth holds only true for workers who anyway 
planned to retire around the official retirement age. For workers who 
planned to retire later than that, the introduction of an official retire-
ment age would generally make them to retire earlier than they actually 
planned to. As this will lengthen their total period in retirement, the 
introduction of a pay-as-you-go public pension system could motivate 
these workers to increase their savings. Thus, the implementation of a 
pay-as-you-go public pension system could also have a positive effect on 
the level of private savings, which could even offset the negative one.  
The substitution effect of public on private wealth is likely to be further 
attenuated by the different characteristics of the two measures (Frick and 
                                                          
 
32  In all countries I analyze, the public pension system is a pay-as-you-go financed sys-
tem or has been so until very recently. 
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Grabka 2013). In contrast to private wealth, no further income can be 
generated from pension entitlements. Pension entitlements cannot be 
used in any way other than receiving an income during retirement and 
can only be liquidized when entering retirement, and this only in the 
form of a regular payment. Furthermore, pension entitlements can be 
bequeathed only to a very limited extent. With regard to the many func-
tions of wealth33, only the security function applies to pension wealth, 
and even this function is limited to income security during retirement. 
Finally, the state can potentially change the value of pension entitle-
ments, making them a “variable stock of wealth”.  
It is obvious that the assumptions of the standard life-cycle model are 
very simplifying. Particularly problematic is the ignorance of any saving 
motive different from old-age provision. It was already in 1936 that 
Keynes suggested a very comprehensive list of eight saving motives 
which Browning and Lusardi (1996) supplemented by one additional 
motive 60 years later. The nine saving motives are: (1) precaution 
(against unforeseen contingencies); (2) foresight (the life-cycle motive); 
(3) calculation (the inter-temporal substitution motive); (4) improve-
ment; (5) independence; (6) enterprise (to carry out speculative or busi-
ness projects); (7) pride (the bequest motive); (8) avarice and (9) down-
payment (i.e. the accumulation of assets to buy houses, cars or other 
durables). The standard life-cycle model only allows for the foresight 
motive. Probably the most innovative extension of the standard theory 
has been to include the precautionary motive by allowing for uncertainty 
as developed in the permanent income theory of consumption by 
Friedman (1957). Friedman sates that individuals save not only for re-
tirement, but also as a provision against unforeseen events in the future 
(like income shocks or a very long life). This model also allows for be-
quests, but these are to be understood as accidentally, due to the un-
known date of death. Saving in this context first depends on the level of 
                                                          
 
33  Frick and Grabka (2009) list seven functions of wealth: income function, utility func-
tion, security function, power function, social status maintenance function, socializa-
tion function, inheritance function. 
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uncertainty the individual actor is faced with and on cash-on-hand (cf. 
Browning and Lusardi 1996).  
A second important extension of the standard life-cycle model has been 
to allow for capital market imperfections. Individual actors are often 
faced with borrowing constraints (cf. Deaton 1991). This is specifically 
the case in younger age, when individuals have usually low earnings and 
low financial securities what will make it difficult to borrow against the 
future, as predicted by the standard model. More developed capital mar-
kets are however likely to relax these liquidity constraints (Alessie et al. 
2013: 317).34 In my extended life-cycle model, I will control for these two 
variables (level of uncertainty and level of capital market imperfections), 
as they are likely to mediate the relationship between the generosity of 
public pensions and the level of private wealth.  
Summing up, as to the relationship between public pension wealth and 
private wealth, any effect is theoretically possible. Most empirical studies 
found a substitution between public pension and private saving as sug-
gested by the standard life-cycle model, that is however considerably 
smaller than one.  
5.3.2 PUBLIC PENSION GENEROSITY AND LEVELS OF PRIVATE WEALTH 
INEQUALITY 
Economic theory states that the average propensity to save increases with 
increasing income, i.e. the higher the income, the higher the percentage 
of saved income, if there were no offsetting government policies (Keynes 
1936). I apply a basic psychological theory to suggest a possible mecha-
nism behind the differences in the impact of pension wealth on individ-
ual saving behavior across the income distribution: Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs (Maslow 1943; Maslow 1954). According to this theory, individ-
uals have different kinds of needs motivating their behavior. These 
needs are arranged in a hierarchical order. On the bottom is what 
                                                          
 
34  Börsch-Supan and Lusardi (2003: 14) argue that uncertainty and capital market imper-
fections are probably two very important reasons for the introduction of a public social 
safety net. 
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Maslow calls physiological needs, including food and shelter. Safety 
needs follow, which include security of the body, security of resources, 
but, most importantly, social security. Love and belonging, regarding for 
example friendship and family, are to be found on the next level. This 
level is followed by the need for esteem (e.g. self-esteem, confidence, 
respect by others) and the need for self-actualization (e.g. creativity, 
spontaneity).  
Based on Maslow, I argue that the individuals’ saving behavior is moti-
vated by different needs, according to their position in the income dis-
tribution. Physiological needs can be understood to be provided to all 
citizens in western welfare states. While the saving behavior of the lower 
income quartiles is strongly motivated by safety needs, the upper income 
quartiles can be expected to save money also to realize esteem and self-
actualization. If in this situation a pay-as-you-go public pension system 
is introduced, the lower quartiles either partly or completely lose their 
motivation to save,35 as (social) safety is now provided by the welfare 
state. While in countries with less generous public pension systems, the 
low income quartiles might still have some motivation to accumulate 
wealth in order to fulfill their need for (social) safety (see the precaution-
ary motive), in countries with more generous public pension systems, 
they shall have only little or even no motivation to save. For the upper 
income quartiles, however, the motivation to save shall decrease much 
less as compared to the lower income quartiles, as they opt not only for 
social safety, but also for self-esteem and self- actualization. It could even 
be the case that they fully compensate the takeover of social security 
saving by the welfare state through an increase in savings for self-esteem 
and self-actualization. In this case, public pension wealth would have no 
effect on their total savings. It is important to note that public pensions 
are financed through taxes. It thus follows, that the non-saving strategy 
of the lower income quartiles could either be the result of a low motiva-
tion to save, or of a low ability to save, or both. In my empirical analyses, 
I will therefore additionally control for the income tax revenue. 
                                                          
 
35  This will depend on each individual’s actual understanding of social safety. 
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From these considerations, I maintain the following. While the intro-
duction of a public pension system shall not or only very little change 
the saving behavior of the upper income quartiles, it shall have a strong 
negative effect on the saving behavior of the lower income quartiles. 
This shall translate into a negative mean effect of public pension gener-
osity on aggregated levels of private wealth, which shall be the stronger, 
the more generous the public pension system. The differences in indi-
vidual saving behavior of the different income quartiles can further be 
expected to affect the country’s distribution of wealth. If the lower in-
come quartiles have only little or even no motivation to save, while it is 
only the higher income quartiles who accumulate money, this shall ce-
teris paribus (c. p.) have a positive impact on the level of wealth inequali-
ty. Based on these arguments, I expect countries with more generous 
public pension systems to exhibit higher levels of wealth inequality as 
compared to countries with less generous public pension systems. Im-
portantly to mention, even if I can find empirical support for a positive 
relationship between public pension generosity and levels of private 
wealth inequality, this association may or may not be the result of differ-
ent needs motivating individual saving behavior across the income dis-
tribution. Yet, to empirically validate this mechanism, one would need 
longitudinal data about saving behavior on the individual (household) 
level. Even then, establishing a causal relationship between public pen-
sion generosity and private saving would be challenging. 
5.3.3 HYPOTHESES 
From my theoretical considerations and from previous research, I derive 
the following hypotheses, each of which I will empirically test in the 
current study: 
H1: The relationship between public pension generosity and levels 
of private wealth is negative. The higher the generosity of a 
country’s public pension system, the lower its level of private 
wealth. 
H2: The relationship between public pension generosity and levels 
of private wealth inequality is positive. The higher the generosi-
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ty of a country’s public pension system, the higher its level of 
private wealth inequality. 
5.3.4 SOME WORDS ON THE RISK OF ECOLOGICAL FALLACY 
In this chapter, I am interested in two relationships: First, the relation-
ship between the generosity of the mandatory public pension system 
and the level of (median) wealth and, second, the relationship between 
the generosity of the mandatory public pension system and the level of 
wealth inequality. Both relationships are located on the societal macro-
level. The mechanisms, causing these relationships, I, however, locate 
on the societal micro-level. In this case, it is important to be aware of the 
risk of ecological fallacy. Ecological fallacy means to wrongly infer from a 
group phenomenon (e.g. a positive relationship between the rate of mi-
grants and the rate of analphabetism in a certain region) on an individu-
al phenomenon (e.g. a positive relationship between migration back-
ground and analphabetism). The probably most popular example for 
ecological fallacy is Durkheim's study on the relationship between reli-
gion and suicide in Prussia (1951). In this study, Durkheim finds a posi-
tive relationship between the rate of Protestants and the rate of suicide, 
inferring that Protestant are more likely to commit suicide. However, it 
could very well have been the Catholics living in more Protestant regions 
who committed suicide (cf. Piantadosi, Byar, and Green 1988; Selvin 
1958). Nevertheless, ecological associations do not necessary imply the 
problem of ecological fallacy, as stated by Robinson (1950). If the unit of 
analysis the researcher is interested in is a group instead of an individu-
al, ecological associations are in fact necessary (Menzel 1950). Menzel 
further claims that ecological correlations might be of great value, even 
when not reflecting about individual correlations. An example he offers 
is the ecological correlation between the number of physicians per capita 
and the infant death rate in a certain region or country. This correlation 
shall be expected to be high and positive, yet, the individual correlation 
of these two variables would obviously be impossible, which, however, 
does not make the ecological correlation to lose any of its significance. 
My case is a bit different. Although I am explicitly interested in an eco-
logical correlation as such, I am also explicitly interested in the micro-
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level mechanism causing this macro-relationship. Thus, I am obviously 
at risk of ecological fallacy. The micro-level mechanisms I suggest, how-
ever, I cannot test with my data. Thus, the data I am using for the study 
is only appropriate to the study of the ecological correlations. It allows 
me to draw any inferences neither on the micro-level correlation, nor on 
the (micro-level) mechanism, causing the ecological correlations I study. 
My theoretical argumentation above as well as the explanations of my 
findings below shall therefore be understood as mere suggestions in-
stead of (causal) explanations. Still, I am convinced that thinking about 
the micro-level mechanism causing the macro-level relationships is 
worthwhile and helpful for a deeper understanding of the phenomena 
studied here. Moreover, as international comparable individual wealth 
data will be available in the near future, it will be possible to test my 
theoretical arguments with empirical data. Even if my suggested micro-
level mechanism might not be supported by the data, this does not re-
duce the value of my macro-level findings. Having this said, I will go on 
with the description of my data and empirical models.  
5.4 DATA, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND VARIABLES 
5.4.1 DATASETS 
For my macro-level analyses, I make use of a number of data sources. I 
derived aggregate-level data on private wealth and private wealth inequal-
ity from the “Global Wealth Databooks” (GWD) published by the Credit 
Suisse Research Institute (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). With these data-
books, the Credit Suisse Research Institute aims to provide the best 
available estimates of private wealth holdings for the world’s 216 coun-
tries, among them estimates of mean and median household wealth, as 
well as Gini coefficients for wealth inequality. Data on the generosity of 
the mandatory public pension systems I took from the OECD publica-
tion “Pensions at a glance 2005 – Public pensions across OECD coun-
tries” (OECD 2005) which provides information on 35 pension system 
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indicators.36 I use the income data as provided by the OECD iLibrary 
(OECD 2013a). Further macro-level indicators I derived from the OECD 
“Better Life” data (OECD 2011a; OECD 2013b), from the OECD “Na-
tional accounts at a glance” data (OECD 2013c), from the OECD “Tax 
Revenue Statistics” (OECD 2013d), and from the World Bank (World 
Bank 2013a). For the six non-OECD countries in my sample, I derived 
data on the income distribution and on further macro-level variables 
from Eurostat (2013a, 2013b, 2013c). My final dataset consists of all 34 
OECD and 6 non-OECD countries. 
5.4.2 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND VARIABLES 
The dependent variables in my models are private wealth and private 
wealth inequality. According to Meade (1964, 1975), wealth (W) of an 
economic entity at a certain time (t) is determined by age and the history 
(starting with birth: k=1) of earnings (E), saving rates (or consumption 
rates C) and rates of return (r) plus inheritances and gifts (I), as already 
expressed in Formula 1. According to this formula, total wealth can be 
decomposed into two components: self-accumulated wealth (life-cycle 
wealth: Ek-Ck) and transferred wealth (via inter vivos transfer or be-
quests: Ik) (Davies and Shorrocks 2000; Gale and Scholz 1994). For the 
analysis and understanding of wealth inequalities, it is important to 
know whether most of the accumulated wealth holdings stem from 
saved income or from transferred wealth. This question is, however, very 
difficult to answer, as one would need detailed longitudinal information 
about personal income and wealth for at least two consecutive genera-
tions. An additional problem is that bequests do not have to be intended 
but can be rather accidental (Gale and Scholz 1994). For this reason, 
Kessler and Masson (1989) even state that that it is “virtually impossible 
to distinguish life-cycle from bequest savings” (p. 145). By assuming that 
social security wealth has an impact on private wealth, I however implic-
itly assume that life-cycle wealth makes up a considerable part of total 
wealth. 
                                                          
 
36  The OECD 2005 data refers to a person who entered the labor market in 2006, which is 
the earliest such data available. 
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There is some discussion on the best suited measure of private wealth to 
capture the effect of public on private wealth. Hurd et al. (2012) decided 
on a narrow measure of private wealth: financial wealth. They argue that 
as financial wealth is relatively liquid it should be most likely to be sub-
stituted by pension wealth. Gale (1998) however argues that the offset 
between public and private wealth is larger when using broader 
measures of private wealth and shows that the use of narrow measures 
leads to econometric biases that understate this effect. Following Gale 
(1998), I decided on a broad measure of private wealth, that is net worth. 
In the first part of my analysis, net worth (assets net of debts) in the 
overall population at time t is my dependent variable. Net worth consists 
of the following components as illustrated by the following formula (all 
in real terms: cf. Brugiavini and Weber 2003: 35):  
  111111   ttttttt CbyNWrNW     (8) 
with net worth (NW) at time t (normally a year) to be composed of net 
worth at time t-1 multiplied with one plus the interest rate (r: net of in-
flation; I assume a single interest rate on private wealth holdings) in t-1; 
plus earned income (y: labor income net of income tax) in t-1; plus pub-
lic pension benefits (b) in t-1; net of consumption and public pension 
contributions. I ignore any other form of social security. In this budget 
constraint, disposable income at time t is the sum of earned income, 
plus public pension benefits, minus public pension contributions. As I 
derived my data from very different data sources, the above formula 
serves primarily for orientation. 
The net worth measure in the Global Wealth Databooks is defined as the 
marketable value of financial assets plus non-financial assets (principally 
housing and land) less debts for individuals aged 20 or above. All net 
worth values are expressed in USD at the time in question and refer to 
the household level. Due to the strong skewness of the wealth distribu-
tion, I measure a country’s level of private net worth in terms of median 
net worth. In order to balance yearly variation in wealth holdings, my net 
worth measure is calculated as the mean of median net worth in the 
years 2010 to 2013. To prevent problems of comparability of values of 
net worth across countries to the greatest extent, and in consistency with 
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previous research, I divide median net worth at time t by median dispos-
able income at time t, and express net worth in times of disposable in-
come (wealth rate). In my empirical analyses, I apply a logarithmic 
transformation. 
The OECD defines disposable income as 2Household net adjusted dis-
posable income”, i.e. the average amount of money that a household 
earns per year, after taxes. This definition is consistent with the defini-
tion of disposable income of Eurostat as well as with the above formula. 
I express all income values in USD at current prices, using official ex-
change rates throughout to convert local currencies (derived from the 
World Bank, 2013b). Different from net worth, disposable income refers 
to the countries’ total population and accounts for household size. To 
likewise balance yearly variation in income, my income measure is de-
fined as mean of median income of the years 2007 to 2010, in order to 
come closest to the period my wealth measure is based upon.  
In the second part of my analysis, wealth inequality in the overall popu-
lation at time t is my dependent variable. I measure the level of wealth 
inequality by the Gini coefficient for net worth as provided in the Global 
Wealth Databooks. The Gini coefficient ranges from zero (total equality) 
to one (total inequality). I express all Gini values as multiplied by 100. 
My main explanatory variable is public pension wealth, or precisely the 
generosity of the mandatory public pension system. The pension re-
placement rate, provided by the OECD, measures the ratio of pensions 
to individual earnings for an average income earner. As it measures the 
efficacy of a pension system in providing a retirement income to replace 
earnings, it can be understood as an indication of the pension promise 
(OECD 2011b; 118, 132). I believe this to be the best-suited indicator of 
the generosity of the public pension system for this particular case, as it 
is the indicator, which is most likely to be known to the individual ac-
tors. I further argue that the net replacement rate37 is more appropriate 
                                                          
 
37  The net replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension entitlement divided 
by net pre-retirement earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social se-
curity contributions paid by workers and pensioners (OECD 2011b). 
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in my case, compared to the gross replacement rate38, assuming that 
individuals base their financial decisions on the earnings and pensions 
they actually (will) have “in their pocket” rather than on the earnings and 
pensions they might have on some pay ticket.39  
Finally, I will add a number of control variables to my models. These 
are: 
 the countries’ GDP per capita in USD (mean of the years 2010-
12) as an indicator of economic development;  
 the total tax revenue of taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains as a percentage of GDP (mean of the years 2009-12);  
 the progressivity of the pension benefit formulae, as an indica-
tor for the degree of actuarial fairness of a pension system;  
 the level of income inequality measured via the Gini coefficient 
(mean of the years 2007-10);  
 the level of capital market imperfections (based on the variable 
“shares and other equity held by households as a percentage of 
total financial assets”; I derived my final measure of capital 
market imperfections by subtracting this value from 100; mean 
of the years 2010-11);  
 the level of uncertainty (measured as “share of dependent em-
ployed with a job tenure of less than 6 months over the total de-
pendent employment in 2011”).  
More details regarding these variables can be found in Appendix C. 
                                                          
 
38  The gross replacement rate is defined as gross pension entitlement divided by gross 
pre-retirement earnings (OECD 2011b). 
39  Importantly to say, the replacement rate does not take into consideration the share of 
retirees who actually receive this pension, further it does not account for life expectan-
cy, retirement ages and the indexation of pension benefits (OECD 2005). 
Macro-level determinants of wealth 151 
5.5 ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
5.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW 
Table 11 shows the distribution of disposable income and net worth as 
well as net replacement rates across all 40 countries of my sample. The 
wealth rate is highest in Italy (WR=5.45) and Australia (WR=5.24), where 
individuals hold values of net worth more than five times as much as 
their annual disposable income. Comparatively high wealth rates can 
also be found in Japan (WR=4.53) and Belgium (WR=4.19). The lowest 
wealth rate is to be found in Denmark (WR=1.13) where the value of net 
worth almost equals the value of disposable income. 
The highest levels of wealth inequality can be found in Denmark (Gini 
NW=93.25), followed by the USA (Gini NW=83.40), Switzerland (Gini 
NW=82.43) and Sweden (Gini NW=82.03). The lowest levels of wealth 
inequality can be found in Slovakia (Gini NW=59.73), closely followed by 
Japan (Gini NW=61.13), Slovenia (Gini NW=62.53) and Spain (Gini 
NW=63.05).  
The highest net replacement rate for (mandatory) public pensions are to 
be found in Turkey (NRR=124.69%40), followed by Romania 
(NRR=112.37%) and Greece (NRR=110.75%). The least generous public 
pension systems can be found in Mexico (NRR=38.02%), closely fol-
lowed by Japan (NRR=38.66%). 
                                                          
 
40  A net replacement rate above 100% means that these countries provide the average 
earner with pensions higher than their earnings when working. 
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Table 11: Net pension replacement rates (NRR) and aggregated income (INC) and wealth 
(NW) measures in 40 countries 
Country 
 
Code NRR in 
%1 
NW in 
US$2 
INC in 
US$34 
WR = 
NW/INC 
Gini 
NW2 
Gini 
INC34 
Australia AUS 53.15 189,770 36,240 5.24 65.63 33.50 
Austria AUT 90.27 78,540 31,090 2.53 70.18 26.53 
Belgium BEL 63.73 123,480 29,450 4.19 65.35 26.30 
Bulgaria BGR 77.80 8,086 3,290 2.46 63.63 34.45 
Canada CAN 57.86 88,890 31,830 2.79 71.53 32.00 
Chile CHE 64.30 11,610 5,170 2.24 72.05 50.10 
Cyprus CYP 69.45 41,710 21,930 1.90 72.48 29.60 
Czech Rep. CZE 64.13 15,200 10,710 1.42 71.38 25.53 
Denmark DNK 91.32 45,350 39,850 1.14 93.25 24.45 
Estonia EST 59.30 13,190 8,910 1.48 67.53 31.53 
Finland FIN 62.39 89,870 32,230 2.79 64.18 25.80 
France FRA 65.65 94,980 29,020 3.27 73.93 29.53 
Germany DEU 61.32 51,990 27,860 1.87 74.55 28.70 
Greece GRC 110.75 43,950 17,480 2.51 68.50 33.18 
Hungary HUN 105.52 13,620 6,530 2.09 64.40 27.20 
Iceland ISL 95.07 100,540 36,400 2.76 65.78 27.25 
Ireland IRL 40.09 81,730 34,330 2.38 68.53 30.77 
Israel ISR 74.04 42,500 17,020 2.50 77.95 37.33 
Italy ITA 74.81 133,370 24,470 5.45 63.38 31.53 
Japan JPN 38.66 120,830 26,670 4.53 61.13 33.60 
Korea KOR 46.56 29,010 15,980 1.82 66.65 31.25 
Latvia LVA 76.56 8,950 6,300 1.42 66.98 36.65 
Lithuania LTU 59.68 9,890 5,670 1.74 67.00 35.05 
Luxembourg LUX 96.50 153,270 48,800 3.14 63.38 27.68 
Malta MLT 59.49 37,150 14,000 2.65 64.60 27.45
Mexico MEX 38.02 8,840 3,280 2.69 77.85 47.05 
Netherlands NLD 103.21 70,020 30,100 2.33 74.98 28.80 
New Zeal. NZL 41.06 67,580 22,250 3.04 72.98 32.35 
Norway NOR 69.26 104,210 51,900 2.01 74.90 24.80 
Poland POL 74.85 9,580 7,560 1.27 72.68 30.70 
Portugal PRT 69.63 33,990 12,960 2.62 70.90 34.93 
Romania ROU 112.37 5,760 2,580 2.23 73.00 35.50 
Slovakia SVK 72.68 14,180 8,940 1.59 59.73 25.63 
Slovenia SVN 87.07 33,710 18,410 1.83 62.53 24.25 
Spain ESP 84.66 64,000 20,200 3.17 63.05 32.43 
Sweden SWE 64.13 41,640 31,510 1.32 82.03 26.57 
Switzerland CHE 64.48 81,380 47,240 1.72 82.43 29.80 
Turkey TKM 124.69 6,020 4,930 1.22 80.68 41.00 
Great Brit. GBR 40.90 106,850 27,600 3.87 68.48 34.23 
USA USA 44.78 46,060 29,180 1.58 83.40 37.80 
Note: 1OECD (2005); 2Credit Suisse Research Institute (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013): Ø 2010-13, 
3OECD (2013a): Ø 2007-10; 4Eurostat (2013a): Ø 2007-10. Abbreviations: NRR = net re-
placement rate; NW = net worth; DI = disposable income, WR = wealth rate; GWD = 
Global Wealth Databook. Own calculations. 
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Table 12 shows the distribution of my additional macro-level variables. 
The GDP per capita ranges between $6,750 in Bulgaria and $104,230 in 
Luxembourg. The income tax as a percentage of GDP ranges between 
5.00% in Lithuania and 29.20% in Denmark. The level of progressivity of 
the pension benefit formulae is available only for the 34 OECD coun-
tries. Pure basic schemes, paying the same flat-rate amount to all pen-
sioners, regardless of their earnings history and other sources of in-
come, score 100% on this index. In these systems, the relative pension 
value is independent of earnings and the replacement rate declines with 
earnings (OECD, 2005: 81). Countries with or close to a pure basic 
scheme are Ireland and New Zealand (PI=100%), as well as Denmark 
(PI=91.70%) and Canada (PI=86.50%). Pure insurance schemes, paying 
the same replacement rate to all workers when they retire, score 0% on 
this index. In these schemes, the pension value increases with earnings 
in a straight line. Countries close to such a scheme are Slovakia 
(PI=3.20%), Italy (PI=4.00%), Greece (4.30%), Poland (PI=5.20%), Hun-
gary (PI=5.60%), and the Netherlands (PI=5.70%). 
The level of capital market imperfections is highest in Slovakia 
(CMI=93.24), where shares and other equity held by households repre-
sent only 6.76% of total financial assets. Greece (CMI=92.93) and Aus-
tralia (CMI=90.71) follow. Capital market imperfections are lowest in 
Estonia (CMI=31.10). The USA (CMI=56.41), Sweden (CMI=62.47) and 
Hungary (CMI=62.73) follow.  
Finally, the level of uncertainty is highest in Switzerland and Korea, 
where 25.80% resp. 24.30% of the dependent employed had a job tenure 
of less than six months over the total dependent employment in 2011. 
The level of uncertainty is lowest in Greece (UNC=4.70) and Slovakia 
(UNC=5.00). Information on capital market imperfections and uncer-
tainty are available in only 30 of my 40 countries. 
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Table 12: Additional macro-level indicators  
Code GDP per 
capita in 
1.000 
US$2 
Inc. tax as 
a % of 
GDP3 
Progressi-
vity Index1 
Level of 
CMI4 
Level of 
UNC5 
AUS 55.99 14.89 74.80 90.71 12.40 
AUT 46.64 12.15 20.70 79.28 9.50 
BEL 44.15 15.17 64.80 69.18 7.40 
BGR 6.75 5.15 - - - 
CAN 47.41 14.49 86.50 65.40 11.30 
CHE 13.19 7.41 27.20 73.79 10.50 
CYP 28.15 11.28 - - - 
CZE 19.23 7.12 71.70 75.21 6.70 
DNK 57.23 29.20 91.70 72.40 12.90 
EST 15.53 6.87 27.00 31.10 10.70 
FIN 45.76 15.32 6.70 61.82 14.50 
FRA 40.49 9.73 46.40 76.53 9.30 
DEU 41.65 10.86 22.90 81.92 8.30 
GRC 25.50 7.47 4.30 92.93 4.70 
HUN 12.92 7.57 5.60 62.73 7.80 
ISL 41.00 16.26 60.80 - 10.80 
IRL 48.08 10.89 100.00 82.30 6.90 
ISR 29.89 9.58 74.50 74.50 10.50 
ITA 34.51 14.20 4.00 71.87 6.90 
JPN 43.86 8.44 47.80 89.22 10.50 
KOR 20.62 7.56 56.90 80.89 24.30 
LVA 12.51 7.43 - - - 
LTU 12.60 5.00 - - - 
LUX 104.23 13.57 17.20 78.14 5.40 
MLT 20.50 13.15 - - - 
MEX 9.01 5.20 13.70 - - 
NLD 47.61 10.63 5.70 88.07 8.80 
NZL 33.73 17.31 100.00  10.50 
NOR 90.83 20.03 45.30 87.61 7.90 
POL 12.42 6.64 5.20 73.89 8.10 
PRT 21.52 8.78 31.10 73.22 8.70 
ROU 8.31 6.23 - - - 
SVK 16.69 5.19 3.20 93.24 5.00 
SVN 23.36 7.45 24.70 71.47 7.70 
ESP 30.41 9.41 13.00 72.74 10.90 
SWE 51.20 15.89 21.60 62.47 13.90 
CHE 74.54 13.14 44.10 79.70 8.40 
TKM 10.01 5.85 24.40  25.80 
GBR 37.76 12.99 69.60 85.31 6.80 
USA 49.24 10.64 40.60 56.41 11.40 
Note: 1OECD (2005); 2Worldbank (2013a): Ø 2007-10; 3OECD.StatExtracts (2013b); 
4OECD.StatExtracts (2013a); 5OECD (2011a, 2013b). Abbreviations: CMI = capital market 
imperfections; UNC = uncertainty (earnings insecurity). Own calculations. 
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5.5.2 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS: PUBLIC PENSION GENEROSITY AND    
LEVELS OF PRIVATE WEALTH 
In the next step, I run a set of multivariate regression analyses to ap-
proach the mean effect of public pension generosity on private wealth 
holdings while controlling for possible mediator variables. Importantly 
to note, next to the fact that I only analyze cross-sectional data, the varia-
tion in public pension generosity is likely not to be exogenous and there-
fore estimates cannot be interpreted as causal. Furthermore, due to the 
small sample size, the law of large numbers most likely does not apply. 
Thus, my results have to be interpreted with caution.  
Results are shown in Table 13. The question remains as to the meaning 
of statistical significance in small samples. In my analysis, relying on a 
non-random sample of 40 countries, results from statistical test should 
be interpreted with some reservation. Since I am oriented to an empiri-
cal assessment of relationships in my sample of countries, rather than 
generalizations to a universe of countries, they are not of primary inter-
est in my case. I therefore suggest attaching greater importance to sub-
stantive significance, as opposed to statistical significance.  
Model 1 shows my baseline model, where I only include the net re-
placement rate. Public pension generosity has a negative impact on the 
level of private wealth. I illustrated this relationship in Figure 15, which 
shows a scatterplot of my two measures of interest, to which I added the 
fitted regression line (linear regression). I also display the correlation 
coefficient (rho=-0.24). For reasons of better understanding, I will also 
report the effect size, keeping in mind that my analysis cannot establish 
causality. The size of the public pension generosity effect is b=-0.004, 
which is a rather small effect. Assuming, that public pension generosity 
affects the wealth rate (and not the other way around), a decrease of the 
net replacement rate by 5% – which is a likely scenario in the light of 
most recent pension reforms – would lead to a $1,075 increase in medi-
an net worth. It is important to note that this holds only under the condi-
tion that disposable income remains constant. Moreover, this effect shall 
be largely driven by the low-income quartiles as explained in the theoret-
ical section.  
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Figure 15: Relationship between public pension generosity (net pension replacement rate) 
and the level of private wealth (wealth rate: median net worth in times of median income)  
Note: Own illustration.  
In M2, I include the GDP per capita to control for country differences in 
economic performance. My results support my expectation of a positive 
impact on the level of private wealth. In M3, I include the income tax as 
a percentage of GDP, which I expect to have a negative impact on the 
WR. Again, results support my expectation. 
Finally, I also control for the levels of capital market imperfections and 
uncertainty (Table 14). As these indicators are only available in 30 of the 
40 countries of my dataset, I first re-apply M1 to these 30 countries, 
before I include these two controls. Running the regression on a smaller 
country set results in a loss of statistical power, which increases the p-
values in M1 as compared to Table 13. However, the directions of the 
effect of the net replacement rate remains the same, and the size of the 
coefficient changes only slightly. To prevent an overspecification of my 
models, this time I do not control for GDP per capita and income taxes.  
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In M2, I include the level of capital market imperfections (CMI). As 
predicted by theory (e.g. Jappelli and Pagano 1989, 1994), it has a posi-
tive impact on the level of private wealth. In contrast to my expectations, 
the level of uncertainty (UNC) has a negative impact on the wealth rate. 
This can be understood as a lower ability to save income in countries 
where the level of uncertainty is high. Summing up, my models show 
support for a negative relationship between public pension generosity 
and the level of private wealth, even when controlling for a number of 
potential counterfactuals.  
5.5.3 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS: PUBLIC PENSION GENEROSITY AND   
LEVELS OF PRIVATE WEALTH INEQUALITY 
Table 15 shows the results of my multivariate analyses on the relation-
ship between public pension generosity and the level of private wealth 
inequality. M1 shows that the effect of public pension generosity on 
private wealth inequality is positive, though too small (b=0.013) to be 
understood as a non-zero-relationship. In addition, the explanation of 
variance is also very low in M1, suggesting that public pension generosi 
ty (alone) is not a good predictor of the level of inequality in private 
wealth. This is also illustrated in Figure 16, showing a scatterplot of the 
two variables with the fitted regression line added. The correlation be-
tween public pension generosity and inequality in private wealth, though 
positive, is very small (rho=0.04) and the regression line is too flat to 
interpret it as a substantial positive finding. Moreover, the positive effect 
is largely driven by Denmark, showing an extraordinarily high level of 
inequality in private wealth and a comparatively high level of pension 
generosity. Nevertheless, I do not see any substantial reason to actually 
exclude Denmark from my analysis. Next to Denmark, also Sweden, 
Switzerland, the USA and Turkey exhibit comparatively high levels of 
wealth inequality. 
In my next models, I control for a number of macro-level variables that 
are likely to mediate, or in my case conceal, the relationship between 
public pension generosity and the level of private wealth inequality. In 
M2, I introduce the GDP per capita, which has a positive impact 
(b=0.067) on the level of private wealth inequality, while the effect of the 
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Figure 16: Relationship between the generosity of the public pension system (net pension 
replacement rate) and the level of wealth inequality (Gini net worth)  
Note: Own illustration. 
net replacement rate does not change in a meaningful way. In M3, I 
control for income tax as a percentage of GDP. The coefficient is positive 
and relatively large (b=0.668). For example, a 3% increase in income 
taxes would lead to a 2-point increase in the Gini for net worth. Interest-
ingly, the sign of the GDP per capita effect changes after controlling for 
income taxes and is now negative. Again, however, the net replacement 
rate effect does not change in a meaningful way. In M4, I include the 
Gini for disposable income, as the level of wealth inequality is at least 
partly driven by the level of income inequality. The Gini for disposable 
income has a strong positive impact on the level of wealth inequality 
(b=0.574). Each one-point increase in the level of income inequality 
would lead to a 0.5-point increase in the level of wealth inequality. Again, 
the net replacement rate effect remains almost unchanged. Finally, I 
include a control for the progressivity of the pension benefit formulae. 
This control is only available for 34 of my 40 countries. Thus, I lose sta-
tistical power in M5, and M5 is not perfectly comparable to M1-M4. The 
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level of progressivity of the pension benefit formulae has a positive im-
pact (b=0.025) on the level of wealth inequality, meaning, that public 
pension systems which are closer to a basic insurance system exhibit 
higher levels of wealth inequality. As before, the net replacement rate 
effect remains almost unchanged.  
Summing up, I do not find empirical support for my second hypothesis 
claiming a positive relationship between public pension generosity and 
the level of private wealth inequality. National differences in public pen-
sion generosity do not work as a good predictor of national differences in 
levels of private wealth inequality.  
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I aimed to answer two research questions: Are national 
differences in the generosity of mandatory public pension systems a 
good determinant of national differences in first, levels of private wealth 
and second, levels of inequality in private wealth. I approached my re-
search questions within the framework of an extended life-cycle model 
based on Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), as well as on Friedman 
(1957) and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943, 1954). I expected to find a 
negative relationship between public pension generosity and the level of 
private wealth. I further derived the hypotheses that public pension gen-
erosity is positively associated to the level of private wealth inequality. In 
order to answer my research questions, I generated a rich dataset con-
taining information on characteristics of public pension systems, private 
income and wealth holdings, as well as income and wealth inequality, 
and a number of additional macro-level variables for 40 countries.  
My results indicated a negative relationship between public pension 
generosity and levels of private wealth. This relationship remained stable 
when controlling for a number of possible confounders. In the light of 
ongoing reforms of the public pension systems, it might be expected 
that the decrease in public pension generosity, as either planned or al-
ready conducted in most of the 40 countries analyzed in this study, 
might result in an increase in overall levels of private wealth.   
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Yet, my data did not show any systematic relationship between public 
pension generosity and private wealth inequality. An interesting result I 
found is the negative relationship between income taxes as a percentage 
of GDP and the level of wealth inequality. I interpret this finding as 
empirical support for the argument that non-saving could be an utility-
maximizing decision for the lower income quartiles in case of higher 
taxes, driving the overall level of wealth inequality (Hubbard, Skinner, 
and Zeldes 1995; Domeij and Klein 2002). My results suggest that this 
is, however, more the result of a low ability to save rather than a low 
motivation to save. Thus, if a (further) cut in public pension benefits 
results in a lower level of income taxes, the overall level of wealth ine-
quality might in fact decrease, as suggested by my hypotheses.  
My study also encompasses a number of limitations that result mainly 
from unavailability of appropriate empirical data. The first drawback is 
the still rather small number of cases, which calls for data on private and 
pension wealth for a larger number of countries. The second drawback 
is the historical specificity of my empirical analyses, calling for longer 
time series data. In addition, the periods my income and wealth 
measures are based upon do not perfectly overlap. A third drawback is 
that I analyze only between-country effects instead of within-country 
effects, for which I would need individual-level data. Although not avail-
able today, there is a large number of projects collecting data on private 
wealth holdings especially, in an increasing number of countries and 
over longer time periods. Thus, in some years it will be possible to ad-
dress these limitations and to replicate my results. Finally, I only study 
macro-relations. This is fine in a descriptive sense, since it points to 
relevant research questions. I leave the task to future research to investi-
gate how individual saving behavior is affected by the interplay of indi-
vidual resources (education, income, etc.) and institutional conditions 
(e.g. the public pension system). 
In conclusion, while national differences in public pension generosity 
work as a good predictor of national differences in levels of private 
wealth, they cannot predict national differences in levels of wealth ine-
quality in the set of 40 countries I analyzed. Although I cannot claim a 
causal relationship between the generosity of the public pension system 
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and the distribution of private wealth, my results pave the way for a 
more comprehensive discussion on the ongoing disputes about pension 
reforms, as well as on the meaning of international differences in levels 
of private wealth and wealth inequality. 
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6 THE CONSEQUENCES OF WEALTH: WEALTH AND SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING 
A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in Research in Social Stratifi-
cation and Mobility (Hochman and Skopek 2013). 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, happiness, or subjective well-being (hereafter SWB) as it 
is often referred to, has been gaining importance as an indicator of eco-
nomic and social progress in the industrialized world (see e.g. Stiglitz, 
Sen, and Fitoussi 2009). The increasing interest in SWB is related with 
the increasing gap found between the information contained in aggre-
gated data regarding objective determinants of well-being (like a coun-
try’s GDP) and the laymen’s own evaluation of it (Stiglitz, Sen, and 
Fitoussi 2009). 
This chapter provides new insight on SWB and its association with indi-
viduals’ objective economic standing. In particular, I am interested in 
how an individual’s relative position in the distribution of wealth influ-
ences his or her SWB, and more specifically his or her general satisfac-
tion with life. General life satisfaction (hereafter GLS), represents the 
cognitive dimension of SWB to be distinguished from the affective 
(quality of life) and the emotional (depression) dimensions (e.g. Amit 
and Litwin 2009). It is considered the most stable dimension of SWB 
over an individual’s life course (Eid and Diener 2004; Oishi, Schimmack, 
and Diener 2001). GLS is also robust to the effects of social desirability 
bias and stable across countries (Pacek and Radcliff 2008). Finally, 
Diener (1984) stresses that a self-reported measure of GLS most accu-
rately captures an individual’s own judgment of his or her SWB. 
Importantly, individual well-being may also be represented by reference 
to physical health. Yet, the causal links between physical health and 
wealth are more complex and more difficult to determine than the links 
between SWB and wealth. Specifically, health is often understood to be 
determined by wealth, but wealth, also depends on an individual’s phys-
ical and/or mental condition (Meer, Miller, and Rosen 2003). Moreover, 
objective measures of health are more likely to provide an indication of 
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the researcher’s definition of whether an individual should or should not 
be satisfied with life, but are less likely to convey the individual’s per-
sonal view (Diener 1984). 
In this chapter, I go beyond an investigation of the wealth-SWB relation 
and additionally consider the possibility that macro-level factors shape 
the influence of wealth on SWB. I compare the relation between wealth 
and SWB across three countries: Germany, Israel and Sweden, which, 
according to Esping-Andersen’s typology represent different welfare-
state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999). The rele-
vance of the welfare-state system to the relation between wealth and 
SWB is best explained through the concept of decommodification, refer-
ring to the extent to which citizens in a country are economically inde-
pendent from the market (Esping-Andersen 1990) through the provision 
of social benefits. These benefits can be understood as a cushion against 
the consequences of shortage of financial resources (Pacek and Radcliff 
2008). Because the extent to which welfare states provide these benefits 
strongly differs between the three regimes analyzed, I predict that the 
association between wealth and SWB, measured as GLS, will also dif-
fer.41 
Most studies on the relationship between economic standing and SWB 
have used income as an indicator of economic standing. These studies 
usually report a significant positive impact of income on SWB (e.g. 
Easterlin 2001; Frey and Stutzer 2011; Larson 1978). Yet, income seems 
to account for only a small part of the variation in SWB (Diener et al. 
1993; Pinquart and Sörensen 2000). Recent studies argue that measures 
of economic standing other than income might be more useful for un-
derstanding its relationship with SWB (see e.g., Christoph 2010; Diener, 
Ng, Harter, and Arora 2010; Headey, Muffels, and Wooden 2008; Howell 
and Howell 2008; Warren and Britton 2003). These studies highlight the 
                                                          
 
41  The welfare state regime also has a role in shaping the distributions of private wealth 
and income. It therefore also determines to some extent the motivation of individuals 
to secure their economic position through long-term saving (see Jappelli and 
Modigliani 1998).  
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important role of socioeconomic status (SES), deprivation, and wealth, 
among other indicators determining economic standing. 
While both income and wealth represent an individual’s economic 
standing, each has different properties. Income, as it is usually meas-
ured, is restricted to a certain time interval (income per week, per 
month, or per year) and, to periods of labor market activity. Wealth is a 
stock figure accumulated throughout a person’s life course. Additionally, 
in contrast to earned income, which requires time, effort, and working 
ability, wealth offers access to capital and goods independent of individ-
ual investment and ability, for example, through intergenerational trans-
fers (Elmelech 2008). Wealth may also be a better indicator of an indi-
vidual’s long-term consumption potential and “capacity [. . .] to maintain 
a particular standard of living” (Spilerman, 2000: 497). Considering the 
unique properties of wealth, I see it fit to measure the consequences of 
economic standing to SWB, over and above the consequences income 
may have on it. 
For my empirical analyses, I again make use of the Survey of Health, 
Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) that is an international, rep-
resentative panel study of the population aged 50 years and over. Study-
ing the wealth-SWB association within this population segment that 
either already entered retirement or is close to it, offers some undeniable 
advantages: first, it provides information on how successful individuals 
have been in accumulating wealth over their life course and thus enables 
me to analyze the outcomes of the process of wealth accumulation. In 
addition, because a substantial fraction of individuals over 50 are already 
out of the labor force, they shall rely more on wealth than on income, 
and the wealth-SWB relation is thus likely to be stronger in this popula-
tion segment compared to the younger population. 
6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
6.2.1 LINKING WEALTH TO SWB 
The centrality of happiness for the understanding of human behavior 
was acknowledged already in ancient Greece, when Aristotle defined 
happiness as the “supreme good” (cf. Diener 1994). In the 18th century 
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Malthus (1798) noted that happiness inequality between nations is as 
important as wealth inequality between them (Becchetti, Massari, and 
Naticchioni 2010). Later, Easterlin (1973) suggested that human well-
being and particularly happiness, represents the one most prominent 
reason for countries’ as well as individuals’ pursuit for material benefits. 
The interest in the happiness-wealth nexus continued throughout the 
centuries, yet remained primarily philosophical. It developed into an 
empirical field of research as soon as data on income, wealth, and hap-
piness was made available. Happiness is nowadays most often referred 
to as SWB (Diener 1994), understood as individuals’ “longer-term levels 
of pleasant affect, lack of unpleasant affect, and life satisfaction” (Diener 
1994: 103). 
During the 1990s, research on the relationship between SWB and eco-
nomic standing (measured by income) indicated that individual income 
has a consistent and positive effect on individual SWB (Blanchflower 
and Oswald 2004; Frey and Stutzer 2002; Pinquart and Sörensen 2000). 
On the country-level, however, this effect was less consistent. Some 
researchers found a strong positive effect of a country’s GDP on the 
populations’ mean level of SWB (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 
2003; Hagerty and Veenhoven 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). Oth-
ers demonstrated that an increase in GDP over time does not result in 
increased mean SWB, primarily in developed countries (Easterlin and 
Angelescu 2009; Easterlin 1973, 1974, 1995). 
The inconsistencies concerning the individual and country level rela-
tions between income and SWB inspired various explanations. One 
central perspective proposing such an explanation is known as needs 
theory. In general, needs theory assumes that individual income, as a 
principal indicator of economic standing, augments individual SWB 
primarily because income enables people to better provide for their 
needs (cf. Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002; Veenhoven 1991).42 Yet a 
                                                          
 
42  Although this paper is centered on needs theory and its contribution to an understand-
ing of the individual-level relation between wealth and SWB, it is important to note 
that there are two alternative explanations to the wealth-SWB nexus: the relative stand-
ards approach and the cultural norms concept. Relative standards theorists would ar-
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question remains regarding the meaning of needs and the extent to 
which economic standing can secure them. Whereas Veenhoven and 
Ouweneel (1995) and Veenhoven (1993) restrict those needs to basic 
inborn needs, such as food and shelter, Maslow has a broader concept of 
needs in mind (see Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: Maslow 1943). Each of 
the two approaches has different implications for the relation between 
income and needs and, by extension income and SWB. 
Following Veenhoven’s concept of needs, an increase in income will 
result in an increase in SWB only until the individual’s basic needs are 
met. Above that point, SWB shall not be affected by individual income 
differences. Veenhoven thus expects to find large effects of individual 
income on the populations’ SWB in poor countries. In rich countries, 
basic needs are expected to be provided to all citizens. Maslow (1943, 
1954) does not distinguish the lower from the other parts of the income 
distribution. Specifically, he claims that income may be used not only 
for securing an individual’s basic needs, but also for the fulfilment of 
self-realization (e.g. travelling, arts classes, or certain sporting activities). 
Income may therefore have a positive effect on the SWB of individuals 
in all parts of the income distribution. Because not everyone who can, 
opts for self-realization, the association between income and SWB in the 
middle and/or top parts of the income distribution may be weaker than 
the association found in the lower parts of the income distribution.  
Summing up, for both conceptualizations of needs, the individual’s 
position in the distribution of income is of importance for the effect of 
economic standing on SWB. The main premise of needs theory is that 
low income implies a disadvantage in SWB while high income leads 
only to a small advantage (Maslow 1943; Maslow 1954), if any 
(Veenhoven and Ouweneel 1995; Veenhoven 1993). Importantly, in this 
chapter I move away from the typical understanding of economic stand-
                                                                                                                           
 
gue that individuals evaluate their current SWB by comparing it with either their SWB 
in the past or to the current SWB of relevant others (Easterlin 2001; Michalos 1985). 
Finally, cultural norms are suggested to serve as a mediating factor in the association 
between income and SWB, and that the strength of this association depends on the 
cultural importance of income (e.g. Diener et al. 1999). 
172 The consequences of wealth: Wealth and subjective well-being 
ing as represented by income, and investigate a different form of eco-
nomic well-being namely, wealth. As suggested earlier in this article, I 
argue that in addition to income, wealth provides an important exten-
sion to conceptualize material well-being. Because it marks a life-long 
process, as opposed to income that is a flow-based indicator, especially 
among the elderly, wealth might even be the more appropriate indicator 
of economic standing (Henretta and Campbell 1978).43 
On the individual level, needs theory expects a strong and meaningful 
association between economic resources and SWB among the poor be-
cause they have difficulties to meet their very basic needs as well as their 
self-realization aspirations. The problem however, is that even if I can 
find empirical support for an association between wealth and SWB 
among the poor, this association may or may not be the result of the 
needs-related mechanism. In other words, the mere existence of a nega-
tive effect of poor wealth on SWB as suggested by needs theory is not 
sufficient to postulate needs as a relevant mechanism underlying this 
relation. In order to test for the empirical validity of this argument my 
models include a subjective measure for economic hardship – that is, 
individuals’ self-reported responses about having “problems to make 
ends meet”. If the relevant mechanism behind the relation of wealth 
with SWB is the fulfilment of basic needs, then I expect subjective eco-
nomic hardship to mediate the supposed negative effect of being poor 
on SWB. 
6.2.2 SOCIAL CLASS AND SWB 
The main claim of this chapter is that the combination of income and 
wealth as measures of economic standing can better capture variation in 
SWB than income alone. I understand needs to be the mechanism be-
hind the income/wealth effect on SWB. A number of researchers claim 
that the relationship between economic standing and SWB is mediated 
                                                          
 
43  Studies that focus on the link between SWB and wealth, typically assume (but hardly 
ever demonstrate) that the same mechanisms also underlie the cross-country differ-
ences found in the effect of wealth on SWB (Christoph 2010; Howell, Howell, and 
Schwabe 2006; Warren and Britton 2003). 
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by social class, meaning that income has first a direct effect on SWB and 
second an indirect effect through its impact on social class which in turn 
affects SWB. Adopting this perspective might help to explain some of 
the ostensible contradictions by the differential in findings regarding the 
impact of income on SWB as outlined above. 
Asserting that social stratification is a multidimensional phenomenon, 
Weber’s class concept (Weber 1922) can very well explain the relation-
ship between social class and SWB. As described in more detail in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis, Weber differentiates between class 
and status as being the principal dimensions of social stratification. 
Weber understands class as the economic category, while status repre-
sents the social category. According to Weber, class refers to “the pos-
session of goods and opportunities for income” (Weber [1922] 2008) and 
thus includes occupation, income, as well as asset ownership. More 
broadly, class can be referred to as “life chances”. In contrast to classes, 
status groups, according to Weber are normally communities. Weber 
understands status as an individual’s social honor or prestige. Differ-
ences in the distribution of social honor between typical groups in a 
community Weber understands as social order. As such, status encom-
passes lifestyle and attended social restrictions (e.g. marriage patterns, 
residence). Wealth is not only an important component of class, but at 
the same time a primary cause of status, as some forms of property are 
directly connected with prestige. For example, rentiers usually hold 
greater status as compared to entrepreneurs, because their wealth is less 
obviously connected to labor (Fisher 1987). Consequently, wealth can be 
understood as “a key determinant of the lifestyle differences upon which 
status depends” (Shortell). Summing up, while class refers to “life 
chances”, status refers to social distinction through “lifestyle”. Weber’s 
understanding of social class moreover includes the concept of social 
comparison, which has been found to be another important determinant 
of SWB (Easterlin 2001; Michalos 1985). Self-perceived social class and 
status are likely to affect SWB through a comparison of how one is doing 
as compared to relevant others (this effect has become known as “Keep-
ing up with the Joneses”).  
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Taking all these together, it is very plausible that SWB is not only affect-
ed by economic standing, but also by social class, which combines vari-
ous effects on SWB (financial effects, effects of social prestige, effects of 
social comparison). In this chapter however, I try to separate the effect of 
economic standing from the more general concept of social class.  
When analyzing wealth as an indicator of economic standing in addition 
to income, I thus try to achieve two goals. Firstly, I attempt to find fur-
ther empirical evidence for the handling of wealth not only as an addi-
tional indicator of social standing, but also as a distinct dimension of 
social stratification. Secondly, focusing the wealth-SWB relationship will 
be informative about the consequences of wealth. 
6.2.3 ADDITIONAL PREDICTORS OF SWB 
In addition to wealth, SWB is shaped by other socio-demographic char-
acteristics and by labor market outcomes (Diener et al. 1999; Okun et al. 
1984; Pinquart and Sörensen 2000; Proulx, Helms, and Buehler 2007; 
Stock et al. 1983; Witter et al. 1984). Following previous research, this 
study controls the respondents’ labor market outcomes, measured 
through their educational attainment, their labor market status and their 
household income. I further control for family characteristics (marital 
status and children); immigrant status (in Israel, I also control for Arab 
origin due to the unique position of this minority in the Israeli stratifica-
tion system); and health. The latter has repeatedly been found to have a 
large impact on overall SWB (Deaton 2008; Edwards and Klemmack 
1973; Okun et al. 1984), particularly among aging individuals (Larson 
1978; Markides and Martin 1979; Spreitzer and Snyder 1974).  
Health may in fact represent an intervening variable in the wealth-SWB 
relation. A vast number of studies link health not only to SWB but also 
to wealth (see for example Ettner 1996; Marmot, Ryff, Bumpass, Shipley, 
and Marks 1997; Meer et al. 2003; Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and 
Maskileyson 2013; Smith 1999; Wu 2003). Smith, Langa, Kabeto, and 
Ubel (2005) indeed find that wealth can serve as a buffer against a de-
crease in SWB in times of health difficulties and thus propose a moder-
ating effect of health on the wealth-SWB relation. Yet, the relative part 
health plays in an individual’s subjective evaluation of his or her well-
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being, remains, to date, indefinite. The possibility that the wealth-SWB 
relationship I observe is an artifact of an individuals’ health (or the op-
posite) requires me to confirm that the effect of wealth maintains once I 
control for health. 
6.2.4 THE COMPARATIVE SETTING: DO DIFFERENT CONTEXTS IMPLY 
DIFFERENCES IN THE WEALTH-SWB RELATION? 
One important aim of this chapter is to investigate the consequences of 
different institutional contexts on the relation between wealth and SWB. 
Specifically, I focus on the contribution of the welfare-state system to the 
wealth-SWB relation. The welfare state has different instruments that 
can affect this relation directly or indirectly. As underscored by Pacek 
and Radcliff (2008), the welfare state’s primary indirect instrument to 
affect the wealth-SWB relation is decommodification, representing the 
extent to which individuals can maintain an acceptable standard of living 
independent of their market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990). In 
other words, the authors consider state sponsored social benefits a safe-
guard against the negative consequences of unexpected (or even ex-
pected) departure from the labor market and other unexpected shocks. 
Thus, I predict the association between wealth and SWB to be weaker 
where such social services exist.  
The actual extent and design of social benefits provision in a country 
depends on the characteristics of its welfare state system. The current 
chapter compares three countries, each of which represents a different 
welfare-state system which complies with a different regime type, speci-
fied in Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). Germany is the prototype of the 
conservative welfare regime, Israel represents the liberal welfare regime 
and Sweden typifies the social-democratic welfare regime. With this 
focus on the relation between wealth and SWB among aging individuals 
who either are close to retirement or already retired, it makes sense to 
demonstrate the workings of decommodification in the three countries 
included in this chapter through the old age provision system in each. 
According to the life-cycle hypothesis (cf. Modigliani and Brumberg 
1954), individuals save parts of their income in times of labor market 
activity for consumption in retirement. Pension programs intervene in 
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individuals’ saving behavior by taking over the task of old age provision 
through mandatory saving (via the detention of earned income). Moreo-
ver, the level of minimum pension benefits provided is likely to affect 
the intensity of the wealth-SWB relation especially among those individ-
uals who did not have the possibility to choose how much they are will-
ing to save, namely the poor. In other words, decommodification, and 
here, the pension system, determines whether personal wealth is a ne-
cessity for individuals in order to maintain their SWB or not, and what is 
the level of wealth required to do so. If the state provides generous man-
datory pensions (for example in terms of total pension wealth, average 
replacement rate and the target achievements, as suggested by Soede & 
Vrooman in 2008), individuals are predicted to save less of their income 
for old-age provision44 (Jappelli and Modigliani 1998). More importantly, 
under such conditions, I predict the wealth–SWB relation to be compar-
atively weak. In the following, I shortly describe the general degree of 
decommodification in Sweden, Israel and Germany and the different 
pension systems in each country. I then proceed with demonstrating the 
association between the welfare-state regime (exemplified here, by the 
mandatory pension system) and the level of SWB.  
The social-democratic welfare regime represented in here by Sweden, is 
most generous in terms of providing education, health and old age bene-
fits to all its citizens, guaranteeing them a high level of social security. 
These social services, financed through relatively high income taxes, 
secure a high level of decommodification. Correspondingly, public pen-
sions in Sweden are relatively generous (OECD 2011b; Soede and 
Vrooman 2008). The relative minimum pension benefits as percentage 
of average earnings have been at 25% in 2008 (OECD 2011b). 
                                                          
 
44  Studies indeed indicate that there is a substitution effect between social security con-
tributions (mandatory saving) and individual wealth holdings (discretionary wealth). 
Yet, this substitution effect is incomplete, as individuals are found to still save money 
(esp. Callen and Thimann 1997; Feldstein 1974; Munnell 1974). According to Jappelli 
and Modigliani (1998), this finding can be explained for example by ignorance or mis-
trust in the efficacy of the mandatory pension system. See also chapter 5 for more in-
formation on the relationship between social security and private wealth. 
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In the liberal model, social services are provided on a basic level and only 
to those in need, where need is typically evaluated by a means test. Ac-
cordingly, public pensions are relatively prudent (OECD 2011b; Soede 
and Vrooman 2008) and the general decommodification level is low. 
Most people cannot count on state benefits to secure their economic 
standing and must depend on their own resources, that is, on wealth 
(Lapinski et al. 1998). Israel closely resembles this model. Pension in 
Israel was privatized during the mid-2000s with private insurance com-
panies forced to invest the larger share of individuals’ pension portfolios 
in the market, placing high risks on pension savings of individuals. Old-
age allowance in Israel, which is universally distributed, is insufficient 
even for a minimal living standard (Dagan-Busaglo 2007). Thus, many 
aging individuals in Israel are susceptible to poverty and/or economic 
hardship. Minimum pension benefits in Israel have been at 13% of av-
erage earnings in 2008 (OECD 2011b).45 
In the conservative welfare regime, social services are based on the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, and are designed as social insurance systems to 
secure status maintenance. The result is an intermediate level of de-
commodification. In Germany, representing the conservative model 
here, a general minimum retirement pension does not exist. However, 
individuals without mandatory and personal savings are eligible for 
basic social security in retirement. The relative benefit value of basic 
social security in retirement equals the standard rate of the basic support 
for employment seekers (Hartz 4) which was about 21% of average earn-
ings (household net equivalent income) in 2008 (cf. Münder 2008; 
OECD 2011b). Although according to Esping-Andersen (1990) the level 
of decommodification should be lower in Germany compared to Swe-
den, the generosity of the two public pension systems and the level of 
                                                          
 
45  The pension system in Israel is but one example for the transition of the Israeli wel-
fare state toward a liberal regime. The transition is marked by increasing reductions in 
government spending on welfare and social security, and by gradual erosion of social 
services. Another central process marking Israel’s transition to the liberal model was 
the consistent efforts of consecutive governments to weaken the power of labor unions 
(most notably the HISTADRUT) reducing workers ability to secure their rights and in-
terests (Doron 2001). 
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minimum pension benefits are similar (OECD 2011b; Soede and 
Vrooman 2008). This might result in only small differences between 
Germany and Sweden with regard to the impact of discretionary wealth 
on SWB.  
For reasons explained above, I consider welfare-state policies like old age 
provision to intervene in the relation between wealth and SWB.46 In the 
liberal model, I understand wealth to be a necessary instrument to se-
cure SWB in old age. I therefore expect the wealth–SWB relation to be 
rather strong in Israel. To the contrary, in the social-democratic model, 
being of poor wealth is predicted to have no or only small negative con-
sequences for SWB. The conservative model suggests a relation of me-
dium strength between wealth and SWB. 
It is important to remember that the Esping-Andersen typology also has 
its limitations. For example, it does not accommodate the diverse pro-
grams and services of different welfare states (Lapinski et al. 1998). Not-
withstanding its limitations though, Esping-Andersen’s typology is a 
suitable tool for my research purposes, providing me with clearly de-
fined categories to explore my hypotheses.  
6.2.5 HYPOTHESES 
From my theoretical considerations, I derive the following hypotheses, 
each of which I will empirically test in the current study: 
H1: Income and wealth together account for the variance in GLS 
better than does income alone. 
H2: Individuals of poor wealth have lower GLS than do those in the 
middle of the wealth distribution. The wealthy group has only 
slightly higher, or the same, GLS than does the middle group. 
H3: The negative effect of poor wealth on GLS is strongest in Israel, 
where decommodification is lowest. It will be less strong in 
                                                          
 
46  One can also think for example on the important role of the health system (as another 
representation of decommodification) determining the importance of income or 
wealth for the ability to maintain good health and GLS. 
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Germany, and similar or slightly weaker in Sweden, where de-
commodification is highest.  
H4: The negative effect of poor wealth on GLS is mediated by indi-
viduals’ subjective feelings about their respective economic 
hardship. 
6.3 DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
6.3.1 DATA AND VARIABLES 
For my analyses, I once again use the second wave of the Survey of 
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE47). SHARE is an in-
ternational, representative panel study of the population aged 50 years 
and over. The main advantage of the SHARE data is that it provides rich 
and detailed (self-reported) information on household wealth in the 
form of financial and other assets, as well as various kinds of debt. My 
units of analysis are individuals aged 50 or more. 
The focus of the current chapter lies in understanding the consequences 
of differential wealth levels, measured as household gross wealth, for 
individual SWB, measured as GLS. In the SHARE dataset, GLS was 
measured using an 11-point single item scale.48 In my statistical models, 
GLS is standardized (transformed to have a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one) to ensure that the coefficients across countries are 
comparable. Consequentially, a one-unit change in one of the independ-
                                                          
 
47  This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011. The SHARE data 
collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th 
framework programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme 
Quality of Life), through the 6th framework programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-
2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-
028812) and through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and 
SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U .S. National Institute on Aging 
(U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 
and OGH A 04-064, IAG B SR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national 
sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of 
funding institutions).” 
48  The original question was “On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means completely dissatis-
fied and 10 means completely satisfied, how satisfied are you with your life?” 
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ent variables results in a change in GLS of one standard deviation. In-
come and wealth are measured on the household level and are presented 
in Euro, adjusted for purchasing power parity.49 I operationalize income 
as total net annual income,50 and make use of an equivalence scale (total 
income divided by the root of the number of persons living in a house-
hold) to account for household size.51  
Recent studies distinguish between positive and negative wealth (debt) 
as different forms of wealth are related to different consequences for 
individuals’ SWB (see Christoph, 2010; Diener et al., 2010; Howell, 
Howell, & Schwabe, 2006; O’Connell, 2004). Whereas wealth is expected 
to positively affect SWB, several studies demonstrate that debt has a 
negative effect on SWB (Brown, Taylor, and Wheatley Price 2005; 
Drentea 2000; Hatcher 1994). These findings reflect the theoretical as-
                                                          
 
49  The overall income and wealth of the household also include the contribution of those 
individuals (spouses, children or in-laws of the main respondent) in the survey who 
reported being younger than 50 and are thus not included in my sample. 
50  “The basic definition used in the SHARE project reflects money income [after] taxes 
on a yearly base and includes only regular payments. Lump-sum payments and finan-
cial support provided by parents, relatives or other people are not included. The availa-
ble data at the individual level include: income from employment; income from self-
employment or work for a family business; income from (public or private) pensions 
or invalidity or unemployment benefits; income from alimony or other private regular 
payments; income from long-term care insurance (only for Austria and Germany). The 
available data at the household level include: income from household members not in-
ter-viewed; income from other payments, such as housing allowances, child benefits, 
poverty relief, etc.; income actually received from highest secondary homes, holiday 
homes or real estate, land or forestry; capital income […]. For homeowners, the data at 
the household level also include imputed rent, based on the self-assessed home value 
minus the net residual value of the debt (payments for mortgages or loans). The inter-
est rate used for imputed rents is fixed at 4% for all countries. The SHARE definition 
of income does not include home business and other types of debts” (Paccagnella and 
Weber 2005: 357ff.). 
51  Equivalence scales assume that each household type in the population has an assigned 
value in proportion to its needs. They account for the number of persons living in a 
household and for economies of scale. Equivalence scales are usually applied for in-
come, but regarding wealth, the situation is more complex. The literature on the dis-
tribution of wealth reveals “no standard or well-defined approach accounting for dif-
ferent needs” (Sierminska and Smeeding 2005: 2). In the present chapter, I decided to 
refrain from the use of an equivalence scale for wealth, because there is no evidence 
that for wealth, certain amounts are needed to maintain a certain material standard of 
living for households (in fact, this is what I seek to understand). 
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sumption that debt poses severe risks to a household, and is associated 
with increased anxiety and distress. In line with this reasoning, I analyze 
positive (gross) wealth52 while controlling for household debt53. A com-
mon problem in survey items inquiring about personal finances is the 
high rate of item-nonresponse (Riphahn 1997). To fill in these missing 
values, the SHARE team applies a multiple imputation strategy.54 
Following my theoretical considerations, I expect the effect of wealth on 
SWB to differ depending on an individual’s, respectively a household’s 
position in a country’s wealth distribution. In my analysis, I account for 
the households’ position in a country’s wealth distribution by making 
use of the wealth quartiles. The two middle quartiles represent the mid-
dle category (hereinafter, “middle wealth” or the “middle group”), which 
serves as the reference category. Those in the highest quartile are here-
inafter referred to as the “wealthy” or as having “high wealth.” Those in 
the lowest quartile are hereinafter referred to as the “poor” or as “being 
of poor wealth”. Alesina, Di, and Macculloch (2004) use a somewhat 
similar approach – they, however, define the people in the two upper 
quartiles as rich and those in the two lower quartiles as poor. 
Subjective economic hardship is captured by respondents’ self-
evaluation of their ability to “make ends meet” in their household. Orig-
inally, responses range from 1 (“with great difficulty”) to 4 (“easily”). I 
combined the outcomes of 1 and 2 to create a dummy variable represent-
ing people with economic hardship. Income, wealth and economic hard-
ship are all measured at the household level, with only one member of 
the household (the so-called financial respondent) responding to the 
                                                          
 
52  In SHARE, gross wealth contains the value of the following assets: (1) real assets, i.e., 
the ownership and value of the primary residence, of other real estate, of the share 
owned of own businesses and of owned cars; and (2) gross financial assets, i.e., the 
ownership and value of bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks, mu-
tual funds, individual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing and life in-
surance policies. The values are summed over all household members in order to gen-
erate household-level variables (Christelis, Japelli, and Padula 2005: 358 ff.).  
53  Debts contain the value of mortgages and financial liabilities summed over all house-
hold members (Christelis, Japelli, and Padula 2005). 
54  For more information on multiple imputation, see Rubin (1987); for more information 
on the imputation method used in the SHARE study, see Christelis (2011). 
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respective items. In order to estimate the impact of household wealth on 
individuals’ SWB, I control for the individual demographic and socio-
economic factors discussed in the theoretical section. Appendix D pro-
vides a list of all variables with detailed definitions. Table 16, displayed 
in the results section, provides an overview of how these variables are 
distributed across Germany, Israel and Sweden. My country-specific 
sub-samples are further differentiated according to the three wealth 
groups described above. 
6.3.2 METHODS 
In order to account for the socio-economic and socio-demographic fac-
tors that affect GLS, I apply a linear regression model (OLS regres-
sion),55 specified as:  
iγiiii uCrichβpoorβDβIββGLS ++++)ln(+)ln(+= 54210 (9) 
where ln(Ii) denotes the natural logarithm of household income; ln(Di) 
denotes the natural logarithm of household debt56; and poor and rich are 
the dummies for the top and bottom quartiles, respectively, of the 
household wealth distribution. Ci is a row vector of the control variables 
described above, and γ is a column vector of parameters. I use the Hu-
ber-White Sandwich estimator for cluster sampling (individuals clus-
tered in households) in all regression models presented to obtain robust 
standard error estimates (cf. Wooldridge 2002). The analyses are carried 
out separately for each of the three countries. 
                                                          
 
55  Researchers often use ordered logit models to represent the relationship between 
economic standing and SWB. I ran my models using logit models as well, but the find-
ings are not meaningfully different from those of the OLS models. Thus, I present on-
ly the results of the OLS models, which allow for a more intuitive interpretation. 
56  I tested for different functional forms of income and debt in my models and found 
that the logarithmic term best represents the relationship between income and GLS as 
well as between debt and GLS. 
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6.4 RESULTS 
6.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Table 16 provides a descriptive overview of the three country-specific 
samples. The predictors were weighted using cross-sectional calibrated 
weights that reflect each country’s national population size of individuals 
born in 1956 or earlier (Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics 
of Aging 2010: 43). These weights help to reduce problems of unit-
nonresponse and sample attrition (Mannheim Research Institute for the 
Economics of Aging 2010: 41). The rightmost column presents the char-
acteristics of the entire sample while the columns on the left hand side 
present the characteristics of each wealth group.  
The top row of Table 16 indicates that the Swedish respondents report 
the highest mean values of GLS (8.14), while Israelis report the lowest 
(7.41).57 Average household wealth is highest in Israel (€519,420) lower 
in Sweden (€313,100), and lowest in Germany (€237,150).58 Differences 
in mean GLS and average household wealth were statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level.  
The poor in Germany possess a mean gross wealth of €10,960 ([0; 
38,000]). In Israel it is €20,680 ([0; 72,000]) and in Sweden it is €32,030 
([0; 83,000]). The wealthiest respondents in Germany possess a mean 
gross wealth of about €653,250 ([338,000; 4,516,000]), while in Sweden it 
is about €942,630 ([373,000; 7,969,000]), and in Israel, €1,446,120 
([575,000; 7,670,000]). 19% of Swedes and 26% of Germans claim eco-
nomic hardship while in Israel, over half of the respondents report prob-
lems making ends meet. This statistic increases to almost 75% among 
poor Israelis.
                                                          
 
57  One should bear in mind the different geopolitical situations of the three countries 
under study, which may also affect SWB. In Israel, in particular, geopolitics may be 
associated with the relatively low GLS of its citizens. 
58  The wealth differences between Germany and Sweden, on the one hand, and Israel, on 
the other, might be linked to the comparatively high rate of homeownership in Israel. 
In Israel, about 80% of citizens own their home. In Germany and Sweden, less than 
60% do. 
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Interestingly, about 22% of Israeli respondents from wealthy households 
also report economic hardship, indicating that a significant number of 
Israelis feel economically insecure, despite reporting to possess gross 
wealth between €575,000 and €7,670,000. 
Given the average age of the respondents (65 in Sweden, 66 in Germany, 
and 67 in Israel) and the higher longevity of women, it is not surprising 
that the majority of respondents in all three country samples are women. 
Moreover, in all three samples, women are more likely to be in the poor 
wealth quartile than men are. There is a relatively high proportion of 
immigrants in the Israeli sample (61%), which is reasonable given Isra-
el’s immigration history (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 2000). In both, 
Israel and Germany, a large proportion of immigrants occupy the poor 
wealth group, which attests to the well-documented difficulties that im-
migrants face in accumulating wealth in the receiving society (e.g. 
Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 2000). 
In line with the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954), 
the findings presented in Table 16 suggest that in all three countries, 
employed individuals are less likely to be poor. Retired individuals are, to 
the contrary, more likely to be poor (59.83%, 55.04%, and 62.41% of 
retirees are in the poorest wealth quartile in Germany, Israel, and Swe-
den, respectively). Not surprisingly, the poorest respondents in all three 
countries have the worst levels of health, which supports the established 
association between economic well-being and health (e.g. Jones & 
Wildman, 2008). Health levels are higher for those in the middle wealth 
group and highest among the wealthy.59 
Income levels are highest in Germany, with an average net household 
equivalence income of €23,940, compared with €23,260 in Israel, and 
€22,510 in Sweden. Yet, these differences are not statistically significant 
                                                          
 
59  Health was measured via the Physical Health Index used by Semyonov et al. (2013). 
The index lists 41 items, including limitations with activities of daily living, mobility 
limitations, arm function and fine motor limitations, chronic diseases and several ill-
ness symptoms, where 1 point is given for each condition on the list. This score is 
then converted into a percent score, which ranges from 0 (for bad health) to 100 (for 
good health). 
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(one-way analysis of variance). The range of the income distribution 
across the different wealth groups is widest in Israel, indicating greater 
income inequality. Finally, the Swedish respondents are the most in-
debted, with an average household debt of €36,550 (mortgage and finan-
cial liabilities), and a median value of €7,540. In Germany and Israel, the 
average household debt is around €13,000, but the median value is 0, 
suggesting that 50% of German and Israeli respondents are not in debt 
at all. Here too, mean differences were statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. The descriptive data provides valuable information regarding the 
differences and similarities among the three countries. Yet, in order to 
better evaluate the associations between GLS and the different indicators 
of economic standing, I proceed to estimate regression models that con-
trol for socio-demographic characteristics.  
6.4.2 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Table 17 shows the results of my multivariate regression models. For 
reasons of clarity, I only report those measures and coefficients that are 
relevant for the hypotheses (the full models can be found in Table 18, 
M1). The first hypothesis states that wealth and income together should 
account for the GLS of the respondents better than does income alone.  
The findings (Model 2 of Table 17) indeed show that controlling for 
income, wealth has an impact on GLS in Germany and Israel. In both 
countries, the poor report lower GLS (b=-0.13 in Germany and b=-0.24 
in Israel) than individuals in the middle of the wealth distribution and 
the rich report higher GLS (b=0.11 in Germany and b=0.17 in Israel). 
Debt is significantly associated with SWB only among the Israeli re-
spondents, where debt is found to slightly decrease their GLS (b=-0.01). 
The R2 of models 1 and 2 indicate that income and wealth, when taken 
together, explain a greater part of the variance in SWB than does income 
alone. The increase in R2 is significant at the one percent level in Ger-
many and at the five per cent level in Israel (F-test). My analysis thus 
supports hypothesis 1 for Germany and Israel. 
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Table 18 presents my full regression models. Model 1 tests hypothesis 2, 
which predicts that the gap in SWB between the middle group and the 
poor will be greater than the gap between the middle group and the 
wealthy. The descriptive results in Table 16 showed that in all three 
countries, the poor report lower GLS than the middle group indicating a 
“poor penalty”, while the wealthy report higher GLS than the middle 
group indicating a “wealth premium”. However, the regression model 
conveys a more complex picture: in both Germany and Israel, the poor 
penalty and the wealth premium are similar in magnitude (net of all 
controls, the null hypothesis b*poor+b*rich=0 could not be rejected). In 
Sweden, the GLS of both the poor and the wealthy are not significantly 
different from the SWB of their middle wealth counterparts. These find-
ings contradict the assumptions of needs theory that the poor penalty 
shall be larger than the rich premium. The SHARE data does not sup-
port hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 proposes that the negative effect of being of poor wealth on 
GLS will be strongest in Israel, and weaker in Germany and Sweden. 
The findings indicate that in Sweden individuals of poor wealth do not 
differ significantly in their GLS compared with individuals in the middle 
of the wealth distribution. Regarding the size of the poor effects on GLS 
in Germany and Israel, interaction based coefficients provide some evi-
dence that being poor is more detrimental for GLS in Israel (b=-0.24) 
than in Germany (b=-0.13). However, this difference is not statistically 
significant. The data does not support hypothesis 3.  
As indicated in the theoretical section, health might intervene in the 
relation between wealth and SWB. Indeed, health has a significant im-
pact on GLS in all three countries under study. Additional statistical 
analysis revealed that among the poor, health mediates the wealth-GLS 
relation.60 This mediation is however only partial because being of poor 
wealth still negatively affects GLS. 
                                                          
 
60  I tested for health as a mediator variable among the poor by carrying out a series of 
Sobel-Goodman tests (Goodman 1960; Sobel 1982). The indirect effect of health was 
significant (p < 0.01) in all three countries with around 40% (DE: 36%; IL: 41%; SE: 
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Model 2 (Table 18) tests hypothesis 4, which suggests that if the negative 
effect of poor wealth on GLS derives from needs, then this effect should 
be mediated by an individual’s subjective sense of his or her own eco-
nomic hardship. The findings presented in Model 2 indicate that re-
spondents who report having problems making ends meet (variable ‘Ec. 
hardship’) are significantly less satisfied with their life compared to 
those who do not have problems (b=-0.46 in Germany, -0.34 in Israel, 
and -0.24 in Sweden). Furthermore, Model 2 demonstrates that the poor 
penalty I found in Germany and in Israel diminishes after I introduce 
this subjective measure of economic hardship. In Germany, the remain-
ing effect is no longer statistically significant implying full mediation, 
but in Israel it remains significant (b=-0.17), implying only partial medi-
ation.61 Therefore, the data supports hypothesis 4 for Germany, but only 
partially for Israel. 
Table 18 also indicates that men have lower GLS than women across all 
countries. In Israel and Sweden, immigrants have lower GLS than the 
native-born population; this gap remains statistically significant even 
after controlling for subjective economic hardship (b=-0.15in Israel, and 
b=-0.22 in Sweden). The GLS of Israelis and Swedes increases among 
individuals with children (b=0.43 and b=0.25, respectively). In Germany, 
employed individuals do not differ in their GLS levels from those in 
retirement or the permanently sick and disabled respondents. The un-
employed have lower GLS (b=-0.26) than the retired and permanently 
sick respondents. In Israel, retirement does not suggest an advantage 
compared to unemployment, yet employed respondents have higher 
levels of GLS (b=0.12) compared with retired and sick individuals.  
                                                                                                                           
 
41%) of the total effect of poor wealth on GLS being mediated by health. For the rich, 
health has no significant impact on GLS. 
61  The Sobel-Goodman tests (Goodman 1960; Sobel 1982) show a significant indirect 
effect of having problems making ends meet in Germany and Israel (p < 0.01) with 
45% respectively 30% of the total effect of being of poor wealth on SWB being mediat-
ed. 
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6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this final study was to investigate the consequenc-
es of individual wealth for individual SWB, drawing on the growing 
consensus that wealth is an important determinant of economic stand-
ing alongside income. My main premise was that the association be-
tween wealth, measured by household gross worth, and SWB, measured 
by general life satisfaction (GLS), might be explained by needs theory. I 
further investigated the impact of different institutional contexts on the 
wealth-SWB relation. Applying Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) typology 
of welfare-state regimes I analyzed and compared the impact of an indi-
vidual’s position in the distribution of wealth on its GLS in Germany 
(conservative welfare-state), Israel (liberal welfare-state), and Sweden 
(social-democratic welfare-state). 
Needs theory claims that wealth augments SWB by enabling a person to 
better provide for his or her basic needs, economic and/or recreational. 
This proposition implies that the poor will most likely enjoy a lower level 
of SWB compared to the middle wealth group, while the wealthy will 
differ from the middle wealth group only slightly, if at all. My findings 
show that net of income, gross household wealth has a significant im-
pact on SWB, measured as GLS, in Germany and Israel. More specifical-
ly, I find a poor penalty and a rich premium on GLS in these two coun-
tries, which, against the predictions of needs theory, do not differ in 
magnitude, suggesting that wealth can buy happiness. In Sweden, nei-
ther the poor nor the wealthy differ significantly in their SWB from the 
middle wealth group. 
Existing literature fails to provide evidence that the relation between 
wealth and SWB is based on individuals’ inability to meet their needs. 
Adding to current research, this chapter utilizes a subjective measure of 
economic hardship, which enabled me to capture and estimate the 
needs-based mechanism.  Results show that subjective economic hard-
ship accounts for the poor penalty as well as the wealth premium in 
SWB, but only in Germany. In line with needs theory, the differences in 
SWB among German respondents are likely to derive from economic 
hardship. 
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The findings were different in the Israeli sample. In this case, economic 
hardship fully accounts for the wealth premium, but only partially medi-
ates the effect of being of poor wealth on GLS. This finding demon-
strates that in Israel as in Germany the poor have problems making 
ends meet. Yet, it also shows that my measure for needs fails to fully 
explain this poor penalty. Previous research suggests that economic 
inequality increases the prevalence of social comparison (Diener, 
Diener, and Diener 1995). An ad-hoc explanation for the remaining poor 
penalty in Israel may thus be found in the higher levels of economic 
inequality present in Israel compared to Germany (OECD 2011c), in-
creasing the dominance of social comparison in this country. I therefore 
encourage future research to build on the findings of this chapter by 
incorporating the social comparison mechanism suggested by relative 
standard theory (Easterlin 2001; but also Michalos 1985) in a compara-
tive framework that takes subjective economic hardship into account. 
Regarding the impact of the policy context, my findings suggests that the 
welfare-state system affects the wealth-SWB nexus. More specifically, I 
argued that the type of welfare-state regime would impact the magnitude 
of the association between wealth and levels of GLS by means of the 
degree of decommodification (exemplified by the pension systems in the 
three countries). My main hypothesis was that the negative effect of poor 
wealth on GLS would be strongest in Israel, where decommodification is 
lowest. The negative effect of wealth on GLS I predicted to be weaker in 
Germany and similar or even lower in Sweden, where decommodifica-
tion is highest. My results show that in Sweden wealth does not affect 
SWB at all, while in Germany and Israel the negative effects of poor 
wealth on SWB I found to not differ in size. Yet, having estimated sepa-
rate models (rather than a multilevel model), one must interpret these 
result with some caution and consider the possibility that other country-
level differences may also be involved in creating the differences I re-
port. 
This chapter contributes to the contemporary literature on SWB by 
demonstrating three things. First, the SWB of individuals aged 50 or 
older, is strongly associated with wealth, representing an important 
source for economic standing, in Germany and Israel, yet, not so in 
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Sweden. Second, needs are the predominant mechanism linking eco-
nomic standing to SWB in Germany, and they partially explain the 
wealth-SWB relations in Israel. Third, the degree of social support pro-
vided by the state has an impact on the magnitude of the association 
between wealth and SWB. The results presented here might thus serve 
as a fertile ground for the on-going debate on whether and how welfare 
policy instruments can improve a population’s SWB. 
Finally, the finding that wealth has an effect on SWB over and above the 
effect of income can be understood as a final indicator for wealth being a 
distinct dimension of social inequality. As my results show, wealth is 
related to advantageous conditions of living, measured in terms of SWB. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The main research objective of this thesis was to contribute to a broader 
understanding of social inequality by going beyond inequalities derived 
solely from the labor market and to establish wealth as a distinct dimen-
sion of social inequality. All five empirical studies of this thesis were 
organized around this research goal. The second chapter formed the 
starting point for the four following studies, in theoretical as well as in 
empirical terms. All subsequent chapters were empirical studies based 
on the definitions and findings as presented in chapter 2. They each set 
a different focus on the topic of wealth, trying to answer one of the re-
search questions raised in the preface and the introductory chapter. In 
the following, I will briefly recapitulate the main research questions and 
discuss the main results of this thesis. 
7.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
7.1.1 NATIONAL PATTERNS OF WEALTH INEQUALITY SIGNIFICANTLY 
DIFFER FROM THOSE OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
In the second chapter, I gave a comprehensive definition of wealth by 
differentiating it from income. Doing this, I developed theoretical argu-
ments for the understanding of wealth as a distinct dimension of social 
inequality. Considering the unique characteristics and the numerous 
functions of wealth – compared to income – I argued that individual 
differences in levels of wealth are likely to be more consequential for 
social inequality than individual differences in levels of income. To find 
empirical support for the theoretical argument that wealth is a distinct 
dimension of social inequality, I described the distributions of wealth 
and patterns of wealth inequality in 17 European countries and Israel 
and compared them to those of income. I made use of two different data 
sources. The first dataset I used is the “Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe” (SHARE), which provides rich and detailed in-
formation on household wealth and income for the population aged 50 
years and above. In addition to the SHARE data, I made use of a second 
wealth data source– the Global Wealth Databooks – and a second in-
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come data source – the OECD iLibrary. These data sets provide infor-
mation on the overall population.  
My results showed – firstly – that there is strong variation in the distri-
bution of wealth between these 18 countries, and – secondly – that levels 
of wealth inequality significantly differ from levels of income inequality 
in about half of the countries analyzed. Although wealth is more preva-
lent among the older population, the trends in levels of wealth and levels 
of wealth inequality as exhibited by the different data sources were very 
similar to each other. This can be understood, firstly, as a sign of good 
data quality and it could also mean that levels of wealth inequality per-
petuate over the life course.  
The highest values of median wealth were found in the Southern Euro-
pean countries, where median income is relatively low. High values of 
median wealth and median income were found in France and Belgium. 
Low values of median wealth and median income were found in the 
Eastern European countries. Surprisingly high levels of wealth inequali-
ty were found in Sweden and Denmark, two countries of the social dem-
ocratic welfare regime, widely considered being highly egalitarian socie-
ties. Conversely, the Southern European countries – where income ine-
quality is high – exhibited comparatively low levels of wealth inequality. 
Obviously, Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states (Esping-
Andersen 1990), which can still adequately describe national patterns of 
income inequality, cannot be applied when it comes to wealth. These 
findings form the first empirical evidence to support the treatment of 
wealth as a distinct dimension of social inequality, and suggest that a 
sole reliance on levels of income inequality would result in a one-sided 
or even inaccurate picture of national patterns of economic and, in a 
broader sense, social inequality. Moreover, these findings raise a num-
ber of further questions, examined in the subsequent chapters. 
Conclusion and discussion 199 
7.1.2 OLDER EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLDS POSSESS CONSIDERABLE 
AMOUNTS OF WEALTH AND HOUSEHOLD WEALTH PORTFOLIOS 
DIFFER ACROSS THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND ACROSS     
COUNTRIES 
I continued to look for empirical support for the theoretical understand-
ing of wealth as a distinct dimension of social inequality by examining 
the relationship between income and wealth among elderly households 
in 13 out of the 18 European countries, I had analyzed in chapter 2. The 
data I used stems from the SHARE, which makes the results of chapter 
3 directly comparable to those of chapter 2. In a first step, I empirically 
determined the income-wealth relationship, to establish whether the 
income rich (income poor) and the asset rich (asset poor) were the same 
group of persons. Commensurate with theoretical considerations and 
past research, my results showed a positive correlation between income 
and wealth. I found older European households, even those in the lowest 
income quartile, to possess considerable amounts of wealth, equal to at 
least five times their (last) annual income. As the income rich (poor) are, 
for the most part, also the asset rich (poor), my results indicate a strong 
accumulation of financial advantages (disadvantages) for this particular 
group of persons. However, of course, these groups are not perfectly 
congruent. There exists, for example, a meaningful number of house-
holds with high net worth but relatively low income. 
I further analyzed the composition of wealth across the different income 
quartiles and conducted a decomposition analysis to determine the con-
tribution of the various components of wealth to the level of overall 
wealth inequality. Differences in the wealth portfolio, within and across 
countries, are important in terms of social inequality, as different types 
of assets entail different advantages and disadvantages. I found the 
wealth portfolios of asset-rich households to be much more diversified 
and thus less “crisis-prone” than those of the asset poor, which is anoth-
er indicator of the manifold financial advantages of the asset rich, who 
are – as I showed before – often also rich in income. In line with past 
research, I found owner-occupied housing to be the central component 
in the wealth portfolio of households, especially in Southern and Eastern 
European countries. For the lowest income quartiles, it is often the only 
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meaningful asset. Financial wealth represents a considerable proportion 
of total wealth in the Northern European countries – which are attribut-
ed a lower risk-adversity – while it is of minor importance in the wealth 
portfolio of Southern European households. Households in Northern 
Europe can thus relatively easy access – and consume or reinvest – their 
wealth, while the wealth of the households in Southern European coun-
tries is less easy accessible and much less mobile. For this reason, elder-
ly homeowners are sometimes described as housing rich, but cash poor. 
Compared to the Southern European countries, households in the 
Northern European countries are, however, more sensitive to financial 
shocks. Housing wealth was found to have an equalizing effect on 
wealth inequality in all countries.  This is especially the case in the 
Southern European countries, where homeownership rates are high. An 
increase in real assets (net of housing wealth), on the other hand, would 
lead to an increase in overall levels of wealth inequality. 
The high importance of housing wealth across all income quartiles in 
the Southern European countries is one potential explanation for the 
high median values of wealth in these countries, as established in chap-
ter 2. There seems to be a positive correlation between high rates of 
homeownership, on the one hand, and high median values of net worth 
together with comparatively low levels of wealth inequality, on the other 
hand. The high importance of financial wealth – a wealth component 
most prevalent in the upper wealth quartiles – and the low importance of 
housing wealth in the Northern European countries might be an expla-
nation for the high levels of wealth inequality in these countries.  
Overall, these results provide further empirical evidence that the income 
rich are also the asset rich. Although the currently available data does 
not allow to determine whether the wealth of the asset rich stems pre-
dominantly from the accumulation of personal income or from transfers 
from parents and relatives, these results still emphasize the self-
reinforcing nature of both wealth itself and of wealth inequalities. 
7.1.3 HOUSING INEQUALITY IS A TWO-DIMENSIONAL PHENOMENON 
Having identified owner-occupied housing as the central component in 
the wealth portfolio of households, I decided to take a closer look at this 
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specific wealth component, and focused on housing inequality in an 
international comparison. I argued that inequalities in housing are man-
ifested in two ways: firstly, through differential access to homeowner-
ship, and secondly, through differences in housing values, a somewhat 
neglected aspect in research hitherto. Before carrying out my empirical 
analysis, I gave a comprehensive overview of previous research on socio-
economic variables affecting the probability of homeownership and 
housing values. I argued that the impact of these socio-economic charac-
teristics does not necessarily need to be the same for the two dimensions 
of housing inequality – home-ownership rates and housing values. In 
my empirical analyses, I compared homeownership rates and housing 
values between 13 European countries. Again, I applied the SHARE 
data.  
My analyses showed that the impact of socio-economic household char-
acteristics on the probability of being a homeowner, on the one hand, 
and on the value of housing, on the other, is not identical. For example, I 
found education and income to have a statistically significant positive 
effect on both dimensions in most countries, whereas the influence of 
family-related characteristics varied: having a partner was found to have 
a statistically significant and positive impact on the probability of being a 
homeowner, while household size was found to have a statistically sig-
nificant and positive effect only on the housing value. Most surprisingly, 
I found migration status to have a negative impact on the probability of 
homeownership, but not on the mean housing value. This contradicts 
the findings from previous studies, mostly conducted in traditional im-
migration countries like the USA and Israel. Altogether, my results sug-
gested that housing inequality is indeed a two-dimensional phenome-
non. 
Finally, I exploratively studied the relationship between these two di-
mensions of housing inequality. My aim was to find out if high home-
ownership rates correlate with high housing values and vice versa (posi-
tive relationship), or if they can only be realized at the cost of low hous-
ing values (negative relationship). I could find theoretical arguments for 
both a positive (due to country-level effects such as the attractiveness of 
the homeownership market compared to the rental market) as well as a 
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negative (due to a process of self-selection) relationship. My analyses 
eventually showed a negative, though statistically not significant, rela-
tionship between homeownership rates and housing values. In conclu-
sion, these analyses offer an innovative approach to an internationally 
comparative, two-dimensional analysis of housing inequalities.  
7.1.4 COUNTRIES WITH MORE GENEROUS PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS 
SHOW HIGHER LEVELS OF WEALTH 
Having analyzed micro-level but also some macro-level determinants of 
wealth and wealth inequality in chapter 4, I went on to focus explicitly on 
the macro level, by examining whether differences in the generosity of 
mandatory public pension systems can explain national differences in, 
firstly, levels of private wealth and, secondly, levels of private wealth 
inequality. Combining data from the OECD, Eurostat, the Credit Suisse 
Research Institute and the World Bank, I generated a comprehensive 
dataset, which allowed me to analyze these relationships across 40 coun-
tries, all 34 OECD and 6 non-OECD countries. Previous research has 
exhibited mixed results on how and to what extent the generosity of 
social security systems affects levels of private wealth. My results clearly 
indicated a negative relationship between public pension generosity and 
levels of private wealth, as suggested by the life-cycle hypothesis. This 
relationship also remained stable when controlling for a number of pos-
sible confounding factors, among them the occurrence and magnitude 
of early retirement, the countries’ GDP per capita, and the level of in-
come inequality.  
From previous research, little was known about macro-level determi-
nants of national differences in the levels of wealth inequality. The few 
international comparative studies on the distribution of wealth conduct-
ed so far, were either designed as in-depth country studies without com-
paring results across countries, or they did not explicitly address the 
issue of wealth inequality. Based on economic theory (Modigliani and 
Brumberg 1954; Keynes 1936) and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 
1943; Maslow 1954), I expected different levels of public pension gener-
osity to differently affect the savings behavior of individuals, depending 
on their place in the income distribution. I hypothesized a positive rela-
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tionship between the generosity of the mandatory public pension 
scheme and the level of private wealth inequality. However, I could not 
find empirical support for my hypothesis.  
In conclusion, while national differences in the generosity of the manda-
tory public pension systems proved to work as good predictors of nation-
al differences in private wealth, they were not able to predict national 
differences in wealth inequality in the set of 40 countries I analyzed. 
7.1.5 HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO                         
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
In the final step, I focused on the consequences of wealth. Specifically, I 
provided new insights into the association between economic standing, 
measured by wealth and income, and subjective well-being (SWB) 
among aging individuals. Most studies on the relationship between eco-
nomic standing and SWB have used income as an indicator of economic 
standing, and reported a significant positive impact of income on SWB. 
Yet income was found to account only for a small part of the variation in 
SWB. Considering the unique properties of wealth, as reported in chap-
ter 2, I argued that wealth represents a more comprehensive measure of 
the effects of economic standing on SWB, beyond the consequences 
income may have on it. I compared the relationship between wealth and 
SWB across three different welfare-state regimes: conservative (Germa-
ny), liberal (Israel), and social-democratic (Sweden). The relevance of the 
welfare-state system to the relationship between wealth and SWB I ex-
plained through the concept of decommodification, referring to the ex-
tent to which citizens in a country are economically independent from 
the market (Esping-Andersen 1990) through the provision of social ben-
efits. These benefits can be understood as a cushion against the conse-
quences of shortage of financial resources.  
Drawing on needs theory, I hypothesized that individuals of poor wealth 
would report lower levels of SWB in all countries. I expected, however, 
the association between poor wealth and SWB to be stronger in the lib-
eral system (Israel) and weaker in the conservative system (Germany) 
with the weakest effect found in the social-democratic system (Sweden), 
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due to differences in the extent of social benefits each welfare-state re-
gime provides its residents. 
For my empirical analyses, I again applied the SHARE data. My results 
indicated that income and wealth explain a significantly greater part of 
the variance in SWB when taken together. I found a “poor penalty” on 
SWB in Germany and Israel, while in Sweden I found wealth to have no 
impact on SWB. Finally, when controlling for subjective economic hard-
ship (needs), the negative effect of poor wealth on SWB disappeared in 
Germany, but maintained significance in Israel, suggesting that needs 
theory alone cannot explain the poor penalty in Israel. In conclusion, my 
findings suggested that the welfare state has an impact on the wealth-
SWB relationship, and that the mechanisms that underlie this relation-
ship operate differently in Germany and Israel. These findings serve as 
additional empirical support for the theoretical argument of wealth be-
ing a distinct dimension of social inequality alongside income.  
7.2 CONTRIBUTION 
The main motivation of my thesis was to make a sociological contribu-
tion to the study of social stratification in terms of wealth. Unfortunate-
ly, sociology has hitherto largely neglected the role of wealth in the pro-
cess of social stratification, while wealth research, in theoretical as well 
as in empirical terms, has largely taken place in the sphere of econom-
ics. In their introductory article on “Who Gets What and Why? Answers 
From Sociology”, Myles & Myers (2007) list three important traditional 
strengths or typical perspectives of sociology: the role of family dynamics 
and family demographics; the role of power; and the role of organiza-
tions and institutions. Adopting one or several of these perspectives, 
sociologists can make an important contribution to the explanation of 
cross-national differences in levels of economic inequality. 
In my thesis, I decided to set a focus on the role of institutions; more 
precisely, on the effects of differences in the form and organization of 
the countries’ system of social welfare. I started my thesis by describing 
levels of wealth and wealth inequality across a sample of 18 countries, 
using and comparing different data sources. I further compared levels of 
wealth inequality to those of income inequality in order to establish em-
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pirically whether wealth has to be treated as a distinct dimension of so-
cial inequality. Doing this, I paved the way for the subsequent chapters 
of my thesis, as well as for future wealth research. From previous re-
search, it was still not clear how wealth is distributed across countries 
and, especially, to what extent this distribution resembles the distribu-
tion of income. 
I built on these findings in the subsequent chapters. All studies were 
carried out as international comparative studies. I concentrated on the 
role of institutions most explicitly in chapter 5, where I analyzed the 
relationship between public pension generosity and the distribution of 
private wealth. In chapter 6, I captured the impact of the welfare state on 
the relationship between wealth and SWB through the concept of de-
commodification. Finally, I also made a theoretical contribution to social 
stratification research by giving a comprehensive definition of wealth by 
differentiating it from the concept of income. Moreover, I developed 
arguments for a treatment of wealth not only as an additional, but also 
as a distinct dimension of social stratification and social inequality.  
Doing this, I did not ignore the achievements of economists. Instead, I 
built on their findings and adopted their theories and arguments where 
they seemed helpful for answering my research questions. I combined 
sociological and economic, but also psychological perspectives and theo-
ries, which I consider to represent a very fruitful approach for a system-
atic and comprehensive study of wealth in terms of social stratification 
and social inequality. 
To sum up, my thesis contributes to social stratification research by 
demonstrating theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for the 
treatment of wealth as a distinct dimension of social inequality. Results 
of my empirical studies clearly show that neglecting wealth in social 
stratification research would paint a one-sided or even inaccurate picture 
of social inequalities. I further contribute to the understanding of wealth 
inequalities by analyzing the composition of wealth, the micro- and mac-
ro-level determinants of wealth and wealth inequality, and the conse-
quences of wealth. I thus understand my thesis as having made a contri-
bution to a broader understanding of social inequality.  
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7.3 SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS 
7.3.1 THE ADEQUACY OF RESCUE PACKAGES 
Levels of private wealth and levels of wealth inequality are frequent top-
ics of discussion in media and politics nowadays. Concerns are ex-
pressed about the high levels of wealth inequality in many countries, as 
well as about national differences in median wealth holdings. As men-
tioned in my introductory chapter, the publication of the first results of 
the “Household Finance and Consumption Survey” (HFCS), for exam-
ple, triggered a wide-ranging discussion on the adequacy of rescue pack-
ages for the financially troubled Mediterranean countries in the Euro-
zone area, in which households possess around three times as much net 
worth as German households.  
My analyses show that a sole focus on levels of wealth tells only part of 
the story, as there are also meaningful national differences in the com-
position of wealth. Households in the Mediterranean countries, for ex-
ample, hold most of their wealth in the form of residential property, 
which is of much less importance in Germany, where households’ 
wealth portfolios are more diversified. Compared to financial assets such 
as shares, bonds, or money in bank accounts, housing wealth is much 
less mobile and less easy to liquidize.  
Moreover, I was able to show that there exists a negative relationship 
between the generosity of public pensions and the levels of private 
wealth. The Southern European countries are, however, an interesting 
special case, as they combine a high generosity of public pensions with 
high levels of private wealth. The reason behind this is the strong insid-
er-outsider labor market in these countries. Although welfare services 
are comparatively generous, they are only provided to those in core sec-
tor employment, while the increasing number of “outsiders” (i.e. those 
who are either unemployed or working in the informal sector, especially 
if they do not have family) are not covered by the social security system. 
Nevertheless, the poor performance of the public pension system in the 
Mediterranean countries combined with a high rate of homeownership 
are likely to be an important explanation for the comparatively high 
levels of wealth in these countries. A recent study of Frick & Grabka 
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(2013) supports this argument. The authors criticize the fact that the 
“standard” concept of net worth as applied in most surveys ignores any 
entitlements to public pension schemes. In their study, based on Ger-
man panel data, Frick & Grabka (2013) calculate an extended measure of 
wealth by combining public pension and private wealth. Doing this, 
median net worth increases by 70%, with public pension entitlements 
making up about 40% of total net worth. In addition, the level of wealth 
inequality (Gini coefficient) is reduced by one quarter, suggesting an 
impact of public pension wealth not only on a country’s level of wealth, 
but also on its level of wealth inequality.  
7.3.2 PRIVATE PROVISION FOR OLD AGE 
Another widely discussed topic related to wealth is the increasing im-
portance of private provision for old age. As a reaction to population 
ageing, welfare states nowadays reduce public pension benefits and try 
to set incentives for private provision for old age, i.e. the accumulation of 
net worth. Responsibility for old-age provision is thus increasingly being 
transferred from the welfare state to the individual actor. Based on my 
analyses in chapter 5, exhibiting a negative relationship between public 
pension generosity and levels of private wealth, it can be expected that 
the decrease in public pension generosity, as either planned or already 
conducted in most of the 40 countries analyzed in this study, will result 
in an increase in overall levels of private wealth. The question remains 
as to whether this increase in savings will be equally distributed across 
the income – but also the wealth – distribution and will thus have or not 
have an impact on the level of wealth inequality. Here, my results, as 
presented in chapter 5, give an initial answer. I found a negative rela-
tionship between income taxes as a percentage of GDP and the level of 
wealth inequality. This finding I interpreted as empirical support for the 
argument that non-saving could be an utility-maximizing decision for 
the lower income quartiles in case of high taxes, driving the overall level 
of wealth inequality. My findings further suggested that this is, however, 
more the result of a low ability to save rather than a low motivation to 
save. I concluded that if a (further) cut in public pension benefits is ac-
companied by a lower level of income taxes (which are used to finance 
public old age provision), the overall level of wealth inequality might in 
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fact decrease. Based on my results, it is thus possible that the increased 
importance of private provision for old age results not only in higher 
individual saving rates, but also in a decrease of levels of wealth inequali-
ty. I understand my results as paving the way for a more comprehensive 
discussion of the ongoing disputes surrounding pension reforms. It is a 
task of future research to find out whether and to what extent the most 
recent public pension reforms have had or will have an effect on the 
overall levels of wealth and wealth inequality.  
7.3.3 PIKETTY: WEALTH INEQUALITY AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
This section discusses my findings in the light of Piketty’s work and 
relates very much to point 2 above. One major point of critique regard-
ing Piketty’s book addressed his ignorance of institutions in determin-
ing the distribution of wealth (Davies 2015; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2014; Krusell and Smith 2014). While Davies (2015: 158) names the 
public pension and health insurance system as well as other state bene-
fits, Krusell and Smith (2014: 2) add educational institutions, skill-biased 
technical change, globalization, and changes in the structure of capital 
markets to cause fundamental changes in wealth inequality. Davies 
(2015) argues that Piketty’s concentration on his inequality relationship 
makes him missing out other possibly much stronger effects on the level 
of wealth inequality. Piketty’s inequality relationship states that that the 
return on capital (r) remains permanently above the rate of growth of 
the economy (g). Acemoglu and Robinson (2014: 1) more generally criti-
cize that “the quest for general laws of capitalism or any economic sys-
tem is misguided because it is a-institutional”. A critique, which also 
applies to Marx.  
My approach, especially in chapter 5 (“Macro-level determinants of 
wealth: Public pension generosity and the distribution of private wealth) 
in which I study the relationship between the generosity of public pen-
sions and the median levels of wealth as well as levels of wealth inequali-
ty, can be understood as an answer to Davies critique. Davies (2015) 
himself suggests that generous state benefits might have reduced the 
need for private saving for a large share of the population, contributing 
to both the decline in wealth inequality in the 1970s and its rise thereaf-
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ter. The recently growing importance of private provision shall increase 
private savings especially in parts of the population who have not saved 
before and might in turn “act as a brake on rising wealth inequality”. He 
further strongly advices to take into consideration the micro foundations 
of wealth inequality. Only then, the true nature of wealth inequality can 
be understood. 
My fifth chapter gives some first empirical support for Davies’ sugges-
tions. Indeed, and as can be expected from the life-cycle theory, my find-
ings show that in countries with less generous public pension systems, 
median private savings are higher. As I just mentioned above, it can 
thus be expected that a (further) decrease in public pension generosity, 
will result in an increase in overall levels of private wealth. Standard 
dynamic economic models with heterogeneous agents who try to 
smooth consumption over the live-cycle suggest that there are differ-
ences in savings behavior in general and particularly across the income 
distribution. This is due to two main reasons: firstly, there are differ-
ences in the discount rates of individuals of future consumption and 
secondly, lower income agents tend to relatively spend more on subsist-
ence goods than agents further up the income distribution do. The lower 
tendency to save of the low-income individuals as compared to high-
income individuals is likely to be the result of two reasons: differences in 
saving motives and differences in the ability to save. Based on the moti-
vations approach or on consumption smoothing, if a country offers gen-
erous public pensions to the overall population, then the tendency to 
save shall be low, especially in the lower income quartiles, which will 
reduce the savings of low-income earners proportionately more than for 
high-income earners. If, as can be observed in advanced capitalist socie-
ties, public pension generosity decreases, the motivation to save shall in 
turn increase, this time especially among those, who had no motivation 
to save before, i.e. the low-income individuals. Like this, a decrease in 
public pension generosity might have a positive effect on the country 
level of wealth inequality, meaning that wealth inequality shall decrease, 
just as suggested by Davies (2015). Although my empirical findings are 
not statistically significant, they do not allow rejecting this hypothesis: 
further research is needed here. 
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Summing up, my results show that institutions have an important im-
pact on the distribution of wealth; ignoring them can lead to misconcep-
tions. I thus like to strongly motivate sociologists to enter wealth ine-
quality research. The traditional strengths of sociology – to account for 
family dynamics and demographics; the role of power; and the role of 
organizations and institutions – in the study of social inequality, predes-
tines sociologists to enter the wealth inequality research field. Sociolo-
gists have a lot to contribute to the topic of wealth inequality and now is 
the time that they should enter the research discourse. Building upon 
the work of Piketty, sociology has the potential to give more insights into 
the nature of wealth inequality and to add explanatory power to the anal-
ysis of differences in wealth inequality between as well as within coun-
tries. I very much hope that my thesis serves to boost sociologists’ inter-
est to engage in wealth inequality research. 
7.3.4 THE DEFINITION OF POVERTY 
Poverty, as measured by most social surveys, is based on a monetary 
approach. In the USA, the poverty line is based on a defined basket of 
goods. The U.S. Census Bureau understands individuals living in 
households with an income, which does not allow them to buy such a 
basket of goods, as being poor (cf. Institure for Research on Poverty, 
n.d.). The European Union applies a relative poverty threshold, defining 
poverty in relation to the distribution of income within each country. 
Eurostat understands individuals, living in households with an equival-
ized income that is below 60% of the national equivalised median in-
come, as being poor (cf. Trinczek, 2007). As can be seen, both defini-
tions of poverty are based on income – and consumption in the case of 
the USA – while not considering wealth.  
The results of my thesis, however, give several indications that this is too 
shortsighted. A first indicator for this argument is the finding that the 
levels of income and wealth inequality differ in about half of the 18 
countries I analyzed in chapter 2, suggesting that income and wealth are 
two distinct dimensions of social inequality. A second indicator is the 
finding that European households possess substantial amounts of net 
worth. Even the lowest income quartiles hold net worth equal to five 
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times their (last) annual income. However, this applies only to older 
households. The finding that wealth has a positive impact on individual 
SWB beyond the effect of income can be seen as another indication that 
income alone can only partly capture an individual’s economic standing. 
In line with that are the findings of a study carried out by the Cologne 
Institute for Economic Research (Niehues and Schröder 2012). In this 
study, the Cologne Institute for Economic Research combined two 
measures of poverty: the “traditional” measure as applied in Europe (see 
above) and a more comprehensive measure, combining income and net 
worth. According to the traditional measure, in 2013 13-15% of the 
German population aged above 25 years are considered poor. Applying 
the broader measure, these numbers fall to 3-5%, which is a huge de-
crease. The results further showed that approximately 20% of those la-
beled as poor according to the traditional measure of poverty possess 
amounts of net worth that they could live upon for at least 10 years.  
A new definition of poverty, based on both income and wealth thus 
seems appropriate. This becomes even more important in the light of 
the expected “inheritance wave”. The last 70 years have been a period of 
peace and economic prosperity in most industrialized countries of the 
Western world. During this time, households have been able to accumu-
late substantial amounts of wealth. The cohort living and working dur-
ing this period is now in its 50s-70s and is expected to bequeath a histor-
ically unprecedented amount of wealth to their children (the baby boom-
er generation, born between 1946 and 1964) and grandchildren. For 
Germany, researchers expect a trillion Euros more to be inherited be-
tween 2010 and 2020 as compared to the decade before, which repre-
sents an increase of 50% (Die Welt 2011). Similar amounts of wealth are 
expected, for example, for the baby boomers in Canada (Yew 2012). 
7.4 LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Having found considerable empirical support for the theoretical argu-
ment that wealth is a distinct dimension of social inequality, new ques-
tions rose throughout the conduction of this thesis. Moreover, I was 
faced with a number of limitations to my research that led to certain 
restrictions for the resolution of my research questions. In this final 
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paragraph, I discuss some of these limitations, as well as the potential 
for future research. 
The limitations I was faced with resulted mainly from the unavailability 
of appropriate empirical data. Most importantly, my results are subject 
to historical specificity. This historical specificity calls for longer time 
series data. Related to this problem, in my studies, I was, for the most 
part, able to propose and develop insightful correlations and associa-
tions, but I could not draw causal inferences neither on the determi-
nants nor on the consequences of wealth. Also related to the current 
unavailability of longitudinal data is the omission of an analysis of the 
sources of wealth. To study those, one would need multigenerational 
longitudinal data containing detailed information about personal income 
and wealth, so as to perform linked-generations analyses. As to the pro-
cess of wealth accumulation, it would be interesting to establish whether 
different occupational careers – understood as opportunities to accumu-
late wealth via saved earnings and via access to public and private pen-
sion systems – can account for differences in levels of wealth in later life. 
Studying the sources of wealth and the process of wealth accumulation 
will be two tasks for future research. Nevertheless, although with the 
availability of multigenerational longitudinal data, developing causal 
analyses will continue to represent a serious challenge, as researchers 
working with observation data are always faced with the problem of 
causation and selection.   
Coming back to the sociological contribution to the analysis of wealth, 
there remain two perspectives, which I did not adopt in my thesis: the 
role of family dynamics and family demographics, and the role of power. 
Both perspectives would certainly lead to further interesting insights 
into the topic of wealth. A relevant research topic with regard to family 
demographics and dynamics would be to analyze the impact of the in-
creasing educational homogamy in partnerships and the increase in 
dual-earner families on the accumulation and distribution of wealth. As 
married persons are more likely to have higher incomes and greater 
savings (Elmelech, 2008: 43), this effect should be reinforced by the 
changing demography of families. Another change in family demogra-
phy is also likely to have an impact on the distribution of wealth: the 
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decreasing number of children per woman. Nowadays, most families 
have only one child. If most wealth is inherited from two parents by 
their one child, this is likely to have an impact on the distribution of 
wealth. In addition, there is an increasing number of persons who never 
start a family. The question remains as to who inherits their accumulat-
ed wealth. Another interesting topic would be to focus on the impact of 
wealth on intergenerational mobility. Controlling for parental income, 
do children from wealthier families perform better in life (educational 
attainment, occupational status, income, etc.) when compared to chil-
dren from less wealthier families? This could even open up fresh per-
spectives for the research of educational mobility, as including wealth 
could potentially answer some of the open questions within this field of 
research.  
Wealth and power are strongly related to each other. One function of 
wealth is the power function, defined as the ability to assert one’s will 
even over that of others (Weber 1984). Possessing high amounts of 
wealth goes along with a potential for high power in other societal 
spheres, like politics. However, this also works in the opposite direction; 
those with more power (e.g. presidents, governors, high-ranking military 
officers) can use this power to accumulate private wealth. Concentrating 
on the power function of wealth means concentrating on the high net-
worth individuals, for example the top 5% or even 1% of a country’s 
wealth distribution. It would be very interesting to study the ways in 
which these individuals accumulated their wealth, and which executive 
power they have achieved, for example, through donations to political 
parties, payments to lobbyists, or grants to experts who are employed to 
think up new policies beneficial to the wealthy (Domhoff 2013). The 
American sociologist G. William Domhoff (2010) has already done a 
great deal of research on this topic in the USA, claiming that the USA is 
a “power pyramid”. Some research on the “High Net Worth Individuals 
(HNWI)” and the “Ultra-High Net Worth Individuals (U-HNWI)” in 
Germany has been done by Lauterbach (e.g. Lauterbach and Kramer 
2009). However, more recent data – especially longitudinal data – could 
add valuable insights to their findings. Moreover, it would be interesting 
to study the wealth-power relationship in other national contexts. 
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Although not available today, there is a large number of projects collect-
ing data on private wealth holdings in particular, in an increasing num-
ber of countries and over longer periods. In some years, it will thus be 
possible to address the aforementioned limitations of my thesis, to repli-
cate my results, and to answer some of the new research questions my 
thesis and other wealth studies have raised. I am very much looking 
forward to the day when such data will be available. I think that my the-
sis can then serve as a fruitful starting point for even more comprehen-
sive research on social inequality, and I hope that my work will inspire 
many sociologists to engage in wealth research in the future. 
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Appendix D: List of variables included in the analysis and their definition 
Variable Definition 
General life 
satisfaction  
General life satisfaction was measured on a 10-values single item scale 
reflecting one’s general satisfaction with life, ranging from 0 (not satisfied) 
to 10 (completely satisfied). 
Sex Respondents’ gender; 1 for male, 0 for female. 
Hh size Total number of persons living in the respondent’s household. 
Age Respondents’ age in years. 
Migrant Respondents’ migration status; 1 for migrant, 0 for native. 
Arab Respondent is of Arab origin (only for IL); 1 for yes, 0 for no.  
Partnered 
Respondent’s partnership status; 1 for living in a steady partnership, 0 for 
any other partnership status (single, widowed, divorced, etc.). 
Child Respondent having at least one child; 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
Education 
 
Respondents’ education, ISCED-97 coding. The exact coding can be 
looked up under http://www.unesco.org/education/information/ 
nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm’.  
Employed Respondent is employed; 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
Unemployed  Respondent is unemployed; 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
Homemaker  Respondent is homemaker; 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
Retired Respondent is retired; 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
Objective 
Health 
 
 
 
 
Objective health is measured via the ‘Physical Health Index’ used by 
Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein & Maskileyson (2013). It includes the number 
of limitations with activities of daily living, number of mobility, arm 
function and fine motor limitations, number of chronic diseases and 
number of illness symptoms, summing up to an index of 41 items. This 
was transformed into percent of items that were selected by the respond-
ent and converted, so that the score would range from 0 for bad health to 
100 for good health. 
Income  
 
 
 
Net equivalent income (in Euros, ppp-adjusted) is measured as yearly total 
household net income divided by the root of the number of persons living 
in this household. The natural logarithm is used in equations. I tested for 
different functional forms of income in my models and found that the 
logarithmic term best represents the relationship between income and 
GLS. The exact components of income can be looked up in footnote 50. 
Gross wealth 
 
Household gross wealth (in Euros, ppp-adjusted) contains the household’s 
total amount of real and financial assets. The exact components of real and 
financial assets can be looked up in footnote 52.  
Debts  
 
Household debts (in Euros, ppp-adjusted) contain the household’s total 
amount of financial liabilities and mortgages. The natural logarithm is 
used in equations. I tested for different functional forms of debt in my 
models and found that the logarithmic term best represents the relation-
ship between debt and GLS. 
Subjective 
needs 
Subjective needs or the ‘accepted standard of living’ is captured by a sub-
jective evaluation of the household’s ability ‘to make ends meet’. This item 
ranges between 1 ‘with great difficulty’ to 4 ‘easily’. I combined the 1, and 
2, responses to create a dummy variable that is coded 1 for hhds that feel 
to have problems to make ends meet and 0 for households that do not. 
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The main research objective of my thesis is to contribute to a 
broader understanding of social inequality by going beyond in-
equalities solely derived from the labor market and find theore-
tical arguments as well as empirical evidence for the establish-
ment of wealth as a distinct dimension of social stratification 
and, more importantly, of social inequality. With social stratifi-
cation, I am referring to a society’s ranking of categories of in-
dividuals into a hierarchy of social positions. Social stratification 
becomes social inequality if access to these positions is unequal 
and if these positions are systematically related to advantage-
ous or disadvantageous conditions of acting and living. In the 
course of my thesis, I will show that both these conditions apply 
to wealth: first, access is unequal and second, being of higher 
(lower) wealth is related to advantageous (disadvantageous) con-
ditions of living. My thesis consists of five empirical studies that 
are knotted together by the common conception of wealth as a 
distinct dimension of social inequality. In order to find empirical 
support for this argument, in each study, I will approach the topic 
of wealth, or wealth inequality, from different perspectives. All 
studies represent theory-driven empirical analysis and are desi-
gned as international comparative studies.
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